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INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER I 
Social Science and Police Studies 
Social scientists examining the police role have typically 
assumed that the individual police officer or department is 
relatively free to implement social policy as he/she or it sees 
fit. This assumption is reflected in many police studies which 
stress the importance of police chiefs, police discretion, and 
police personalities as being the decisive factors in police 
behavior. Nonetheless, it is rather incredible that social 
scientists have believed that a highly stratified society would 
permit people drawn from the working class such as the police to 
formulate and to control major social poliCy.l 
A more tenable approach to studying the police would be to 
examine police behavior in terms of the place of the police in 
class conflict. This approach would focus mainly on how conditions 
outside of police organizations have shaped police response. 
Sidney Harring has emphasized the importance of conflict in histor-
ical studies of the police: 
An historical analysis of the police institution must 
begin with a specific understanding of power relations, 
economic interests, and class conflict within particular 
communities. • . . The structure of the police institution, 
the ways in which it is controlled, and the policies that 
it adopts change over time as the interests of those in 
positions of power change. 2 
To date there have been few attempts to systematically collect 
and analyze data on the police role in any kind 0f class conflict. 
A potentially rich area of study involves the police response to the 
pitched battles fought between labor radicals and the dominant 
political and economic interests. Two key empirical 'issues in this 
area are: 1) What do the police do in times of worker rebellion and 
revolution? and 2) Why do they act the way that they do? 
These type of queries have rarely been subjected to critical 
examination. Such a task was undertaken in this dissertation. More 
specifically, this dissertation was an exploratory study of the 
response of the urban police to labor radicalism. The purposes of 
the inquiry were to develop a conceptual framework that allowed for 
a more precise examination of police response than is currently 
feasible and to apply the framework in a comparative analysis of the 
responses of the city police in Portland, Oregon and Seattle, 
Washington to radical labor unrest during the period of 1912-1920. 
An exploratory approach was necessary because the theoretical 
work pertaining to police response is not sufficiently developed yet 
to generate rigorous hypotheses for testing. Additionally, the 
literature on this subject is limited and widely spread about in 
articles and books in the fields of labor history, policy history, 
urban history, criminology and criminal justice; these studies have 
yet to be combined into a single conceptual scheme. Hence, it was 
imperative to first systematize the knowledge of the area and to 
formulate "working" pY'opositions; this made it possible to then 
conduct a more definitive investigation of the cases of the Portland 
and Seattle police. 
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The product of this approach is a dissertation in three main 
parts. In part one, a theoretical frarrework is explicated for the 
analysis of the police response to labor radicalism. The second 
part consists of an empirical study of the response of the Seattle 
and Portland police to the protest and unrest of labor radicals in 
1912-1920. Finally, in the concluding section, the theoretical 
concepts and propositions in the first part of the dissertation are 
checked in terms of their applicability to the empirical data in 
the second part. 
construction of a Theoretical Framework 
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By combining ~·1arxian theory with some empirical evidence from 
the scattered information on the police and labor, a framework was 
constructed for the analysis of the police response to labor radi-
·calism. The framework was labeled IIneo-Marxian ll since it drew 
heavily from the conceptual work of Roberta Ash Garner, Charles Tilly, 
Harvey r,10lotch, and others who have revised and expanded on ~1arx's 
writings in the area of political economy and social control. The 
~·1arxian theory of class conflict, in particular, was relied upon 
heavily in the development of the framework. The version of the 
r·1arxian theory of class conflict used in this dissertation stresses 
that conflict between social classes is rooted in contradictions 
in the capitalist mode of production. The chief contradiction of 
capi ta 1 i srn 'j s th~ contradi cti on between IIsoci ali zed product; on II 
(i .e., production by a collectivity of \'1orkers as opposed to 
production by individuals) and IIcapitalist appropriation ll (i .e., the 
owner of the means of production appropriates to himself/herself the 
product and most of the profits derived from it, even though the 
product was produced through the labor of other persons}. This 
contradiction is manifested in the conflict between the working and 
the capitalist classes.* 
In addition, some ideas in the framework \'/ere borrowed from 
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the resource mobilization perspective of tl1ayer Zald, John t1cCarthy, 
and Anthony Oberschall and from the police studies of James Q. t~ilson, 
Jerome Skolnick, Samuel Walker, and Donald Black. The resource 
mobilization perspective is an approach to the study of social move-
ments which emphasizes the social process by which a discontented 
group or organization assembles and utilizes resources in the pursuit 
of collective goals. As for the empirical research on the police 
that was utilized in the construction of the framework, it pertained 
to police professionalism, police-community relations, and the 
mobilization of the law. 
The focus of the framework developed in this study was on 
improving the capacity to foretell the police response to labor 
radicalism and on enhancing the understanding of processual relation-
ships between the main conceptual units. Given the exploratory 
nature of this study, high precision in prediction and powerful 
explanation were neither sought nor achieved. Rather. the conceptual 
part of the dissertation explicated a theoretical base upon which 
others can build. 
*For a more detailed conceptualization of this version of 
Marxist theory, see Charles H. Anderson, The Political Econo~ of 
Social Class, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 974), 
pp. 46-75. 
As a whole, the framework was organized in the following way. 
First, the main units of analysis, namely police response and labor 
radicalism, were defined. A conceptualization of four pivotal areas 
of inquiry--1inkages between class power, state power, and police 
response; patterns of labor discontent and police response; community 
influence on police response; and the factor of the police in police 
response was then developed. Finally, 22 1~lOrking" proposition were 
stated. 
Application of the Framework 
The cases of the Seattle and Portland police and their response 
to the activities of labor radicals in 1912-1920 were examined in the 
second part of this research. In light of the fact that the police 
response to radical labor movements is a relatively unexplored area, 
the in tens i ve study of these two cases seems to be a useful \'/ay to 
check the propositions in the framework and to stimulate the creation 
of new propositions. 
The discussion of police actions vis a vis labor radicals in 
Seatt1 e and Port1 and begins \'/i th a broad overvi ew of the organi zati on 
and functioning of the police in both cities along with a brief 
description of the Wobb1ies* and the other labor radicals with whom 
the police dealt on a regular basis from 1912-1920. This chapter is 
followed by six chapters which focus on different time periods and 
explore various facets of the relationship between the police and 
labor radicals in Seattle and Portland. 
*Wobb1y is a nickname for a member of the Industrial Workers 
of the World labor organization. 
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It should be stressed at the outset that the type of study 
conducted in the second part of the dissertation mainly leads to 
insights; it does not "test" hypotheses. Among other things, the 
cases of Portland and Seattle may not be entirely representative of 
the police response to labor radicalism. Other police encounters 
with labor radicals in other cities, and in other time periods may 
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not have been so intense, colorful, and violent as the clashes between 
the police and the Wobblies in Seattle and Portland. Then, too, data 
from only two cases provide an inadequate basis for drawing conclusive 
generalizations about any kind of social phenomena. Hence, the reader 
should keep in mind the proviso that more carefully controlled studies 
will be needed to determine whether the findings that emerged have a 
more general applicability than for Portland and Seattle and for only 
the period of 1912-1920. 
Summary 
In this brief introduction it has been contended that a per-
spective emphasizing class analysis is necessary in order to adequately 
study the police. Also, it has been suggested that the foundation for 
this perspective should be Marxian social theory and that many of the 
building blocks can be drawn together from a number of areas of study. 
In short, the position taken in this dissertation is that a synthetic, 
multidisciplinary approach is most useful for i~quiries into the , 
police response to labor radicalism. 
This chapter also included a delineation of the basic features 
of a comparative study of police response \vhich constitutes the 
second part of the dissertation. An unstated, yet implicit point in 
• 
the conduct of this inquiry into the actions of the Seattle and 
Portland police is that social scientists must perform more empirical 
analyses of the police as well as other functionaries of the criminal 
justice system if they are to make more substantial contributions to 
the understanding of societal reactions to protest, crime, and other 
forms of soci a'l disorder than they have made in the past. 
In general, the thrust of this introductory chapter is that 
there is little solid information on how the police respond to 
challenges to the social order by labor radicals. Furthermore, much 
of what \'Ie think we know about the police comes from studies that 
underestimate the importance of political, economic, and social 
factors in influencing police behavior. The way to resolve these 
problems is not for all social scientists to convert to Marxism. 
Rather, the best approach seems to be for social scientists to begin 
to critically grapple with the subject matter in some of these 
inchoate areas, such as the police response to labor radicalism, 
whi ch seem to fall between or at the -i ntersecti ons of academi c 
disciplines and intellectual fields. 
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THEORET! CAL FRM~EWORK 
CHAPTER I I 
A NEO-r~ARXIAN FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSE 
OF URBAN POLICE TO LABOR RADICALISM 
Definition of Terms 
Those who have investigated police encounters with labor 
organizations largely have ignored the problems associated with 
defining key terms. These scholars have been more given to 
narrating and recording police involvement in labor conflicts than 
to dissecting the conceptual units used in their analyses. Yet, 
some attention must be paid to definitional matters in the study of 
police-labor interaction. "Police response" and "labor radicalism" 
are two terms that must be defined before one can even commence a 
serious exploration of the police and labor. 
Let us begin with police response. This term embraces both 
the mobilization of resources by the police and the collective and 
individual actions of the police. The distinction between mobiliza-
tion and collective action should be underscored. Police mobiliza-
tion involves the p~ocess of acquiring and marshalling resources 
needed for action. An example of the mobilization of resources 
would be the police petitioning the city council to authorize the 
hiring of more police officers for the purpose of maintaining order 
at demonstrations. 
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The mobilization of the police can be broken down into these 
components~ a) accumulating resources (e.g., labor power, weapons, 
goods, etc.) and b) increasing claims on resources. These components 
apply to the mobilization of any group.l Accumulating resources 
consists of aggregating manpower, money, and other resources in a 
police department. The second component includes reducing competing 
claims on resources, altering the organization's program of action, 
and making police workers more satisfied with their job in order to 
build comnlitment to the police occupation. 
Besides mobilizing resources, the police may use resources 
and act together in the pursuit of a set of interests. Collective 
action by the police can be analyzed on three levels: policy, strategy, 
and tactics. Like other authorities, the police take at least three 
policy stances vis a vis labor and other contenders for power. These 
are: a) facilitation; b) toleration; and c) repression. 2 A policy of 
facilitation lowers the contenders' costs for mobilization and 
collective action and makes it easier for the contenders to achieve 
their goals. An example of a facilitative policy would be the dis-
arming of strikebreakers by the police. When a policy of toleration 
is in operation, the police are neutral and impartial in their actions. 
Allowing strikers to picket while at the same time protecting strike-
breakers exemplifies a tolerant police policy. 
Repression merits special consideration since it is a term 
that frequently has been used to describe police behavior in situa-
tions of conflict between the forces of capital and labor. With a 
repressive policy, the police check, subdue, or put down labor unrest 
through the use of force or other types of pressure. If the police 
are bent on repressing radical labor or other contenders for power, 
they have the option of working on an organization's mobilization 
processes or on its collective action. 3 ~1easures such as suspending 
newspapers and forbidding assemblies exemplify the anti-mobilization 
approach. Enforcing oourt orders which outlaw particular organiza-
tions and arresting participants in demonstrations are ways of 
raising the costs of collective action. 
With regard to police strategy, police organizations possess 
certain general ways of coping with the crime problem. Policing 
strategies refer to an orientation toward allocating resources to 
afford the maximum support to police policy. Peter f1anning and 
John Van r~aanen among many others have i denti fi ed II reacti ve, II 
IIproactive,1I and IIpreventive ll strategies as being basic forms of 
police work. 4 Reactive strategies are the most commonly employed 
by the police. S In these, the police respond to a citizen complaint 
after the crime or the trouble has already occurred. Conversely, 
police action happens prior to or simultaneously with crime 
commission in proactive strategies. Proactive police strategies 
are initiated by the police themselves. The utilization of decoys 
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and drug raids are two examples of proactive police \'Iork. Preventive 
strategies are siMilar to proactive ones in terms of the timing of 
police action. Yet they differ from proactive strategies in that 
preventive strategies are geared toward anticipated acts of law-
breaking. The hardening of the potential targets of criminals through 
the use of locks, alarms, and other hardware is a prime example of a 
preventive strategy. 
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How do policing strategies relate to labor unrest? Basically, 
law enforcement personnel use the same strategies to police conflict 
between capital and labor except that in dealing with labor they may 
prohibit or prevent citizens from behaving in legal ways, whereas in 
fighting crime they control and/or prevent cit~zens from behaving in 
illegal ways. The work of reserve and auxiliary police reflects a 
reactive strategy for handling labor disturbances. These police wait 
until a labor disturbance breaks out before taking action. Regular 
or full-time police can also be reactive in responding to calls for 
assistance from either labor or management. Proactive strategies 
are exemplified by police raids on labor union halls and po1ice-
initiated riots that disrupt or end meetings of workers. Intelligence 
gathering operations that are geared to allow the police the 
opportunity to forestall, defuse, or delimit the actions of labor 
and/or management and special police activities that are aimed at 
controlling working class youth are representative of preventive 
strategies. 
Tactics are another aspect of police response. A poi ice tactic 
is a specific method for accomplishing an intended effect. Some 
examples of tactics that have been used in situations involving labor 
are as follows: 
1. Isolate and ignore protesting workers. 
2. Divide off areas that might be used by workers to 
meet, to protest, etc. 
3. Deny workers access to an area. 
4. Disperse workers at a rally or other gathering. 
5. Arrest leaders at a gathering of workers. 
6. Search premises without warrants and arrest workers 
on suspicion. 
7. Assault and/or shoot participants in meetings, riots, 
demonstrations, etc.* 
Turning to IIlabor radica1ism,1I it also must be addressed in 
specific terms. Historically, radicalism has been the exception 
rather than the rule over the course of labor relations in the 
United States. Reformism ;!;.':; been the nonna1 course of labor 
affairs as union representatives have adjusted to the prerogatives 
of capitalist management and have been interested mainly in piece-
meal, pragmatic gains rather than in drastic social change. 
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In spite of the reformist character of the labor movement, there 
have been roughly three phases of labor radicalism in the United 
States. 6 The first phase extended from around 1870 until the early 
years of the twentieth century. A hodgepodge of industrial armies, 
\'Iorking class political parties, industrial quasi-unions, and 
anarchist groups formed the backbone of this first current of labor 
radicalism. The marches for jobs and food as well as the other 
agitational activities of these pro-labor collectivities often were 
crushed by the combined power of the militia, federal troops, private 
vigilantes, and city police. 
The second phase of labor radicalism started around 1909 and 
continued through World War I. Labor radicals, who were active in 
this phase, sought to replace the capitalist system with a cooperative 
*t1any of these examples have been borrowed from Raymond ~·1. 
Momboisse's Riots, Revolts, and Insurrections (Springfield, Mass.: 
Charles C. Thomas Publisfier, 1967) and modified to fit the situations 
in which the police and labor radicals have encountered one another. 
or socialist system. The Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) 
stands out as the archetype of working class radicalism in this 
perioci. The I.H.W. held that any step taken by the workers at the 
point of production that improved wages, reduced hours, or otherwise 
brought about a transfer of power from the dominant class to the 
working class should be a vital part of labor's arsenal. Direct 
action took a variety of forms, including free-speech fights* and 
general strikes.** The ferment of radical activities in this period 
was snuffed out, in part, by the actions of federal, state, and 
local police forces. 
The third phase of labor radicalism followed on the heels of 
the Depression when workers in the mass production industries formed 
industrial unions. Their efforts in various cities coalesced in the 
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organizing drive of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.). 
Formed in 1935, the C.I.O. involved approximately half a million 
workers in "sit down strikes'.'*** and organized about four million 
\'/orkers into unions in the years 1936-1937. By the end of World t1ar II, 
*Free speech fights consisted of Wobblies standing on top of 
soap boxes or on street corners, haranguing working class crowds 
about the inequities of capitalism. Police attempts to stop Wobbly 
speakers often were foiled because as soon as one speaker was taken 
into custody another would take his or her place in spouting ideas 
on the injustice of a private property system. 
**The I.W.W. 's notion about a general strike was that when a 
sufficient number of workers had been organized, it would be possible 
to seize an entire industry by striking. 
***In a sit down strike the workers stop work but stay in the 
workplace instead of picketing outside of the plant or mill. 
however, the militancy of the C.I.D. had faded. The police appear 
to have been connected with the demise of C.I.D. radicalism just as 
they were with the termination of other forms of labor radicalism 
in earlier phases.* 
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Generalizing from these three phases of radicalism in the 
labor movement, labor radicalism may be defined as a nonconventional, 
militant approach to economic and industrial problems characterized 
by extreme dissatisfaction with the status quo. This definition is 
state~ in general terms in order to encompass the actions of labor 
radicals in all three phases. It must be recognized that this 
definition stresses the approach or the method used by labor radicals 
to achieve their goals. This emphasis upon "means" in defining 
radicalism is in contrast to the usual emphasis that has been placed 
upon "ends." Typically, social scientists have defined radicalism 
as a desire to make extreme or fundamental changes in the social 
structure of society. 
With regard to the phenomenon of labor radicalism, the traditional 
attention paid to ends does not seem to be entirely appropriate 
because the repertoires of action of early pro-labor collectivities, 
the I.W.W., and the C.I.O. appear to be the most useful characteristic 
in distinguishing labor radicalism from labor reformism. In point 
of fact, it seems that the most significant difference between labor 
radicals and labor reformers has been that the marches, general 
*The deradicalization of the C.I.D. also was partially due 
to the C.I.D.'s own organizational goals and its relationship to 
big business and government. For a more complete discussion of 
this point, see C. Wright Mills, The New Men of Power (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1948). 
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strikes, and sit-down strikes of the radicals have taken place out-
side of the acceptable limits of protest, whereas most of the 
practices and actions of the A.F.L. and other reformist organizations 
have occurred within institutionally legitimate channels. This 
emphasis on means rather than ends is not meant to discount the 
anarchist, syndicalist, socialist, and communist ideas have been part 
of the thinking of labor radicals; instead, this emphasis is 
necessary in order to capture the actual importance of action in 
the history of labor radicalism. 
Linkages Between Class Power, State Power, and Police Response 
In analyzing the police response to labor radicalism it is 
imperative'to include a theoretical conceptualization of the police 
function. In general, the police function in the United States has 
been described in police studies as consisting of the components of 
"order mai ntenance" and "l aw enforcement. II The former term refers 
to peace-keeping activities, while the latter relates to crime-
fighting activities. James Q. Wilson was the first social scientist 
to identify these two functions as being central to the police role. 7 
Numerous other classification schemes have been devised to capture 
the essence of the police function since the publication of his 
Varieties of Police Behavior, but most of these differ only slightly 
from Wilson's original work. 
In terms of the sources of influence on the police, a sub-
stantial portion of the police literature has been devoted to examining 
phenomena such as discretion, subcultural values, attitudes, adminis-
trative ethos, and styles of police work which pertain to law 
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enforcement personnel and organizations.* In addition, the idea that 
the police are subjected to pressures from a host of special interests 
has been a standard feature of most of the theoretical work on the 
police •. The influence of political parties and racketeer organiza-
tions has often been stressed in this regard, while the power of 
legitimate economic interests over the police has been given short 
shrift by conventional or non-r·1arxist scholars. Still another cOll111on 
feature of police studies is the recognition that the police operate 
in a governmental framework whose purposes are diffuse and often 
contradictory. This is held to be the case because a variety of 
public institutions operating at different levels of government and 
possessing conflicting goals have some influence on the police role. 
A Marxian position on the police function is similar to the 
traditional perspective in some ways, yet markedly different from 
it in other respects. Marxists, while conceding that there is a large 
amount of routine peace-keeping involved in policing, maintain that 
the requisite of defending the class system is at the heart of the 
police function. Stated another way, a Marxian conceptualization 
of the police posits that the class system is at the core of 
capitalist society protected, in part, by the armor of the state 
through the capacity of the police to use force. 8 
What is most unique about a Marxist analysis of the police is 
that class relations are singled out as being the preeminent force 
involved in the structuring of the police function. From a Marxist 
*A useful summary of some of the most important studies on these 
topics can be found in Don C. Gibbons' Society, Crime, and Criminal 
Careers, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 
pp. 49-78. 
perspective, social classes are largely determined by the productive 
relations into which human beings are either born or enter with 
little freedom of choice. 9 Crucial, insofar as the police function 
is conce~ned, are the relations among social classes and the 
relations between specific classes, the government, and the police. 
The pivotal ideas of t1arxian social theory can be developed 
more concretely by examining some of the ways of looking at the 
relationship between the capitalist class, city government. and 
police response to labor unrest. To begin with, it appears that 
police intervention has been to the detriment of labor and to the 
benefit of the capitalist class. A review by Philip Taft and 
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Philip Ross of American labor-management disputes makes it clear that 
the police, troops, and plant guards have done the bulk of the 
killing and wounding. In a sketch of the usual circumstances in 
which persons died in labor violence during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Taft and Ross summarized their findings in 
these words: 
Facing inflexible opposition, union leaders and their 
members frequently found that nnthing, neither peaceful 
persuasion nor the heads of gO/ernment, could move the 
employer towards recognition. Frustration and desper-
ation impelled pickets to react to strikebreakers with 
anger. ~·1any violent outbreaks followed efforts of 
strikers to restrain the entry of strikebreakers and 
raw materials into the struck plant. Such conduct, 
obviously illegal, opened the opportunity for forceful 
police measures. In the long run, the e~ployer's 
side was better equipped for success. The use of 
~orce by pickets was illegal on its face, but the 
action of the police and company guards were in 
vindication of the employer's rights. 10 
Why have the police so often sided with the capitalist class? 
A number of studies have addressed this question. In some cases, the 
question is at least implicitly raised, but no evidence is presented 
to resolve it. ~elvyn Dubofsky's treatment of the response of the 
Paterson, New Jersey police to the I.W.W.,ll indicated that the 
police arrested three I.l~.W. leaders and closed every hall in town 
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to the strikers only one day after the start of the city's silk mill 
strike. The next, day the police arrested Frederick Sumner Boyd, a 
socialist, for having read the IIfree speech clausell of the New Jersey 
state constitution at a strike meeting. When Police Chief Bimson 
asked Boyd \tJhat law he had been reading, Boyd informed him: 1I~~hy 
chief, that was the Constitution of Ne\'~ Jersey.1I12 r10reover, 
during the same strike, Big Bill Haywood, the fabled I.l~.rJ. leader, 
was denied the right to speak in Paterson by the police. Haywood 
and approximately 1,000 men and women marched to Haledon, a small 
township outside of Paterson, in order to hold a meeting. A few feet 
short of the Haledon line, the marchers were met by the Paterson 
police who improperly arrested Haywood and another I.H.H. member for 
disturbing the peace, acting disorderly, and holding an unlawful 
assembly. 
Dubofsky depicted the police as acting in accordance \'Iith the 
interests of the employing class. Still, the reader is left up in 
the air over the burning question of, IIwhat forces influenced the 
police to behave the way that they did?1I Did the police receive 
their marching orders from a mayor who was beholden to the 
capitalist class? ~~ere some of the police under the employ of the 
mill owners? Dubofsky never tells us. 
Explanation by accusation is another way of dealing with the 
relationship between the capitalist class and the police. Wyndham 
~·1ortimer's description of the "Battle of Bulls Run" in 1937 between 
the officers in the Flint, ~1ichigan police department and the 
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members of the United Auto \~orkers Union exemplifies this approach. 13 
According to t40rtimer, the Fl int pol ice preci pitated the fi rst 
violence during a sit-down strike when they stopped a truck carrying 
food to the strikers inside Fisher Plant Number Two. Next, the 
police attempted to force their way into the plant, thus starting 
the "Ba.ttle of Bulls Run." The strikers inside the plant responded 
by drenching the police with high-pressure fire hoses and by pelting 
them with bottles, automobile door hinges, and other objects. After 
several charges by the police and six hours of water-fighting by the 
strikers and some gun-play by the police, the Flint police \'/ithdrew 
from the scene. 
The reason for the police behavior in the "Battle of Bulls 
Run," in ~~ortimer's view, was the the police and the entire city 
government were "subservient" to the General ~10tors Corporation. 14 
Rather than supporting his explanation by limning the facets of the 
rel ati onshi p between the pol i ce and General Motors, ~'ortimer 
allowed his accusation to stand unsupported. 
A third approach to studying the influence of the capitalist 
class on the police might be termed the "personnel-overlap view." 
Proponents of this view hold that the linkages between the economic-
ally dominant class and the state lie in particular position-
holders. 15 Sidney Harring and Lorraine ~4cr4ullin utilized this 
approach in their investigation of the Buffalo, New York police. 16 
They argued that the business-related occupational backgrounds of 
the mayors and police commissioners in Buffalo accounted for the 
police repression of labor unrest. 
By itself this approach provides only a partial resolution to 
the issue under consideration. Once the investigator ascertains 
that the position-holders are members of the dominant class, he/she 
still must exa~ine their behavior in regard to issues and conflicts 
in order to determi ne whether or not pm<ler was actually exerci sed 
in accordance with mateY'ial interests. Then too, the researcher 
must also find out how often the position-holders have been success-
ful in overcoming opposition from other groups.17 
Despite the limitations of the personnel-overlap approach, it 
is very useful in ferreting out the ~aterial interests of those who 
are responsible for the formulation of police policy. Hence, the 
following proposition seems suitable for exploration: 
I. Police policy-makers, who have business occu-
pational backgrounds, are predisposed to 
favor a policy of repression of labor 
radicalism. 
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A fourth way to look at the relationship between the capitalist 
class and the police is to search for ideological convergence between 
the two. This approach assumes t~at if the police and the dominant 
class share the same attitudes, then police actions will benefit the 
capitalist class. A prime example of this approach can be found in 
Herbert Gutman's inspection of the causes of the Tompkins Square 
Riot in New York City in 1874. 18 The New York police, under the 
direction of conservative businessmen and powerful political figures 
who were serving as Police Commissioners, attacked a rally in 
Tompkins Square of workers who were calling for enlarged public 
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works to aid the increasing numbers of jobless workers. Gutman 
reported that mounted police charged the peaceful gathering of 
workers repeatedly, riding down and clubbing men, women, and children 
in a very brutal display of the abuse of police power. 
To explain the riotous behavior on the part of the police, 
Gutman stressed police attitudes toward urban workers. His thesis 
was that both the police and the propertied urban classes adhered 
to the belief system of laissez-faire capitalism. One drawback of 
Gutman's work is that he did not provide any evidence that the 
rank-and-file police who administered the beatings to workers sub-
scribed to the notions of a free market and individualism and 
opposed the concept of public responsibility. Instead he presented 
only pro-capitalism statements from high ranking police officials 
and newspaper reporters. In addition, Gutman neglected to identify 
the criteria he used for deciding that ideology was the crucial 
factor underlying police behavior. Although he indicated that the 
Police Board was mainly comprised of wealthy entrepreneurs and 
powerful political figures, Gutman implicitly relegated material 
interests to secondary importance and elevated ideology to the level 
of being the primary cause of the riot without providing a justi-
fication for his choice. 
Notwithstanding the pitfalls of the ideological convergence 
approach, it seems plausible that~ 
II. The more siMilarity between the belief systems 
of line police officers and the capitalist class. 
the more likely that the police will implement a 
policy of repression of labor radicalism. 
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In addition to these first three approaches to the study of the 
relationship between police behavior and the capitalist class, there 
are other ways in which the interests of the dominant class can 
influence police response. The political party affiliation of 
elected officials in city government is another bridge between the 
capitalist class and police operations. 19 Political parties have 
served as mechanisms through which both the capitalists and the 
workers have sought to control the mayor's office and the city 
council. Controlling these areas, in turn, has meant that a social 
class possibly could exert influence on the police since the mayor 
in many cities has had the formal responsibility of making police 
policy and the city council has typically allocated resources and 
drafted ordinances defining illegal conduct. 
~Jith regard to the Democratic Party, Roger Lane indicated that 
there was a split on the Boston City Council in 1878 over the practice 
of allowing police officers to be contracted out to employers during 
strikes. 20 Lane reported that the workers' influence in the 
Democratic Party was responsible for the divisions on the Council. 
The working class had a fairly strong hold over the police and 
other municipal agencies in cities where the Socialist Party was 
powerful in the first part of the twentieth century. James Weinstein 
found that in 1912 alone Socialists held "some 1200 public offices in 
340 municipalities from coast to coast, among them 79 mayors in 24 
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states. 1121 One of the distinguishing marks of these socialist-run 
cities was the curbing of police hostility toward strikers. The city 
government of i1i1waukee, Hisconsin in 1910-1911 is an example of 
w6rker influence on police practices. Labor gained access to the 
police when Emil Seidel, a Socialist, and a Socialist-dominated 
administration were elected to office in 1910. During his term as 
mayor, Seidel made it a point to see that the police respected 
strikers' rights. 22 
As for the Republican Party, it has commonly been presumed that 
police operations are most likely to favor the capitalist class when 
the Republican Party dominates city government. However, studies 
that support this assumption are difficult to uncover. In fact, 
Gutman found that a Republican mayor refused to heed the demands 
from the business community to suppress labor disorders in Paterson, 
New Jersey in the l870s. 23 r·10reover, the findings from Harring 
and ~1d1ul1in's study of Buffalo police seem to show that political 
party was not an important determinant of police behavior. 24 Instead, 
they asserted that political power shifted between Republicans and 
Democrats regularly, but power was always held by businessmen and 
police response was always somewhat repressive. 
In view of the findings from these empirical studies, a 
rather pessimistic assessment of the effects of the major political 
parties on police policy seems in order. This assessment can be 
expressed in the form of a II nul1 11 statement. 
III. There will be no major differences between the 
police policy pertaining to radical labor in a 
Republican-controlled municipal administration 
and police policy in a Democratic-controlled 
municipal administration. 
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Another linkage between class interests and the police derives 
from the way that municipal gove~nment is structured. Cyril Robinson 
presented a sophisticated explanation of why the police, who have 
been drawn from the working class, supported labor at times in the 
nineteenth century, but were so often used by the capitalist class 
to put down strikes and other types of action sponsored by the 
working class in the twentieth century.25 According to him, at one 
time the working class, through its ability to capture electoral 
majorities, was able to exert considerable influence on the mayor 
and, in turn, on the police who were under the mayor's authority. 
Robinson took the position that the structural aspects of police 
reform contributed to the tendency of the police to side with the 
capitalist class. Specifically, he stated that the creation of 
civil service and administrative police boards weakened the control 
of the mayors over the police and, in effect, insulated the police 
from the working class. Robinson's explanation is supported in 
James Richardson's analysis of civil service, municipal reform, and 
the po1ice. 26 Richardson cited civil service, the city manager and 
commission forms of government, and at-large elections as all 
reducing the capacity of the working class to direct police actions.* 
*The working class did not passively allow their political 
power to be taken from them. In the early 1900s Socialists 
opposed attempts to institute city manager or commission forms of 
government and attempts to substitute nonpartisan city-wide 
elections for ward-based elections to city councils and school 
boards. For a more complete description of working class 
resistance to the municipal reform movement, see Bruce Stave 
(ed.), Socialism and the Cities (Port Washington, N.Y.: 
Kennikat Press, 1975). 
Based on the thinking of Robinson and Richardson, it can be 
expected that: 
IV. The process of institutionalizing reforms in 
municipal government promotes a police policy 
of repression of labor radicalism. 
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Up to this point, the discussion has dwelled upon the dependence 
of municipal government on class interests. This is only a partial 
explanation of the relationship between class and state power. A 
first step toward a more flexible description of the interplay of 
class and state interests is to realize that municipal authorities 
may possess and exercise power that is relatively independent of the 
capitalist class even though the general purpose of the state is to 
preserve the coherence of capitalist society as a whole. Stated 
another way, there are times when the political power of the state 
is lIendowed with a movement of its own. 1I27 
Andrew Hopkins has gone so far as to state that big business 
has had to give ground to lIother" interests under some circumst.anccs.*28 
He made this assertion in connection with a discussion of the problem 
of accounting for criminal laws such as antitrust la\'Is which are 
inimical to the interests of powerful groups. According to Hopkins, 
the way to deal with this problem is simple--admit that business 
interests can be and sometimes are over-ridden by other classes, 
° to d ° tOt to 29 organlza ions, ~n lns 1 U 10ns. 
*Stephen D. Krasner's interpretation of U.S. oil policy toward 
the Middle East supports the view that the state can be an autonomous 
force. Krasner's analysis of four select episodes involving the U.S. 
government in the t·1i ddl e East duri ng the peri od of 1951 through the 
1970s indicated that the government has endorsed policies that have 
been opposed by the oil industry. For a more detailed account of 
the state as an autonomous entity, see Stephen D. Krasner, IIA 
Statist Interpretation of American Oil Policy Toward the r~iddle East," 
Political Science Quarterly, 95 (Spring, 1979), pp. 77-97. 
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This same line of reasoning is applicable to understanding the 
po 1 i ce response to 1 abor unrest. ~Ihen one di scovers instances where 
police policy and actions are harmful to the capitalist class, there 
should be a search for antagonisms between class and state interests.* 
Clashes between the capitalist class and governmental authorities can 
be expected to have a moderating effect on police policy. The 
following relationship between class-state conflict and police 
response should hold: 
V. A high level of conflict between class and state 
interests promotes a police policy of toleration 
of labor radicalism. 
Patterns of Labor Discontent and Police Response 
Collective action by radical labor unions and other organs of 
the working class has probably affected police organizations and 
behavior in a variety of ways. For one thing, the modern urban 
police system in the United States was created partially in reaction 
to the labor-related disorders of the 18305, 18405. and 1850s. 
Beyond this fact, however, not much attention has been given to 
studying the ways in which working class organizations have altered 
the structure and activities of police institutions. 
In part, this void in our knowledge about the impact of 
working class collective action on the police is due to the "fallacy 
of elitism"** which is reflected in many police studies. This 
*A more fully developed discussion of state activities that 
may threaten the class system can be found in Roberta Ash Garner's 
Social Change (Chicago: Rand McNally Publishing Company, 1977), 
pp. 259-262. 
**The fallacy of elitism consists of conceiving human groups in 
terms of the upper strata. See David Hackett Fisher, Historians 
Fallacies (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 230-232. 
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fallacy has been prominent in the writings of police experts such as 
August Vollmer, O. W. l~i1son, and James Q. Ui1son. These authors have 
tended to conceptualize the development of the police in terms of the 
ability of police administrators to dominate all aspects of police 
work. 
To counteract the elitism in police studies, scholars need to 
look into the ways in which the power of an insurgent, organized 
working class can be a determinant of police response. Charles Til1y·s 
observations on the relationship between the power of movement 
organizations and the actions of authorities provide some insight 
into this matter. 3D He averred that power begets respect from 
authorities. In other words, if a labor union has a considerable 
amount of power (i.e., a large membership and/or the ability to 
exercise major say on issues deemed of importance to its interests), 
the authorities will at least tolerate the union·s activities for 
fear of incurring losses or costs from confrontations. Conversely, 
if organized labor is weak, it is likely to receive the "fu11 
force of the 1 aw. II 
Data from at least two studies suggest that the type of policy 
the police follow may be related to the perceived likelihood that 
labor can apply its resources to make its interests prevail over 
those of the capitalist class. C'laude Hoffman discovered that 
there was an "amassingll of police during a "reign of terror ll against 
the United Auto Workers· local 663 in Anderson, Indiana in 1937. 31 
One gets the impression from reading Hoffman·s narrative that a sort 
of "Thermidorian reaction"* took place in Anderson at a time of 
retrenchment for labor following the defeat of local 663's sit-
down strike. A similar situation has been described by Gutman in 
his treatment of the Tompkins Square outrage. 32 Gutman portrayed 
the period after the Tompkins Square Riot as one of extreme police 
repression. 
The main theme in the empirical research as well as in Tilly's 
conceptual work can be expressed in this hypothesis: 
VI. A dramatic decline in the power of a radical 
labor organization can lead to a police 
policy of repression. 
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A qualification should be added to this discussion of police 
response and labor power. Police response may depend on the stability 
of the political-economic system. While certain policies, strategies, 
and tactics can be anticipated \'/hen a system is stable, other types 
of police response may occur during a "revolutionary situation." A 
revolutionary situation or a state of "dual power" might begin when 
a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign 
polity becomes partially controlled by workers who mobilize into a 
power bloc that rivals the official government. 33 In a revolutionary 
situation labor itself may exercise enough control over the state appa-
ratus to determine police policy. Under a state of dual pOIJ/er, police 
policy may be markedly different from \'Jhat it is under usual conditions. 
*The term "Thermidor" is the name given to the warmest season of 
the year by the leaders of the French Revolution. On 9th Termidor of 
the second year of the French Revolution (1794), the revolutionary 
leader Robespierre was deposed. The next day he was executed, thus 
ending one phase of revolution and commencing another phase. The 
period involving the suppression of radicals has been referred to 
as the "Thermidorian Reaction." See Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, 
Sociology, 5th Ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 599. 
VII. Toleration and/or facilitation are likely to 
become adopted as police policies in a 
revolutionary situation. 
Moving from poi ice policies to police strategies, it should 
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be stressed that social action by the working class may be a decisive 
force in molding police response. Donald Black's writings on the 
impact of social conflict on policing strategies provide an idea as 
to how labor-business conflict may be related to police strategy.34 
He proposed that "government-initiated" or "proactive" strategies 
are disproportionately used by police when there is a high level of 
conflict between the "authority system and those subject to it.,,35 
According to Black, this is so because proactive strategies contribute 
more to the perpetuation of systems of social stratification than do 
"citizen-initiated" or reactive strategies. He asserted that ideally 
decision-making in the form of citizen complaints cancels itself out 
in reactive strategies (i.e., citizen complaints are evenly distributed 
across groups in a stratified order), while a decision by the police 
to initiate action reflects police biases and to some extent the 
interests of those in superordinate positions of authority over the 
police. 
With respect to labor-business conflict, some historical evidence 
lends credence to Black's predictions. There have been several recorded 
instances where the police have concentrated on weakening labor's 
capacity to mobilize resources. For example, the police illegally 
confiscated a sound truck belonging to the United Auto Workers in 
Anderson, Indiana during one of the heated battles between the C.I.O. 
and the auto industry.36 Police also worked on labor's ability to 
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mobilize resources during the prelude to the Tompkins Square affair in 
New York. 37 The New York police first went on the offensive by turning 
down the parade route proposed by the organizers of the demonstration. 
Also, the Police Board ordered the patrolmen to arrest anyone trying 
to persuade workingmen to participate in the parade. After the 
parade was cancelled and a site was chosen for a street meeting, the 
Police Board intervened again by convincing the Department of Parks 
to void the permit to meet in Tompkins Square. Besides these 
examples of proactive strategy, police raids following the riot 
influenced workers to stay away from other meetings and organizing 
drives. All of these proactive efforts by the New York police 
occurred at a time of intense conflict involving labor radicals and 
big business. 
By translating Black's authority-relations terminology into 
the language of class analysis and by extrapolating from the data in 
two related studies, the following proposition has been formulated: 
VIII. The higher the level of labor unrest, the more 
likely it is that there will be an emphasis on 
proactive strategies. 
Reactive strategies are also likely to be employed in times 
of worker dissatisfaction and agitation. These types of strategies 
tend to favor the dominant class because the creation and application 
of many laws that stipulate the forms of behavior that the police 
must deal with in reactive police \'1ork reflect the interests of the 
capitalist class. The historical record is replete with instances 
where the pol i ce have enforced "speci al" 1 aws that \'lere desi gned to 
break strikes and to undermine community support for organized labor. 
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Criminal syndicalism 1aws* and city ordinances prohibiting freedom of 
speech are two blatant examples of these types of laws. 
As for the application of laws already in existence, it is 
important to remember that discriminatory law enforcement is a result 
of differences in po\'/er and that decisions as to \'/hose behavior is 
criminal are expressions of power.38 The extent to \oJhich some laws 
are enforced more frequently or more rigidly in regard to a given 
social class is, however, an empirical question. 
To analyze the process whereby reactive strategies are brought 
into use, it is beneficial to take the t·1arxian thesis of the "crim-
inalization of surplus 1abo~~*into account. Marxists contend that 
the capitalist class depends upon the existence of a relatively free, 
apolitical surplus labor force in order to break strikes and to keep 
wages 1m'l. It follows that attempts by radical labor unions to 
broaden the scope of their mobilization efforts and, as a consequence, 
to politicize portions of the surplus labor force are likely to be 
opposed by the capitalist class. This opposition may be reflected 
*Criminal syndicalism laws defined almost every basic tenet of 
I.W.W. ideology as a crime. Hence, anyone who advocated l~obbly ideas 
by speech, writing, publication, or display became ipso facto a 
criminal. For a more complete discussion of criminal syndicalism 
laws, see Eldridge F. Dowell, "A History of Criminal Syndicalism 
Legislation in the United States," The Johns Hoekins univerSit" 
Studies in Historical and Political Science Serles, LVII, No. 
(Baltimore, 1939). 
**For a more thorough explication of the idea of the "crim-
inalization of the surplus labor force," see Richard Henry Ta\,/ney, 
The A rarian Problem in the Sixteenth Centur (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1967. Steven Spitzer a so stated a rief argument of this 
kind. See Steven Spitzer, "Toward a t·1arxian Theory of Deviance," 
Social Problems, 22, 5 (June, 1975), pp. 638-651. 
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in the enforcement of laws covering types of behavior in which some 
people in the surplus labor force tend to engage. More specifica1~y) 
the police may begin to treat potential union members who are also 
part of the surplus labor force as being criminals in order to impair 
the mobilization efforts of radical labor. 
Sidney Harring conducted one of the few inquiries into the 
phenomenon of the criminalization of surplus labor. 39 Harring 
described how the Buffalo police, acting under the Tramp Acts of 
1885, indiscriminately arrested tramps, beggars, hobos, vagrants, 
unemployed persons, and workers. ~10re importantly, he claimed that 
the Tramp Acts served as a tool for the police to repress Count 
Rybakowski's tramp army* which appealed to many of the groups whose 
members were arrested under the Tramp Acts. 
Harring and McMullin's analysis of labor unrest and the efforts 
of the police to control workers in Buffalo, New York from 1872-1900 
contains empirical data that bear on the issue of discriminatory law 
enforcement. 40 They discovered that the level of strike activity was 
positively related to the proportion of laborers arrested as opposed 
to persons of other occupations. Arrest rates for "pubiic order 
offenses,"** in particular, were reported to have been affected by 
fluctuations in the level of strike activity. 
*Count Joseph Rybakowski's army consisted of Polish and 
Bohemian canal workers from Chicago, Illinois, who marched from 
there to Buffalo, tJew York, demanding jobs and public relief. 
**Vagrancy, tramps, disorderly conduct, and the like are 
examples of public order offenses. 
The following propositions summarize the relevant features of 
the conceptual and empirical work on the police and the utilization 
of reactive strategies in dealing with radical labor: 
IX. A broadening of the scope of mobilization by labor 
is likely to be countered with the criminalization 
of segments of the surplus labor force by the police. 
x. A high level of labor unrest is likely to be met 
with the criminalization of segments of the regular 
labor force. 
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The relationship between labor unrest and the use of preventive 
strategies appears to be quite different from the relationship between 
labor actions and other types of police strategies. Since a pre-
ventive strategy often involves police intervention into aspects of 
the lives of human beings--especially working class people--that had 
not previously been under the watch of the police, it is possible 
that there will be resentment and opposition on the part of the group 
or class of persons whose lives will be more closely regulated. 4l 
Hence, a time of labor unrest is hardly the most propitious moment 
to introduce preventive strategies. Rather, it is probable that: 
XI. The lower the level of labor unrest, the greater 
the emphasis on preventive strategies. 
Like collective action by the police, police mobilization may 
be affected by labor unrest. It is logical to assume that unrest 
may lead the police to accumulate more resources, to devise special 
plans, and to institutionalize organizational arrangements which 
facilitate the rapid deployment of police to the scene of labor 
problems. 
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Harring and r1c~1ullin's study of the Buffalo police is one of the 
few sources of information on the interaction between labor's activities 
and police mobilization. 42 Their research highlighted the fact that 
the size of the Buffalo police department increased as more men and 
money poured into the agency to fight labor wars. They reported that 
"labor problems" were repeatedly cited as the reason for providing 
more resources to the police. Additionally, Harring and McMullin 
noted that there was an emphasis on a platoon system with a reserve 
to handle riots and labor disputes rather than on a patrol system 
for crime control. 
To ascertain the generalizeability of findings from Harring and 
r~d·1ullin's research, these two propositions need to be explored: 
XII. The higher the level of labor unrest, the larger 
the size of the police department. 
XIII. Special modifications in the organizational 
arrangements and practices of police departments 
are likely to accompany high levels of labor 
unrest. 
Community Influence on Police Response 
Community influence may be transmitted to the police through 
individuals, groups, or organizations. Norms and standards, expec-
tations about the selective enforcement of laws and pressures for 
changes in operating procedures, and input about the creation of 
laws and ordinances are all components of community influence. The 
community influences the police either directly as in the situation 
of corporations paying the salaries of "special police"* or indirectly 
*Special police were sworn and uniformed police with the full 
powers of the r."lunic;pal police. They \'/ere hired, paid, and directed 
by private concerns. 
through the mayor's office and other units of government that are 
instrumental in determining police functions. 
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A key issue in the study of police-community relations centers 
on the relationship of community to other sources of influence on the 
police. Gutman emphasized that many historians have subscribed to 
the view that from the start, industrialists and big businessmen have 
had the social and political clout and prestige to match their 
economic power and that they controlled towns and police forces. 43 
Stated another way, it has often been proposed that from the beginning 
in America, there has existed a close relationship between social 
status, political power, and economic class and that business interests 
have been able to direct police operations according to their every 
whim. 
Two recently published studies cast doubt on the validity of 
this view. In one of the most comprehensive analyses of police--
community relations in American Cities, Richardson identified the 
climate of community opinion toward a labor dispute, not economic 
class, as being the key factor in determining whose side the police 
were on.
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Gutman reached a similar conclusion in his more general 
inquiry on class, status, and community in industrializing America. 45 
He summarized his findings in the proposition that economic power 
was n~: easily translated into social and political power in the 
nineteenth century. 
Another important issue in police-community relations involves 
the areas of policing that are most likely to be affected by community 
expectations and pressures. Wilson, in his classic study of police 
39 
behavior. indicated that community choices tend to have a great effect 
on police personnel. budgets, pay levels, and organization. 46 He 
strongly implied that, in general, the community exercises more 
influence on police mobilization than on police policy regarding 
collective action by the police. 
In another study, Hilson stressed that there is apt to be some 
conflict or difference of opinion about police operations in hetero-
geneous communities. 47 For example, racial or ethnic minority 
citizens may feel differently about proposals to add more police or 
to allow the police to use more powerful weaponry than white Anglo-
American citizens. The implication of this observation, while not 
entirely clear. may be that there is "strength in numbers" so far 
as the likelihood of minority groups influencing police functions 
is concerned. 
Some data bearing on the subject of heterogeneous communities 
and influence over the police can be found in Gutman's research on 
Paterson, New Jersey.48 He described the curious situation in 
Paterson where Benjamin Buckley, a Republican mayor, used his po\'1er 
over the police to suppress only violent labor disorders in the 
1870s. This upset members of the economically dominant class who 
tried to pressure the city authorities to enlarge the police force 
and to limit the strikers' use of the streets and their freedom of 
action. But the Democratic Board of Aldermen upheld the Republican 
mayor on both counts. ~1ore than that. respected and powerful groups 
in the ethnically mixed Paterson community refused to support the 
industrialists in labor disputes. The "bottom line" in the case of 
Paterson seemed to be that the existence of vital subcultures among 
the immigrant and native American poor served as a source of staunch 
opposition to the power of the emerging upper class. 
that: 
Based on the work of Wilson and Gutman, it can be expected 
XIV. In heterogeneous communities, the presence of 
large numbers of economic and ethnic minorities 
may limit the capacity of the police to mobilize 
resourcas to use against labor. 
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One of the more interesting facets of the relationship between 
the community and police response involves the use of violent tactics 
by the pol i ce. Oberscha 11 predi cted that ci vi 1 ian casua 1ti es wi 11 be 
high during periods of "red scare" when public opinion favors the 
repression of discontented groups.49 He implied that more civilians 
are k i 11 ed in these s i tuati ons because soci a 1 control agents know 
that they will not be held accountable for their actions by the 
community. Harring, Platt, Speiglman, and Takagi offered another 
explanation of police killings. According to them, political/power 
variables account for fluctuations in the rates of police ki11ings. 50 
To support this claim, they cited the dramatic increase in the 
number of civilian deaths (especially of black citizens) caused by 
the pol ice beb/een 1962 and 1969, a peri od of i ntense pol i ti ca 1 
struggle. 
Both of these explanations have direct and clear applications 
to the study of the police response to labor problems. Although 
neither explanation is necessarily incongruent with the other one, 
each explanation emphasizes the importance of a certain type of 
factor in influencing police violence. The following proposition 
needs to be examined before any judgments can be made about the 
adequacy of the positions of Oberschall or Harring and his 
colleagues: 
XV. The level of police violence against radical 
labor will be higher during periods of intense 
1 abor unrest than during peri ods of "Red Scare" 
(\'Jhen public fear and hysteria about radicalism 
encourage repression.)* 
The community's reaction to police violence is another 
potentially important aspect of community influence. Hilliam 
Gamson indicated that the best way for the authorities to maintain 
community support is to match their means of social control with the 
"trust orientation" of the opposition group.51 He postulated that 
41 
if the authorities use persuasion when dealing with groups that 
trusted them, sanctions and inducements with groups that were neutral, 
and insulation or repression with alienated groups, then the 
authorities would minimize the chances of adverse community reaction. 
Conversely, when the authorities select means of social control that 
are incongruent with the status of the opposition group's trust 
orientation, then it becomes more costly for the authorities to deal 
with the oPPosition group because of negative community reaction. 
What costs are likely to accrue to the authorities? Ted Gurr 
provided some ideas on the costs of choosing incongruent means of 
social control. 52 He maintained that inappropriate means of control, 
*Labor unrest and public fear about radicalism may exist 
together. Hence, those interested in examining proposition 15 
may need to search for periods when one of these phenomena was 
present and the other was not present. 
if used by the authorities, will enhance the legitimacy of dis-
contented groups and detract from the legitimacy of the authorities 
in the eyes of the community. Some community groups, according to 
Gurr, may even respond to unnecessary police violence by assisting 
or joining in with the opposition group. 
At least one piece of evidence seems to support the "sketchy" 
notions of Gamson and Gurr. From Irving Bernstein's account of the 
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police response to the Ford Hunger March* in Dearborn, Michigan on 
March 7, 1932, it appears that police actions brought a result 
opposite to that which was planned. 53 After a crowd of approximately 
3,000 unemployed workingmen had peacefully paraded from do\'mtown 
Detroit to the Dearborn city line, Dearborn police blocked the road 
and tried to stop the marchers with tear gas. Returning the fire 
\,/ith stones and 1 umps of frozen di rt, the demonstrators advanced 
further down the road until they reached an open field where speakers 
addressed the crowd. The police, licking their wounds, opened point-
black fire on the demonstrators with pistols and machine guns, 
killing three marchers and seriously wounding about 50 others. The 
Communist leaders of the March capitalized on the police "overkill" 
by producing a funeral extravaganza for the four martyrs. A band 
played the funeral dirge of the 1905 Russian Revolution, a cortege 
of 10,000 persons participated in a march to the cemetery, and a 
crowd of 30,000 gathered to hear Red orators verbally blast 
capitalism. 
*The Ford Hunger t4arch was a demonstrati on in favor of jobs, 
higher wages, fewer hours, and other improvements in working 
conditions. 
Research on the effects of the excessive use of police force 
on student demonstrators and others has documented similar outcomes. 
One study of Kent State University students' protest and socio-
political activity before and after the "Kent State ~1assacre" on 
~·1ay 4, 1970 lends support to the ideas of Gamson and Gurr. 54 
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Utilizing self-reports of students' political activity, Raymond Adamek 
and Jerry Lewis collected data that indicated that exposure to extreme 
social control violence may have had a "radicalizing" effect on 
participants. In another study of the police and student demon-
strators, Allen Barton found that the use of excessive force at 
Columbia University increased the sympathy of "third parties" 
(i .e., faculty and students) for the demonstrator's tactics. 55 
For situations in which the police utilize incongruent means 
of control that are overly coercive, the net effect probably is to 
make the police task of controlling labor unrest more difficult. 
The next proposition, however, deals with an "intermediate" phase 
in the interactive process which links excessive police violence 
to the aggravation of police problems in dealing with labor. 
XVI. The use of excessive force is likely to 
radicalize third parties to the class struggle 
between the capitalist and working classes. 
But what if the community never learns about the police use of 
incongruent means of control or is misinformed about how social control 
is carried out? This is where the communications media come into the 
making of police response. Michael Lipsky has emphasized that the 
media are an extremely powerful community institution that affect the 
authorities' actions. 56 The media grant or withhold publicity on 
police activities, select the information that most of the community 
will have on police-related issues, and decide what alternatives 
the conmunity \'/i11 consider in response to civic affairs. 
t~hat determines the ideas, issues, and choices that are 
presented by the media? From a strict t1arxian vieNpoint, it might 
be held that newspaper editors and other media representatives 
produce news that augments their own material interests. This is 
a somewhat vulgar and overly-deterministic stance. Harvey Molotch 
has developed a plainer conceptualization of the class bias of the 
d . 57 H . b· . t . . th t th 1 h me lao lS aSlc POSl lon lS a I ere are severa reasons w y 
the mass media in the United States have been under the control of 
the capitalist class. First, the owners of the newspapers and the 
television and radio stations are themselves either members of the 
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capitalist class or aspire to such membership. Second, the revenues 
of the media are heavily dependent upon advertisements and grants 
from the capitalist class. Third, the capitalist class is the single 
most important social influence on the national government which, 
through its regulatory agencies and through the courts, controls 
the media. Fourth, the capitalist class is the most important force 
in structuring the national ideology through mechanisms such as 
education, voluntary associations, religious organizations, theatre, 
etc.--the other media that socialize news producers and news 
consumers. 
In addition to material interests, community responses to 
media content must be examined if a full account of the relationship 
is to be given of the impact of the media on the police. While a 
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newspaper may share the capitalist class's belief in the "free enter-
prise system," this belief may not become articulated in print. Then 
too, community members may not respond to a news article or an 
editorial in the manner desired by the editor. In short. the 
community or parts of it may resist manipulation by the media. 
Donald Sofchalk's analysis of the interplay between the police, 
the press, and the community following the Chicago r1emorial Day 
Incident* is instructive in the regard of media influence. 58 Prior 
to the Incident, public opinion favored labor. Yet. the public's 
reaction to the Incident was to hold the strikers and their C.I.O. 
leaders responsible for the violence that occurred. Sofcha1k 
attributed this shift in community attitudes to the news media1s 
unbalanced accounts of the event. The picture painted by the 
Chicago Daily Tribune and other local papers represented only the 
police version of what happened. Headlines such as "Riots Blamed 
on Red Chiefs" served to concentrate public attention on "outside" 
agitators and other "radicals" who had allegedly planned the entire 
affair. When one places the media's biased performance in historical 
perspective, the "power of the press" appears somewhat staggering. 
If Sofchalk's analysis is correct, then the decade's most spectacular, 
single occurrence of industrial war failed to provoke any support for 
labor, in part, because of the fallacious and misleading content of 
the Chicago newspapers! 
*The Chi cago ~1emori a 1 Day Inci dent i nvo 1 ved a c1 ash between 
1,500 workers on strike from the Little Steel plant and 300 members 
of the Chicago Police Department on Memorial Day, 1937. ~Jhen 
several stones were thrown at the police, they responded by shooting 
6 persons dead and by brutally attacking the workers with enough 
force to wound 58 persons. 
Another example of the ability of the press to shape public 
opinion is the encouragement offered for acts of police violence 
against tramps by the papers in Buffalo, New York in the 1890s. 59 
The Buffalo media were at least partially responsible for the public 
clamor for strengthened and more repressive anti-tramp measures. 
Still another case in point is the propaganda contest waged between 
the established newspapers and the Arbeiter Zeitung, an Anarchist 
paper, in Chicago in the 1880s. While the larger newspapers damned 
the A.F.L.·s campaign to win the eight hour day as IIcommunism, lurid 
and rampant,II60 the Anarchist media fanned the flames of worker un-
rest and denounced the police for shooting strikers. 61 In the end, 
the major press seems to have been more successful since public 
sentiment was polarized against the Anarchists after the Haymarket 
Riot.* 
The main themes of the above analysis of the media and police 
response can be expressed as a set of propositions. 
XVII. The more the media is dependent upon the 
capitalist class, the more likely that the 
media content will be supportive of police 
policies, strategies, and tactics that 
benefit the capitalist class. 
XVIII. The more biased the media content in favor of 
the capitalist class, the more supportive the 
community is likely to be of police policies, 
strategies, and tactics that benefit the 
capitalist class. 
*The Haymarket Riot took place May 4, 1886 in Haymarket 
Square in Chicago. Police killings outnumbered citizen killings 
of police about two or three to one, after a bomb was thrown at 
the police. 
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XIX. The more strongly the community supports a police 
response that serves the interests of the 
capitalist class, the more likely that such a 
response will be implemented. 
The Factor of the Police in Police Response 
Besides class interests, state interests, and community 
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influences, the police themselves shape police response. Role 
conflicts, police organizational characteristics, and police attitudes 
all affect police behavior. Generally, these aspects of police 
response have been dealt with separately by students of the police; 
there have been few attempts to develop a conceptual framework that 
links psychological and organizational variables to broader social 
structural bases of action.* 
~'larxian social theory, with its emphasis on structural environ-
ments, allows for the incorporation of empirical data from some of 
the benchmark studies of Wilson, Skolnick, and others, while it 
directs attention to social class as a determinant of police response. 
With regard to role conflict and police response, the interface of 
class and occupation as sources of identity for police officers 
seems to be a useful but overlooked area of inquiry. A central 
contradiction of police work is that even though the police have 
been recruited from the working class, they have been saddled with 
the task of policing the \'1orking class. It is reasonable to expect 
*One of the few attempts to develop such an analytical frame-
work was made by Clayton A. Hartjen. Hartjen abstracted findings 
from criminological research on the police and reinterpreted them 
from a perspective of social order and interpersonal interaction. 
See Clayton A. Hartjen, "Po1ice-Citizen Encounters," Criminology, 
10, 1 (r1ay, 1972), pp. 61-84. 
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that when an officer, who views himself as being a IIworker ll as well as 
a police "professional" intervenes into a labor dispute, he/she may 
make certain compromises, accommodations, or even concessions to 
organized labor. 
From the point of view of police administrators and other city 
. authorities, it may be necessary to thwart these tendencies by 
building the officer's commitment to the police occupation. How can 
occupational commitment be increased for those working in police 
organizations? Harring found that high salaries, military disci-
pline, and an emphasis on neutrality were used to encourage loyalty 
among rank and file police officers in Buffalo, New York during the 
labor strife of the late 1800s. 62 
In order to guage when commitment mechanisms such as those 
identified by Harring and ~1c:-.1ullin are likely to be stressed in 
police departments, it is useful to explore the applications of the 
concepts of "alienation ll and "dual power structure. II In regard to 
these concepts, it can be postulated that a person is most apt to 
change role affiliations after he or she becomes alienated or with-
draws from an established social system and after he or she becomes 
aware of the existence of a competing system that has about the same 
amount of power (i .e., a dual power structure). The implication for 
police mobilization is that commitment to the police occupation may 
be in jeopardy when the police become alienated from their \'wrk and 
when labor organizations accumulate sufficient power to compete for 
their loyalties. 
The following relationship is predicted bet\~een the amount of 
power possessed by labor and police mobilization: 
XX. In situations where radical labor has amassed 
a considerable amount of power, there is likely 
to be an emphasis on "convnitment mechanisms" 
(e.g., salaries, discipline, neutrality ethic, 
etc.) in police departments. 
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In terms of organizational characteristics, professionalization 
should make a difference in police response. There are bolO con-
trasting positions on the effects of professionalization on response. 
Oberschall suggested that a professional police department is less 
likely to engage in unnecessary violence than is a non-professional 
one. 63 He reasoned that if a department has clearly spelled-out 
guidelines for the use of force and its leadership exercises control 
over rank and file officers, then the department will be more 
accountable. A high degree of accountability, in turn, should reduce 
the level of police violence, according to Oberschall. 
The Center for Research on Criminal Justice assumed a different 
posture. 64 It contended that the introduction of police reforms such 
as professionalism has not diminished the importance of the "iron 
fist" side of the police function. Instead they viewed profession-
alism as being the "velvet glove" side of policing, the side that 
serves to obscure and to legitimize the violent, coercive aspects 
of the other side of the police role. In sum, the Center's position 
is that a professionalized police force is not less violent than an 
unprofessionalized one. 
The relationship between professionalization and violence is 
probably more complex than either position indicates. Perhaps the 
most critical issue has been all but ignored. That issue revolves 
around the notion of the "locus of control" over the police.* It is 
logical to think that the nature of police response depends, to some 
degree, on whether control is "internal" or "external." In fact, 
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the writings of several police experts suggest that police violence 
can ,only be reduced when the pol ice are controll ed by forces outsi de 
of police organizations. Skolnick, for one, criticized the idea that 
the answer to the problem of accountability lies in the improvement 
of internal police administration. 65 Instead of internal control 
over the police, Skolnick opted for external control in the form of 
the "rul e of law."** In a similar manner, ~Ja1ker argued that 
external means of control (e.g., community control and civilian 
review boards) promote public accountabi1ity.66 
If we accept the line of reasoning advanced by Skolnick and 
Wa 1 ker, the key questi on becomes, "ho'l' is pol ice profess i ana 1 ism 
related to the institutionalization of external mechanisms for 
controlling police behavior in police departments?" Judging from 
the historical development of police professionalism, it does not 
appear that the professiona1ization has been accompanied by the 
introduction of external means of control. To the contrary, controls 
over the police have developed largely within the structure of police 
departments. 67 This should not be surprising given the "manageria1" 
*Oberscha11 made a passing reference to this issue. See 
Anthony Oberscha1l, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 338. 
**The term "rule of 1aw," as used by Skolnick, refers to the 
rights of individual citizens and the legal constraints upon the 
police. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 6. 
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conception of professionalism that was promoted in the early battles 
against police corruption. To translate this managerial view of 
professionalism into actual police practices, efficiency-minded 
IIprofessionalizers li attempted to enhance the power of police 
executives, to install centralized rational administrative procedures, 
and to improve the quality of the police officer. 68 
One of the costs of developing a professional code based upon 
a model of administrative efficiency has been the increasing insul-
ation of the police from the community. Hhereas the centralization 
of power and authority and the use of impersonal management tech-
niques may have improved the efficiency of police departments! 
these same features have tended to cut the police off from the 
influence of the working class and the labor movement. 69 On a more 
general level, it appears that the professionalization of the police 
may have so undermined the capacity of the police to be accountable 
to external controls that in the year 1979 it has become exceedingly 
difficult to provide a solid answer to the question, IIwho controls 
the police?lI* 
Returning to the matter of the relationship between police 
professionalism and the level of police violence, a proposition 
specifying the type of control seems to be in order. 
*The police are not unique in terms of being relatively 
immune from external regulation. Magalf Larson's account of the 
process by which professions emerge illuminates the fact that all 
professions seek autonomy; this autonomy tends to insulate them 
from the public and from political authorities. See Magali 
Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociolo ical Anal sis, 
{Berkeley, Ca 1 .: nlverslty 0 a 1 ornla ress, 
XXI. No marked differences are expected in the level 
of police violence against radical labor between 
professionalized police departments in which only 
internal controls are present and non-profes-
sionalized police departments. 
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A final factor that shapes the police response in human 
volition. The attitudes, values, and experiences of individual 
officers are important in determining how the police react to strikes, 
parades, and other contentious gatherings sponsored by organized 
labor. 
How does one go about studying the role of individual police 
officers in labor wars? To study the human factor in any kind of 
situation, Frederick Teggart, the noted philosopher of history, 
stressed that mental and physical activity are, in large part, due 
to the occupational, social, and geographical surroundings in which 
one finds himself or herself. 70 Skolnick's investigation of how 
the occupational environment of policing molds a set of cognitive 
tendencies among police exemplifies the approach suggested by 
TeggartJl One of Skolnick's main contentions \oJas that police 
officers become very supportive of the status quo by virtue of 
enforcing the law. He argued that to believe in their task and to 
appear consistent to themselves, police become extremely con-
servative. For some officers who rigidly adhere to conservative 
ideas, it may be necessary to view the proponents of opposing 
ideological positions such as radicals as being "dangerous, immoral 
devils." Walter t1iller labeled this as constituting a mental state 
of "fdEm logi ca 1 i ntens i fi ca ti on. II 72 
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In a similar \'1ay, the police occupation seems to foster anti-
labor attitudes among patrol officers. In fact, Skolnick maintained 
that handling labor disputes is one of the best examples of situations 
inclining the police to support the status quo. 73 In these situations, 
the responsibilities of their job lead the police to see striking, 
picketing, militant workers as disturbing the order that they are 
charged with maintaining. Some rare bits of information on the anti-
labor bias of police have been recorded by Harold Ickes, who was an 
attorney in Chicago for part of his career. Here is how he described 
the handling of clashes between employers and workers between 1886 
and the 1930s by the Chicago Police. 
The Augean stables emanated delicate perfume compared 
with some of the odors that have been redolent in this 
Department in the past. From the time of the Haymarket 
Riots (1886) in Chicago, police always justified the 
brutal invasion of civil rights by calling those whom 
it manhandled lanarchists."74 
Besides the studies on the anti-radical and anti-labor attitudes 
of police, other research has documented the ethnic and racial prej-
udice of some officers.* Interview data collected by the "LaFollette 
Committee,"** for instance, indicated that the police in the late 
1930s regarded participants in picket· lines and C.I.O. demonstrators 
as being either "misguided" foreigners or Conmunists. 75 
*For an overview of the literature on racial attitudes in 
police departments, see Don C. Gibbons, Society, Crime, and Criminal 
Careers, 3rd. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1977), pp. 75-76. 
**The LaFollette Conmittee was a subconmittee set up by the 
Senate Conmittee on Education and Labor to counteract illegal inter-
ference with worker's civil rights through espionage, provocation, 
and organized violence. The subcommittee was chaired by Senator 
Robert M. LaFollette, Jr. of Wisconsin. 
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How do police attitudes relate to police response? They are 
related in that the police may overreact in handling events of 
collective action, if they hold erroneous views about the workers, 
radicals, or ethnic group members who are participating in the 
actionJ6 Furthermore, police behavior may become particularly over-
zealous and unwarranted if the targets of police reaction possess 
the combined characteristics of ethnicity, union membership, and 
radical politics. 
The police activities in Weirton, West Virginia on October 7, 
1919 offer an illustrative example of what can happen when there is 
a confluence of these factors. Weirton police rounded up 150 
Finnish Americans, marched them to the public square, and forced 
them to kneel and kiss the United States' flag; then, the police 
drove them out of town. Police authorities justified their actions 
by pointing out that the 150 persons were the chief agitators in a 
steel strike and were suspected of being members of a radical group 
in Finland. 77 
The type of overreaction exhibited by the Weirton police would 
definitely classify as the use of "incongruent means of social 
control. II It seems that attitudes may be an important factor in 
determining inappropriate and seemingly irrational responses by the 
police. Based on the above-described ideas about police attitudes 
and on Gamson's conceptualization of incongruent means, it is 
anticipated that: 
XXII. Police who possess erroneous and extremely 
biased attitudes against an ethnic group, a 
labor organization, and/or a particular 
political ideology are more prone to utilize 
incongruent and excessively violent tactics 
than police who do not possess such attitudes. 
Conclusion 
This framework may be considered to represent one theoretical 
orientation to the study of the police response to labor radicalism. 
In the course of developing the framework there has been an attempt 
to avoid some of the pitfalls of "vulgar" r·1arxism. The state has 
been viewed as the terrain on which struggles between classes and 
groups are fought, rather than as the always faithful servant of the 
capitalist class.* Then too, there has been a recognition of the 
ways in which the community as \'1ell as the police themselves may 
affect police response. As a whole, the frame\'1ork is intended to 
be a more encompassing and nuanced view of the police role in class 
conflict involving labor radicals than has been constructed 
heretofore. 
*David Greenberg criticized Richard Quinney, the ~1arxian 
criminologist, for failing to appreciate the fact that state-
organized crime control policies may be adopted in response to 
pressure from classes othe~' than the capitalist class. See 
Greenberg's review of Quinney's Class, State, and Crime in 
Crime and Delinguency, 25, 1 (January, 1979), pp. 110-113. 
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THEY SHOOT WOBBLIES, DON'T THEY? 
CHAPTER III 
THE SEATTLE AND PORTLAND POLICE AND 
THE LABOR RADICALS, 1912-1920 
The Research Problem 
Nobody appears to know why the average officer can't 
keep his temper in dealing with crowds, but he can't. 
There was no need to club anybody; there was no need to 
curse anybody; there was no need to shout and rave and 
kick and pull and yank, for that crowd was willing to 
do what the officers ordered it to do, but the officers 
went wild, as they have done before ••. 1 
This excerpt from a newspaper editorial on the subject of a 
police attack upon free-speech fighters in Portland on October 29, 
1913 is indicative of the disquietude of laypersons and academicians 
alike over the apparent irrationality and inexplicability of police 
behavior in encounters with radicals. Some scholars have even 
suggested that police violence is both arbitrary and personalized. 2 
Another point of view on police encounters with labor radicals 
has been explicated in the theoretical framework of this dissertation. 
A central contention of this perspective is that the urban police 
function is best understood in terms of political and economic 
interests, power relations, and class conflict. Then,too, it is 
assumed that police actions are, to a large extent, structured by 
the political nature of the police institution as it exists within 
municipal government and by the class position of the police as 
workers. Implicit in this perspective on police behavior is the 
idea that seemingly irrational police actions are in fact, rational 
responses to the police-community situation. 
The purpose of the present inquiry was to explore and to 
analyze the phenomenon of the police response to labor radicalism 
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in Portland, Oregon and Seattle, Washington during the period of 
1912-1920. Although it was assumed that political, economic, and 
social factors shaped the ways in which the police in these two 
cities dealt with members of the Industrial I~orkers of the World 
(I.W.W.) and other labor radicals, the question of whether or not 
this was the case \'1ith regard to the actions of the Seattle and 
Portland police in the early twentieth century is an empirical issue. 
It is hoped that some light can be shed on this issue by searching 
for the social forces that influenced the police response to labor 
radicalism from 1912-1920 (the period which included highest levels 
of class conflict involving the I.W.W. in Seattle and Portland). 
In addition, this investigation involved an attempt to identify 
details pertaining to the police response to radical labor unrest 
that are generalizable to the police activities in other cities 
and in different periods of history. At the same time, it should 
be recognized that portions of this study can only be understoo~ in 
relation to the particular events occurring in the world, in the 
United States, and in Portland and Seattle during a specific period 
in history. 
The main objectives of this part of the dissertation were 
as foll ows: 
1. Describe the police response to labor radicalism 
in Portland and Seattle from 1912-1920. 
2. Identify the changes and continuities in the 
police response to labor radicalism within the 
Portland and Seattle city police departments. 
3. Ascertain the similarities and differences in the 
police response between the Portland and Seattle 
city police departments. 
4. Explain the variations in police response both within 
and between the Portland and Seattle city police 
departments in terms of particular social forces. 
The Methodological Approach 
To realize these objectives, the following data sources were 
utilized: 1) archival data (e.g., annual reports of Portland and 
Seattle police departments, mayor's correspondence, police payroll 
records, city auditor's reports, city council papers, manuals of 
standard operating procedures of police departments, and notebooks 
of police detectives), 2) personal documents (e.g., manuscript 
collections of former members of the Portland and Seattle police 
department, I.t~'\~. organizers, fonner mayors, fonner police chiefs, 
and I.W.W. lawyers), and 3) public documents (e.g., Portland and 
Seattle daily newspapers, union newspapers, histories of the cities 
of Portland and Seattle, histories of the police departments of 
Portland and Seattle, and taped interviews with former police 
offi cers). 
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The selection and operationalization of the specific variables 
on which data were collected was based on the propositions identified 
in the conceptual framework. These include variables that relate to 
the following areas: a) linkages between class power, state power, 
and police response, b) patterns of labor discontent and police 
response, c) community influence on police response, and d) the 
factor of police organization in police response. 
Whenever it was possible, primary sources of data were used. 
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However, reliance often had to be placed upon secondary sources 
because of the lack of primary sources in some parts of the inquiry. 
Extensive use of secondary sources was made in studying the police 
response in Seattle since many valuable police records were destroyed 
several years ago. 
A variety of techniques was used to collect data from the 
above-mentioned sources. First, a document schedule was used for 
recording data obtained from Portland and Seattle daily newspapers. 
Appendix A contains a copy of the document schedule. Second, 
several focused interviews of former police officers were conducted. 
During these interviews, former police officers were asked a series 
of general, open-ended questions that focused attention upon their 
handling of labor disputes involving the I.W~W. Questions were 
derived from the conceptual framework and combined into the form 
of an interview guide. Appendix B contains a copy of the interview 
guide. 
Besides these data collection techniques, there was a con-
siderable amount of general information gathering. Arrest data, for 
example, was gleaned from the annual reports of the Portland and 
Seattle police agencies. Information from daily newspapers was a 
most important source of data. Additionally, there was a certain 
amount of pouring over old manuscripts left by the police, city 
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authorities, and members of the I.W.W. in an attempt to ferret out 
personal interpretations of clashes between the police and the I.W.W.* 
Turning to the matter of data analysis, data from personal 
documents, and public documents were analyzed qua1itatively.** The 
management and organization of these non-quantified data was 
accomplished through the use of some basic historiographic techniques. 
Lengthy passages copied from published and non-published materials, 
chronologies of key events, and sketches and diagrams of relation-
ships tentatively posed between variables were all utilized. In 
*l4ith regard to the use of the above-discussed sources and 
techniques, several methodological concerns need to be addressed. 
As in all historical research, a major problem in this study lies 
in the inaccuracy and bias of some of the documents. Typically, the 
reports of local government agencies su§h as police organizations 
are biased in favor of the authorities. To deal \'1ith this problem, 
alleged facts in government sources were cross-checked with other 
primary sources authored by I.W.H. members or with secondary sources 
such as newspapers that are somewhat more neutral than the I.l4.14. 
However, another problematic area involves the extreme bias of some 
newspapers. The Portland Oresonian, for instance, has historically 
slanted its news toward the Vlew of business interests in the community. 
Information from newspapers was validated by cross-references to 
primary sources when they were available and to other newspapers if 
primary sources were lacking. 
There were also limitations on the availability of subjects for 
interviews. Almost all of the prospective interviewees could not be 
interviewed due to a variety of reasons, including death, failing 
health, recent changes of resi dence to other reg"ions of the country, 
and personal feelings of shame. !·Jith respect to the last reason, 
two former members of the Seattle Police Department declined an 
offer to be interviewed, stating that they were "too ashamed of 
what they had done to the l~obbl ies to go through an interview. II 
Thinking that these refusals may have been due to the author's own 
status "outside" of police circles, two active members of the 
Portland Police Bureau were trained as interviewers and sent into the 
field. They also were turned down by the same two former Seattle 
police officers as well as several other ex members of the Seattle 
Police Department. The interviewers from uinside" the police 
occupation, however, did manage to complete b/o interviews with 
former Seattle police officers. 
**The use of quantitative forms of analysis was precluded due to 
limitations in the scale and the amount of data that was available for 
this research. 
analyzing all of this information there also was an emphasis upon 
examining data along a temporal dimension. Hhen data from different 
time periods were available, within and between departmental 
comparisons were made in order to detect changes in relationships 
that occurred over time. 
The Setting for Police-Radical Labor Interaction 
This investigation of the encounters between the police and 
the labor radicals in Portland and Seattle focused on one constant 
and one variable. The constant is the fact that labor radicalism 
posed a significant challenge to the leaders of American corporate 
capitalism from the early 1900s down through World War I. One of 
the main organizational vehicles for the expression of this radical-
ism was the I.W.W. With its preamble proclaiming that the working 
and employing classes have nothing in common, the I.H.W. seemed to 
many employers of this time to be an incarnation of !~arxian 
prophecy.4 From the woolen mills of Lawrence, ~assachusetts to 
the i ron ore mi nes of the Mesabi Range i n ~·1i nnesota to the wheat-
fields, shipyards, sawmills, and forests of the Pacific Northwest, 
the Wobblies presented a militant threat to the basic fabric of 
American society. 
Throughout the entire period of 1912-1920 the specter of the 
I.W.W. loomed large in the cities of Portland and Seattle. Not only 
were these cities the sites of I.W.W. action, additionally both were 
centers of anti-union activities directed at the I.W.t~. and other 
radical organizations which aided the cause of militant working men 
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and women. r·1i 11 owners, 1 oggi ng entrepreneurs, shi ppi ng company 
magnates, and similar types of employers played a key role in plan-
ning and organizing activities to suppress the labor radicals. The 
reason for the opposition of these employers to the I.W.W. was a 
contradiction of interests. Whereas the I .~J.\~., with its' advocacy 
of worker control and revolutionary union tactics, challenged the 
existing distribution of wealth and power in society, these employers, 
with their monopoly control over the extractive industries upon 
which the economies of Portland and Seattle were dependent, were 
part of the most privileged group in the Pacific Northwest. In 
short, the interests of these two groups predisposed them to be 
antithetically opposed to one another. 
Additional to the actions of the employers and the labor 
radi ca 1 s, the course of the confl i ct bet\oJeen these groups appears 
to have been affected by the sometimes shifting allegiances of 
IIthird parties ll that were mainly based in Seattle and Portland. The 
media was one of these parties. The content of Seattle's major news-
papers, namely the Seattle Times and the Seattle Post-Inte1ligencer, 
and Portland's largest newspapers, the Portland Oregonian and the 
Oregon Journal, were extremely biased in favor of business interests 
throughout the period of 1912-1920. The biases of the Seattle Star 
and the Port1 and News, two Scripps * owned newspapers ,seemed 
to change during this period. Both papers were pro-labor prior to 
World ~lar I, but they shifted to an anti-labor position during the 
*E. l~. Scri pps was the owner of both the Star and the News. 
war. 5 Labor's main supporters among the medi a were the Seattle Uni on-
Record, the first labor-owned daily newspaper in the U.S., and the 
Industrial Worker, the I.W.lL newspaper. Both of these papers 
remained loyal to the labor radicals from 1912 through 1920. 
Menbers of the Socialist Party* and the Socialist Labor 
Party** joined the Wobb1ies in skirmishes with employers and city 
authorities in 1912 and 1913 and in some major confrontations with 
the dominant economic and political interests in 1917 and 1919. 
~4embers of 1 oca 1 uni ons affi 1 i ated wi th the Ameri can Federati on of 
Labor (A.F.L.),*** the I.W.~I.'s strongest competitor in terms of 
labor organizing, also aligned with the I.W.W. several times between 
1917 and 1919 in what amounted to class war between the working 
class and the economically dominant class. For the greater part of 
the period of 1912-1920, however, the A.F.L. assisted in the efforts 
to crush the I.\LW. Finally, members of the Corrmunist Party**** and 
the Communist Labor Party***** became entangled with the I.W.W. in 
*The Socialist Party is a political party that vias formed in 
1901. The Party's basic strategy has been to work for nimmediate 
demands" or rea1izeab1e reforms, while its ultimate goal has been 
to create a socialist society. 
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**The Socialist Labor Party was a political party organized in 
1874. The Party took the position that reforms should not be sought 
within the context of the capitalist system, but only as part of a 
socialist revolution. For a more complete delineation of the ideology 
and goals of the socialist Labor Party, see Sidney Lens, Radicalism 
in America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969). 
***The American Federation of Labor is a national labor organ-
ization that was founded in 1886. The A.F.L. organized workers on 
the basis of crafts in the early 1900s. 
****The Communist Party was organized in the U.S. in 1919. It 
was composed primarily of foreign-born persons who belonged to 
Communist foreign language federations in the 1920s. 
*****The Communist. Labor Party \lIas also organized in 1919. 
Initially it was made up mainly of American intellectuals. 
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Seattle and Portland in 1919-1920 when the repression of radicals was 
extraordinarily severe. 
With regard to the demographic characteristics of the two 
ci ti es, it does not appear that these types of factors "'/ere 1 i ke ly 
to have had much of an effect upon the police role in the class 
struggle in Portland and Seattle from 1912-1920. The size of the 
populations in both cities, for example, was roughly the same in 
1912 (i .. e." over 200,000 inhabitants in each city) and in 1920 (i.e., over 
250,000 inhabitants in each city).6 It is conceivable, however, that 
a study more specifically focused on the impact of physical character-
istics on police-labor radical relations might uncover evidence on 
the ways in which demographic factors affected police actions in 
regard to labor radicals. 
As for the variable or varying force analyzed in this study, 
it is proposed that the actions of the Seattle and Portland police 
vis a vis the Wobblies and other labor radicals changed in response 
to shifts in social forces that were themselves in motion. Police 
mobilization and collective action in both cities was inextricably 
bound to the origins, organization, size and previous history of 
handling labor unrest of the Seattle and Portland police departments. 
In terms of the origins of the police in Seatt"· and Portland, 
the police forces in these cities assisted in the process whereby 
the vast natural resources of the Pacifi c ~orthwes t \'/ere trans-
formed into capi ta 1.1 Then too, the fi rs t mode rn pol ice depa rtment 
in each city was established, in part, as response to the need to 
protect private property from being destroyed by the riots of the 
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1870s.8 Given these origins, it appears that the Seattle and Portland 
police mainly functioned as the defenders of economic interests in 
their earliest years of existence. 
Since the time of the official formation of police departments 
in Seattle and Portland, the organization and function of the police 
in these cities has been influenced by political as \ole" as economic 
interests. Local political control has been a predominant force in 
the history of both police departments. In particular, the Seattle 
City Council exercised authority over the police for the entire 
period of 1912-1920. The Portland City Council formally controlled 
the police in that city in 1912 and a Commissioner of Public Safety 
(i .e., the f4ayor under the cOl1111ission form of municipal government) 
directed the police in Portland from 1913 through 1920. State 
control over the Seattle and Portland police departments existed in 
the form of the power of the Washington and Oregon state legislatures 
to enact criminal laws which the police were responsible for 
enforcing throughout the period of 1912-1920. Even some degree of 
national political control over these police departments was present 
during World War I. 
With regard to the city police departments per set the Seattle 
and Portland police departments featured two major branches and 
several special units during the years under consideration.9 Most 
of the police in both departments were part of patrol divisions. 
These officers wore uniforms and were assigned beats to patrol. 
Other police officers wO'rked in detective divisions. ~4any of 
these officers wore plain clothes and conducted criminal investigations. 
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In addition to the departments' major organizational components, each 
department had specialized units. The existence and operations of 
these units largely seems to have depended upon prevailing social 
conditions. Red squads, for instance, emerged within the Portland 
and Seattle police departments when radicalism became an important 
problem for the economically dominant class and for the larger 
society. 
Size was a point of dissimilarity between the two depart-
ments. In 1912 the Portland Police Department had a total of 292 
sworn officers, while the Seattle Police Department had a total of 
3290fficers. 10 By 1920 the total strength of the both departments 
was approximately 400 police officers. ll Besides the regular police 
force, both cities utilized auxiliary police forces at different 
points in time between 1912 and 1920. These auxiliary police were 
often referred to as "special" police because they were hired for 
riots, major strikes, and other special situations. 
With respect to the handling of labor unrest by the Seattle 
and Portland city police prior to 1912, the available information 
pertains to police involvement in a few, possibly unrepresentative 
events. In part, this lack of information has stemmed from the 
low 1 eve 1 of organi zed 1 abor acti vi ty that ex; s ted before the 1. ~l. w. 
had firmly established itself in Seattle and Portland. 
The anti-Chinese incidents of 1884-1886 are perhaps the most 
frequently cited of the early police encounters with militant workers 
in Seattle. 12 The Seattle police "distinguished" themselves in one 
of these incidents when they refused to break up a mob of native-born 
laboring men who attempted to forcibly depor't a large group of 
Chinese to San Francisco.*13 Since the police did not intervene 
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into this disturbance, it has been alleged that they were in sympathy 
with the mob. 14 
One of the most famous of early police contacts \'1ith labor 
radicals in Portland was the 1907 I.~~.W. sawmill strike. The 
relatively controlled behavior of the Portland police was evidenced 
by the absence of any police-initiated violence and by the fact 
that there was only one strike-related arrest during the 40-day 
strike. 15 The Portland police behaved,·somewhat differently during 
a 1910 strike of iron workers. Responding to a call about a "free-
for-all fight" between pickets and scabs, the police dispersed the 
combatants with the use of clubs and arrested a leader from each 
side of the brawl. 16 
Although it is not known whether the inaction of the Seattle 
police or the well-controlled manner of the Portland police were the 
normal responses of these police forces to labor unrest before 1912, 
the above-cited instances at least provide an idea of what early 
police-labor relations were like in Seattle and Portland. It must 
be reiterated that the Seattle and Portland police did not have a 
great deal of experience in dealing with labor disputes prior to 
1912. ~·'oreover, it should be recalled that both police departments 
had been in existence a relatively short period of Lime before 1912. 
Thus in 1912, though the l~obb1ies were emerg'f.nq as a force in the 
*The reason for the mob's action was that some native-born 
workers felt that Chinese workers were crowding them out of the 
labor market. 
communities of Seattle and Portland. the police in these cities 
lacked tradition of coping with labor radicalism. Just what the 
police did in their encounters with labor radicals from 1912-
1920 is the subject of the next six chapters of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE POTLATCH RIOTS AND THE SEATTLE POLICE 
The IIRiotsll 
During the period of 1912-1913 the Seattle police related to 
labor radicals in much the same way that a spoon would relate to a 
hot toddy. The police had to stir a simmering mixture of labor 
radicalism, which included the I.t~.~J. and a strong Socialist Party. 
In the process of dealing with the labor radicals, the Seattle 
police were not only burned, they were scalded by the community's 
reaction to their handling of a particular series of events known 
as the Potlatch Riots. 
The Potlatch Riots were more or less the stage upon which the 
police and the I.W.W. acted out a rolicking, wild scenario, which 
those wi th power and pri vi 1 ege used both the I. ~I. W. and the ci ty 
police as pawns in a game of power politics. The riots themselves 
were a string of collective gatherings and disturbances that happened 
at the time of the Potlatch Days summer festival in Seattle in 1913. 
Actually, the II r iots,1I as they have been referred to by newspaper 
reporters and historians, were not riots in the precise terms of 
what constitutes a riot. A riot in the true sense of the word is 
lIa situation in which a number of mobs are simultaneously active in 
the same area. 1I1 None of the so-called Potlatch Riots fit this 
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definition since there was only a single mob in action at one time 
in each of the disorderly and violent situations during Potlatch Days. 
The first violent outburst during Potlatch Days involved in-
toxicated sailors who attempted to break up a Socialist street 
meeting on July 16, 1913. The sailors took over a soap box that 
had been occupi ed by Nrs •. l\nni e r-1i 11 er and they conducted a mock 
meeting. When tks. Hiller tried to get the soap box back, one of 
the sailors raised his fist to strike her. A "l arge , well-dressed 
Man, with a diamond ring, who bore no resemblance to the typical 
I.WJ~.," stepped in and struck the sailor several times with his 
fist. 2 Next, a fight started which developed into a "general melee" 
wh,~n the crowd whi ch had been 1 istening to the speakers turned into 
a mon, attacking the drunken sailors. Sergeant Joseph T. Mason, 
who was patrolling the area, turned in a riot call* which brought 
a squad of police, a police captain, and three motorcycle police 
to the scene. The police were able to disperse the mob and to pull 
the mil ita t'y men frOM under the feet of thei r as sa i 1 ants. The 
police made no arrests because none of the injured could identify 
their assailants. 3 
Even though the Seattle police were able to rescue the sailors 
from the mob, the Seattl e Times charged Seattl e r"layor George F. 
Cotterill and the police with "dereliction of duty. II Also, the 
Times mistakenly claimed that r~rs. t1iller was a t~obbly and that 
*A riot call consisted of a policeman informing an officer at 
police headquarters that some type of disorderly situation, involving 
two or more persons, was either in progress or likely to occur. Riot 
calls were often made in regard to incidents that were not riots. 
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IIred flag worshippers" and "anarchistsll had beaten up two police 
officers and three soldiers. 4 These details as well as other parts 
of the account of the event amounted to bald-faced lies. The lies 
were exposed several days after the disturbance when sworn affidavits 
of persons who saw or took part in the melee on July 16th indicated 
that ~ks. Miller was not a member of the I.W.W. and that no one was 
seriously injured in the fracas. 5 
Subtle threats and warnings in addition to these falsehoods 
were contained in the July 17th issue of the Times. The Times 
cOMmented that its reporters had "heard" citizens state that the 
II real patriots ll should rise up in wrath and do the ~1ayor's job 
for him by IIcleaning out the reds. 1I In addition, the Times 
prophetically noted that the Seattle police had been notified two 
times that a group of enlisted men would "circulate aboutll the 
I.W.W. headquarters on the 18th.6 
Pandemonium and lawlessness reigned in Seattle on the night 
of July 18th. j·10b vi olence broke out when a party of uni formed men 
entered I.W.W. headquarters while the I.W.W. was holding a street 
meeting. A street cop turned in a riot call and by the time that 
a squad of police had ans\'/ered the call, the invaders had already 
gained entrance to the headquarters and had begun to carry out a 
scheme of destruction. Desks were smashed, chairs hurled against 
the wall, and literature was thrown out of windows. 7 The Wobblies, 
upon learning of the attack on the office, ran from the street 
meeting to I.W.W. headquarters in an attempt to stop the soldiers 
and sailors. The Wobblies' efforts to defend their property 
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failed miserably and the military men had no trouble "do\'Ining the wage 
slaves" in an exchange of fisticuffs. 8 
By this time nearly 5,000 spectators had gathered about the 
I.\~.~1. headquarters. The Seattle Times described the remainder of 
the riot in colorful, yet accurate terms:* 
Cries of "Fourth and Pike ll sounded, and the little vanguard, 
backed by a small number of excited civilians, shot up First 
Avenue, crossed over to Second at the double quick, east on 
Pike, and drew up at Millard Pricels newsstand •••. Half a 
dozen hands seized the Socialist newsstand up against the 
curb and in a second papers and pamphlets filled the air. 
The stand emptied, the soldiers and sailors of the vanguard, 
numbering no more than a dozen, overturned the stand and began 
to demolish it ..•. The avengers had noted that the stand 
was painted red. IISmash everything thatls red,1I shouted one 
of the party, as he laid the last whole board [of the stand] 
on ~he curb and descended on it with his No. lOis .••. 
From somewhere about the stand one of the sailors plucked a 
red fl ag. . • . Thi s \'Ias torn to tatters. Matches were 
quickly applied [to the remains of the flag] and the odor of 
burning rags presently told of the destruction of the I.W.W. 
emblem. [Near] the Socialist newsstand stood a stand where 
daily newspapers are sold .... A Soldier ran over to the 
other cart and stuck an American flag among the papers in the 
top rack. When the willing workers made for that stand too, 
thinking it of the same breed as the one just smashed, they 
spied the flag and promptly moved back. Heads were bared 
and cheers for the flag drowned the roar of Pike Street 
traffic ..•. [Next] •.• the little band broke into a run 
down Pike Street to Third Avenue, thence north toward the 
Socialist headquarters at 1909 Fourth Avenue. By this time 
a crowd of more than 1,000 civilians trooped along to see 
the fun. 
The headquarters escaped with a broken window .••• A 
soldier, loudly applauded by the crowd ..• climbed with an 
American flag •.• to place it over the window [of the 
Socialist headquarters]. 
The little band now headed south to Olive Street and at 
Olive Street broke into a run eastward. The crowd that 
*There were no major discrepancies between the Times report 
of this disturbance and the Seattle Starls version of the same 
event. For the Starls account, see the Seattle Star, July 19, 
1913, p. 1. --
followed was now blocks long and included men, women, 
and children. Automobiles brought up the rear. 
The parade terminated at 711 Olive Street. At that 
place stands a dilapidated oid church said to be used 
as a branch headquarters of the "di rect action" 
Socialists .••• Rushing up the shaky steps of the 
building, three or four of the leaders leaned against 
the old door, and it crumbled like a rotten shingle . 
. . • The door smashed in, there was presently heard 
the crashing of glass in a half dozen places 
simultaneously •... Much of the work was done with 
chairs or whatever came to hand, but when one of the 
more completely smashed windows burst out, a pro-
truding foot told how the deed was done. Every-
body cheered for the foot. A second later another 
pane crashed, and at the open window appeared a 
soldier with an American flag. Wavin~ the flag 
wildly, he shouted "Hurr~h for the American flag, 
down ~/i th the 1. \4. t4. 's . II 
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There were no dissenting votes to the military man's suggestion 
to smash the I.W.W., no mobocrats* were arrested by police, and in 
general, no serious effort was made by the police to stop the 
ravaging of property. 
r~ayor Cotterill, not the police, made the next move. Asserting 
the emergency powers of the office of mayor on the 19th, Cotterill 
assumed control of the police department. He then ordered the 
Times to suspend the publication of all issues for the next bm days, 
demanded the closing of all saloons, and called for the breaking up of 
all meetings. 10 The police were an important part of Cotterill's plan. 
TV/enty-five policemen were dispatched to the Times building where they 
closed do\'1n t~e newspaper. The pol i ce \'1ere also charged \'1i til the re-
sponsibility of enforcing Cotterill's orders regarding saloons and 
street meetings." All of this \'1as done in the name of riot prevention. 
*A mobocrat is a person who attempts to accomplish an end 
through rule by the mob. 
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Cotterill's attempt to gain control over an explosive situ-
ation was quickly undone by a court order restraining Police Chief 
Claude G. Bannick and him from preventing the printing and circulation 
of Seattle Times newspapers. Cotterill's command to close down the 
saloons were also overturned by a court order. Instead of Cotterill's 
plan, the community of Seattle received United States military troops. 
Shore police from a Navy fleet and military police from a nearby 
Army camp were imported to assist the local police in keeping the 
peace. 12 Surprisingly, order was maintained for the remainder of 
the summer festival. 
The absence of disorder, however, did not mean that the work 
of the city police was finished. Deciding to make "political hay" 
out of the July 18th disturbance, the I.W.W. held a series of 
evening meetings on the streets of Seattle. This time it was the 
merchant~ who complained about the Wobblies. They contended that 
I.~lI.H. street meetings hurt trade in their stores. The police 
responded to the businessmen's complaints by dispersing crowds and 
by arresting speakers at I.~J.~J. gatherings. For example, on 
July 21st the Seattle police broke up a crowd of over 2,000 at an 
I.W.W. meeting. 13 Although the Wobblies persisted in holding 
meetings, the constant intrusion of the police into their propoganda-
spreading efforts, eventually contributed to the abandonment of the 
alleged riot issue by the I.!W.W. 
Police Behavior in the Potlatch Disturbances 
At this point a closer inspection of police behavior during 
the Potlatch unrest is required in order to explain police inaction 
as well as police action. Before, during, and after the so-called 
riots, the Seattle police department \'las a focal point of attention. 
To some degree, the police like the radicals, were the "victims" of 
a whirlwind that swept through the city in July 1913. The police 
were roasted in print by the Seattle Times and the U.S. Navy Board 
of Inquiry for their neutral posture in the July 16th brawl;*14 they 
were crucified in a report for being too biased in favor of the 
sailors and the local mobs in the July 18th disorder by the U.S. 
Navy's Board of Inquiry;15 and they were even blamed for the actual 
occurrence of mob violence on July 18th by the Socialists. 16 Only 
~·1ayor Cotteri 11 defended the pol i ce. 17 
The Times treated the July 16th incident as though it could 
have been prevented if the police had suppressed public speaking by 
18 labor radicals and had confiscated their red flags. The U.S. 
Navy Board of Inquiry agreed with the Times' critical assessment of 
the police role in the melee of July 16th. 19 The Board charged 
that the police were lax in pennitting Socialists and \~obblies to 
heap abuse upon the military in the streets of Seattle. ~10reover, 
the Board complained that the three servicemen involved in the 
melee were taken into custody by the police without a charge and 
that concurrently no charges were filed against the I.W.I~. 
In regard to the mob actions on the 18th, the Board claimed 
that the small number of enlisted men in the disturbance could have 
*The U.S. Navy Board of Inquiry was appointed by the Commander 
in Chief of the Pacific Reserve Fleet to investigate the Potlatch 
Riots. 
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been checked by the police. Exactly how many enlisted men and police-
men were at the I.H.W. headquarters is not known. However, the Board 
estimated that 20 to 30 men of the Navy and Marine Corps corrmenced 
the plundering procession. 20 The Times stated that a "squad" of 
police arrived at I.W.W. headquarters. 21 Given that a police squad 
consisted of six to eight men in 1913, it would seem that a squad 
of police, using some type of force, may have been able to stem the 
tide of unrest through early intervention. 
Another one of the Board's allegations was that the police \t'ere 
too conspicuous in their support for actions of the mob. According 
to the Board, it was all too evident from police conduct during the 
riot that the police were in sympathy with the acts of those who 
were destroying property. !·1ore speci fi cally, the Board charged that 
Seattle police officers were among the crowd that followed the 
military men along the path of destruction. The inaction of these 
police, in the Board's view, provided an unofficial sanction to the 
disturbance. In addition, the Board reported that no formal 
complaints were made against the enlisted men by the police authorities 
in Seattle. Based upon these and other "findings," the Board 
concluded that the responsibility for the mob violence on the 18th 
should be placed on the police because they took no effective steps 
to prevent the mob from carrying out its ruinous work. 22 
The Socialist Party also blamed the police for the outbreak of 
violence on the 18th. Millard Price, one of the leaders of the 
local Socialist Party and the one whose newsstand had been destroyed 
by the mob, declared that the police could have stopped the military 
85 
men and thus saved his property. He told a Seattle Star reporter that 
the Socialists on learning of the military men's plans in advance, 
asked for police protection. However, Chief Bannick sent only 
two men to patrol the area surrounding the Socialist headquarters, 
d· t p. 23 accor 1ng 0 rlce. 
Price's point about the inadequacy of the response of the police 
appears to have some merit. The complete saturation of an area with 
police was the standard response of the Seattle police to predicted 
mob violence or to an actual riot call. Then, too, it seems fitting 
to at least raise the question of whether or not more police would 
have been dispatched if the Seattle Times offices had been threatened 
and then besieged by Wobblies. In the same vein, it can be asked, 
"would the police have been more likely to use force to stop the 
mob if the mob had been composed of l~obb 1 es and the mob I s target 
had been the property of 'respectable' citizens?" Price as well 
as the Board of Inquiry no doubt would have answered both questions 
in the affirmative. 
r,1ayor Cotteri 11 took an enti re ly di fferent and se 1 f-servi ng 
position in regard to police actions during Potlatch Days. He main-
tained that a "debt of public gratitude" was due the Chief of Police 
and the offi cers under hi s cOJTll1and for "tactful servi ce" performed 
under "great difficulties" on extra time "beyond the regular hours 
and cornpensatio;;: ,~r police \'Iork."24 On the topic of the skirmish 
on July 16th, Cotterill asserted that he would never use the police 
to suppress the free speech rights of the I.W.W. or any other group. 
He also pointed out that the police could not be expected to "crack 
down ll on persons who waved red banners si nee thet'e was no 1 aw or 
ordinance prohibiting the display of any flag in Seattle. 25 
On the issue of police conduct on July 18th, Cotterill averred 
that the police had acted wisely. IIHad they interferred,1I he said, 
26 
"there would have been mass bloodshed." In support of Cotterill's 
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contention, it should be noted that the Times reported that the I.W.W. 
headquarters was already in shambles by the time the riot squad 
arrived on the scene. 27 The~ too, it is not clear that even squads 
of policemen would have matched the numerical strength of the 
enlisted men in the middle and later stages of the disturbance. 
Approximately 200 enlisted men of the Navy and r~arine Corps had 
participated in the mob action by the time that it had run its course 
through Seattle. 28 
Even if there had been as many policemen as servicemen present 
on the mob's route, the police still may not have been able to qu~11 
the disorder, given the nature of the crowd which took part in the 
disturbance. It is clear from articles in both the Times and the 
Star that the crm'ld was supportive of the military men's actions.*29 
"Supporti veil may be an understatement. The Navy's Board of Inqui ry 
observed that from their dress and appearance, many of the civilians 
in the crowd clearly belonged to the "better class of citizens." 
The Board offered these details on the activities of civilian 
"1 eaders ": 
*It was estimated by a correspondent of the Seattle Star that 
the crowd varied in size from 25,000 to 30,000 persons, depending 
upon the phase of the disturbance. In general, the crm'ld resembled 
a snowball, picking up more persons as the mob rolled along its 
course. 
The movement appears to have been led, or at least 
guided, by the citizens of Seattle, who constantly gave 
notice and passed information among the crowd as to where 
the various Industrial Workers of the World and Socialist 
offices and rooms were and to which place the crowd would, 
after visiting one place, proceed to the next. It appears 
that after arriving at each of these Industrial Workers 
of the World and Socialist places the citizens in the 
crowd took the lead in showing the men engaged either in 
wrecking these places or in taking out the furnishings 
and burning them in the street, where the entrances were and 
hm'l the contents mi ght be removed. 30 
Besides the rational, calculating "gentlemen of property" who 
may have been the stage managers of the riot, other persons in the 
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crowd were very emotional. These persons let out frantic cheers, 
howls, and screams each time either something red t'las smashed or some-
thing red, white, and blue was exhalte.d to a position of prominence. 3l 
Irrational behavior by some civilians in the crm'ld manifested itself 
in the wrecking of a gospel mission. The civilians discovered their 
mistake before the entire mission had been plundered, hm,/ever. \'Ihen 
they found that the red banners on the walls read IIGod is Lovell 
instead of 1I0ne Big Union. lI* 
As well as the apparent strengths in Cotterill's defense of 
t:,e police, there were at least two glaring \'/eaknesses. In stating 
that the police acted wisely by not interfering with the mob's 
actions on the 18th because they wanted to avoid bloodshed. 
Cotterill implied that the Seattle police recognized that the mob 
was harming only property and that as a consequence they chose not 
to intervene for fear of endangering the lives of persons. 
*One Big Union was an I.W.W. slogan. referring to the I.~J.~I. 
principal of organizing workers on the basis of entire industries 
rather than on the basis of crafts as the A.F.L. did in its 
operations. 
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Cotterill's position was ingenuous. On the one hand, it is true 
that, for the most part, the mob attacked property rather than persons. 
The total property damage resulting from the July 18th melee was 
estimated to be from $3,000 to $5,000, while the only casualty 
reported was a Wobbly whose nose was broken. 32 
On the other hand, there is no evidence to indicate that the 
Seattle police made it a standard practice to step aside when property 
was being smashed to bits, justifying their inaction on the grounds 
that is was "only" property and that someone might get hurt if they 
were to protect that property. Contrary to what is implied in 
Cotterill's stance, part of the law enforcement activities of the 
Seattle police department in 1913 were devoted to the enforcement 
of laws relating to property. Police records indicate that the 
police were busy arresting thieves, recovering stolen merchandise, 
and guarding stores, mills, and other business places in 1913. 13 
Hence, the protection of private property was an integral part of 
the day-to-day functioning of the Seattle police. It seems exceedingly 
doubtful that the Seattle law enforcement officers could have so easily 
discarded a concern for defending private property when such a concern 
was so integrally bound up with their role as police. 
Cotterill's defense of the police was also defective on 
another count. By directing his statements exclusively toward the 
role of the polic~ in the disturbances, Cotterill was able to 
abdicate his own responsibility for police policy. Under Seattle's 
council form of municipal government, the mayor was supposed to be 
the elected official who was most accountable for police behavior. 
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l~ith a politician's sleight-of-hand, however, Cotterill was able to 
avoid a discussion of the real issue of \>lhose interests were served 
by the actions of the Seattle police during the Potlatch Day's 
disorder. 
Class Politics and Police Policy 
Setting aside the issue of who should be blamed for the Potlatch-
related violence, it is useful to analyze police behavior in terms of 
the political context of the disturbances. At the time they \'>/ere in 
full swing the so-called Potlatch Riots were billed by the Seattle 
media as involving a battle to preserve the American way of life. In 
reality, however, this was not a fight for or against the flag. The 
key fact behind all of the Potlatch-related incidents was that the 
city of Seattle was going through a mighty upheaval in which organ-
ized labor including its radical elements, was aligned with the 
churches, the social clubs, and the civic and reform organizations 
against a loosely connected network of powerful men and interests 
headed by J. D. Farrell, the vice president of the Great ~Jorthern 
Railroad. 34 Linkages between the legitimate business community, 
city politicians, the police, and organized vice constituted the most 
important aspects of this network.* 
In essence, the political context of the Potlatch Riots was 
the classic early twentieth century power struggle between reformers 
and machine politicians. Seattle reformers obtained a 1I\,/edge ll to 
*A similar combination of the business, political, police, and 
criminal interests was discovered in a study of social life in 
Seattle in 1971. See William J. Chambliss, IIVice, Corruption, and 
Power,1I Wisconsin Law Review, 4 (1971), pp. 1130-1155. 
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force their way into city government when a recall amendment was 
inserted into the city charter in 1906; the passage of a women's 
suffrage amendment in 1910 set the stage for the recall of machine-
supported ~·1ayor Hi ram C. Gi 11 in 1911. 35 Gi 11, a Democrat, was 
defeated by George vI. Dilling, a Progressive Republican, in a recall 
election in which the point of contention was ·an "open" versus a 
"closed" town. Gill and Chief of Police Charles H. ~Iappenstein,* 
who was Boss Farrell's personally selected chief of police, promoted 
the unobstructed perpetuation of gambling, prostitution, and other 
forms of vi ce in Seattle, whi 1 e the reformers favored the suppressi on 
of all vice. The police response to Socialist and I.W.W. activities 
was not an issue presumably because the patriotic passions of the 
citizens had not yet been raised the the reality of war and by the 
Seattle Times' propaganda. 
During Gill's first term in office his tolerance for all 
kinds of vice was matched by his willingness to at least put up with 
the varieties of labor radicalism that existed in Seattle. Apparently, 
neither the Socialist Party and the I.W.IL nor the /\.F.L. local unions 
were sufficiently enamored by Gill's position regarding labor radicals 
to support him. In fact, organized labor was responsible for the 
circulation of petitions to recall Gill.**36 Ne'lJlyenfranchised 
*Chief of Police Wappenstein was later tried, convicted, and 
sent to the lrJashington State Penitentiary for accepting a bribe from 
two operators of "Dawdy" houses in Seattle in 1912. 
**The recall process in Seattle's municipal government operated 
as follows: if the signatures of one-fourth of the registered voters 
were collected on recall petitions, a special election would be held. 
The name of the official under attack and the names of candidates 
nominated by local political constituencies were placed on the ballot. 
If the incumbent received more votes than any of the challengers, the 
incumbent remained in office; if another canaidate received a plurality, 
the incumbent was recalled. Murray r·10rgan described this process in 
Skid Road: Seattle: Her First 125 Years (Sausalito, Calif.: Comstock, 
1978), p. 172. . 
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women were another group that was active in the recall of Gill. Some 
political analysts have even gone so far as to claim that the female 
vote was the decisive factor in the 1911 recall. 37 At the very least, 
it can be stated that Dilling was elected and finished out what would 
have been Gill's term in 1911, in part, because of the efforts of 
Seattle women. 
So far as the riots are concerned, it is essential to under-
stand the class politics involved in the 1912 mayor'al election that 
followed the recall. The critical point ;s that George Cotterill, 
"a Progressive Democrat, was able to defeat Gill, his opponent, 
because Cotterill was supported by a coalition of middle class 
Progressives and working class people.*38 This was an uneasy 
coalition due to the antagonistic interests held by the middle and 
working classes. The fundamental contradiction manifested itself 
in the issue of "refontl." Reform for the middle class meant the 
prohibition of alcohol, gambling, and other vices, the abolition of 
entrenched political machines, and the establishment of a middle 
class dominated power base. To a sizable segment of the working 
class, however, reform meant pro-labor public policy and radical 
39 
social change. 
When Cotterill took office, he had to maintain this tenuous 
coalition as well as ward off attacks from the opposition. The 
*For an excellent analysis of the relationship between militant 
workingmen and liberals in the ear'ly twentieth century, see Eugene M. 
Tobin, "Direct Action and Conscience: The 1913 Paterson Strike as 
an Example of the Relationship Between Labor Radicals and Liberals," 
Labor History, 20 (Winter, 1979), pp. 73-88. 
latter concern turned into a source of continual annoyance for 
Cotterill. From the beginning of the 1912 mayoral campaign through 
the Potlatch Days Colonel Alden J. Blethen, the owner of the Seattle 
Times and an advocate of an "open" town, utilized the pages of the 
Times to make appeals to the patriotic passions of the Seattle 
citizenry in hopes of weakening Cotterill's support. In particular, 
the Times criticized Cotterill for not employing the police to 
suppress I.W.W.-sponsored demonstrations in early 1912. The demon-
strati ons were for Leonard 01 sson, a Wobbly 't/ho fought to have hi s 
citizenship restored by the courts. Blethen also blamed Cotterill 
for allowing the Wobblies to bear a red flag in a ~~ay Day parade in 
Seattle in 1912. 40 The troubles between Cotterill, Blethen, and the 
1. \~. W. became more and more rancorous unti 1 they exploded in the 
face of Cotterill and in the presence of the Seattle police during 
the 1913 Potlatch Days. 
In retrospect, it now appears that the class composition of 
r·1ayor Cotterill's political base \lIas a key factor in the shaping of 
the pol i ce pol i cy toward the ~Iobb 1 i es and the Soci ali s ts duri n9 
those violent and disorderly days in the summer of 1913. While the 
tumultuous events of Potlatch Days were in motion, Cotterill had to 
counterbalance the interests of the working class union people, who 
had supported him, with the interests of the Seattle Times, which 
had backed his political opponent. At the same time, Cotterill had 
to consider the interests of middle class merchants whose profits 
would have been reduced if he had either locked up all of the mob-
ocratic military men upon whose money the economic success of the 
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Potlatch festival partially depended or allowed I.W.W. street meetings 
to scare away middle class shoppers in the days following the mob 
violence. 
The end product of Cotterill's attempt to mesh these clashing 
interests was a police policy of minimal intervention. To a certain 
extent, a policy of little or no police action was dictated by the 
fact that the main elements in Cotterill's political base, namely 
the middle and working classes, were set in opposition to one another. 
In this situation of political stalemate the problem of labor radical-
ism presented such difficulties to Cotterill's fragile base of support 
that an attempt to resolve the problem in favor of any of the 
affected parties may have had disastrous political consequences for 
the r··1ayor. Ironically, the policy of minimal intervention served 
to heighten the antagonisms between the middle and working classes 
by making their antithetical interests more noticable. This was 
the result, even though Cotterill apparently intended to appease 
both classes. 
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CHAPTER V 
ROHDYISM, REFORr~, RIOT, AND REPRESSION IN PORTLAND 
Police Policy Under the Rushlight Administration 
Labor radicalism became a thorny problem for the Portland 
police in the latter part of 1911 and in 1912. During these years 
the ~'lobblies and Socialists began to hold rowdy street meetings, 
using abusive and profane language which brought complaints from 
the "decent" citizens of the city.l ~ayor A. G. Rushlight, a 
Republican by party affiliation and a plumber by trade, had to deal 
with the complaints since he held authority over police officers. 
To some extent, the nature of Mayor Rushlight's political 
constituencies predisposed him to allow working class protest in 
Portland. His power seems to have derived, in part, from certain 
\'/ea lthy Repub 1 i cans, who had close ti es to the "power broker" 
element in Portland. 2 This is not to imply that he always enjoyed 
complete support from the business corrmunity, but rather to point 
out Rushlight's connections to the old business-political establish-
ment* in Portland which was in a state of decline in 1912. This old 
establishment had traditionally relied upon the working class as a 
wellspring of its political power. In Rushlight's case, the 
*The "o1d establishment" in Portland consisted of business and 
professional leaders, most of whom were members of the wealthiest 
families in Portland. 
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working class was a source of support, owing to his representation of 
this class in his former role as a councilman for southeast Portland. 
Vice interests may have been yet another component in Rush1ight l s 
political base. There is at least circumstantial evidence to 
indicate that Rush1ight was linked to Portland vice interests. 3 !~hat 
\ 
these bits and pieces of information seem to add up to is a mayor, 
styled in the genre of the traditional machine-supported official, 
but lacking a finely-tuned political machine. 
One of Mayor Rush1ight l s first encounters with the labor 
radicals came in the Baden-Powell affair. Robert Baden-Powell, the 
founder of the Boy Scouts, arrived in Portland in the spring of 1912 
for the purpose of extolling the virtues of the scouting movement. 
A public debate was scheduled between Baden-Powell and Allan McDonald, 
the secretary of the I.W.H. local unions in Portland, but the full 
debate never took place because Baden-Powell was heckled during his 
initial presentation. 4 Unidentified rowdies shouted down Baden-
Powell IS efforts to speak; the rowdies yelled and hooted about the 
militarism that allegedly inherred in the scouting movement. 
The Spanish-American War Veterans and the Realty Board* were 
so upset by the outcome of the quasi-debate that they passed a 
resolution, blaming the Socialist Party and the I.I~.H. for pre-
venting Baden-Powell from speaking and threatening ~Ilayor Rushlignt 
\'/ith areca 11 if he di d not stop soap box orators from speaki ng 
*The Realty Board was an association of businessmen concerned 
with real estate affairs in Portland. 
98 
on the streets of Portland. On the other side of the controversy, 
the Central Labor Council* of Portland criticized the Realty Board 
for advocating the suppression of First Amendment rights, defending 
Rushlight's stand in favor of free speech. As for the I.W.tL, it 
denied any responsibility for the heckling. In a public statement 
the I.W.W. pointed out that since the I.l~.W. secretary was invited 
to be a participant in the debate, there was no reason for the I.IL~/. 
to disrupt the meeting. 5 
Several days later the Portland News claimed to have uncovered 
a "plot" to incite a riot at the Baden-Powell meeting. 6 According 
to the News, the hecklers were hired by the Employer's Association** 
and other local business interests to create a disturbance in order 
to force Rushlight to use the police against organized labor. 
Interestingly, the News stressed that most of the members of the 
Employers' Association were "keen businessmen" who \.,rere practically 
blameless in the Baden-Powell flare-up. Those behind the plot, in 
the News' opinion, constituted a small minority of "radical labor 
haters" who had taken control of the Employer's Association. 7 
The News' "evidence" of a plot was flimsy and not sufficient 
to convince any reasonable person of the existence of a conspiracy. 
Moreover, the matter of the alleged plot was dropped as an issue 
*The Central Labor Council was composed of representatives 
from local unions that were affiliated with the American Federation 
of Labor (A.F.L.). 
**The Employers Association was an organization of Portland 
businessmen who formalized their affiliations in order to enlarge 
their control over the local economY. 
by the press soon after it was fi rst introduced by the News. :'lhat 
pricks one's curiosity, however, is the revelation that the police 
were a primary source of information for the News in its attempt to 
outline the alleged plot. * The News stated that it was the plan of 
the police to follow the "trouble-makers" at the Baden-Powell debate 
to their rooms and to arrest them unobtrusively in order to prevent 
a demonstration by people who thought that a "bona fi de Sod al ist" 
was being persecuted. Unfortunately for the police, the alleged 
hecklers evaded them at the end of the meeting. 8 
These types of police actions apparently were not uncharacter-
istic of the ways in which the Portland police handled labor unrest 
in 1912. In fact, the general police policy toward labor during 
the early months of the Rushlight regime seems to have been one 
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of toleration. Hhile Rushlight served as mayor, the police allowed 
street speakers the right of free speech and permitted union pickets 
to gather in front of a struck plant. Commenting on the police 
policy under the Rushlight adminstration, the Portland News declared: 
•.. The police were instructed merely to preserve the 
peace and order and to take the side of neither capital nor 
labor, but to give each a square deal. 9 
Another major event involving the Portland police and the 
labor radicals was a strike of women and girls at the Oregon Packing 
Company on Portland's eastside. The strike began when from 50 to 
*That the police were informants for reporters of the Portland 
News should not surprise anyone who has perused issues of the paper 
for the years of 1911-1913. The News staunchly supported the police, 
often printing poems, letters, and other items written by street 
policemen. 
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to 100 of the company's 250 workers walked out of the plant on June 27, 
1913 because of extremely low wages and unsanitary working condi-
tions. 10 This dispute between the \'/ell-established fruit company 
and women fruit sorters had a "David versus Goliath" scenario. The 
women were both exploited and powerless, being paid only a 10 cent 
hourly wage and lacking union organization. They received a sub-
stantial amount of support from members of the I.W.W., the Socialist 
Labor Party, and independent Socialists who supplied aid to them in 
the form of fund raising, housing, food, and baby-sitting. Host 
importantly, the radicals organized the women workers and represented 
them in negotiations with the management of the packing company. 
The Oregon Packing Company, in contradistinction to the fruit 
sorters, was a powerful inter-state corporation. In point of fact, 
the "Oregon Packing Company II was merely a local name for the 
California Fruit Canner's Association. This Association controlled 
the market in canned goods in the West; it was a mUlti-million 
dollar concern, setting prices and making substantial profits. In 
California, the majority of the fruit packing plants were controlled 
by the corporation and, at the time of the cannery strike, the 
Association owned plants in Portland and Salem, Oregon. Cheap labor 
was a keynote in the corporation's success. The Association made 
heavy use of the cheapest type of immigrant labor in California, 
whereas the corporation refused to pay the women even subsistence 
wages in Portland. ll 
The police became involved in the dispute between the women 
and the company on the second day of the strike. When the inexperienced 
10l 
strikers set up a picket line, some police tried to intimidate 
them by zooming up to the picket line in a patrol car whose bell 
was clanging. Hhen the officers jumped out of the car hurriedly, 
the women expected a raid which never occurred. Later a police 
captain explained to the press that this was only part of the routine 
changing of officers from the night to the day shift. 12 
Other minor forms of police harrassment were employed in the 
first days of the strike. Police Captain Moore, apparently upset 
by banners reading "Forty cents a day makes prostitutes" and "A dog 
wouldn't scab," incorrectly informed the women that according to 
city law they could not carry banners. 13 Other police officers told 
the strikers that they could picket, but that "calling anybody a 
scab" would be grounds for an arrest. 14 In spite of this chicanery 
on the part of the police, the strikers continued picketing in 
from of the plant, occasionally mounting a tar barrel in order to 
urge those still \tJorking to join them. 
In contrast to these measly attempts to frighten the women 
strikers, Guy Fuller, a patrolman, sided with the strikers. Fuller 
even composed the following poem which was used by the women to 
publicize their situation: 
I have seen men gaunt and weary 
waiting for a strike to end. 
Waiting for a chance to labor for 
the homes they must defend. 
There's a strike now in our city, 
going on this very day; 
A demand by girls for wages for 
a soul-sustaining pay--
Wages that will buy them clothing--
give them decent food to eat; 
Keep their souls from being bartered 
to the vice clique of the street. 
This is but one strike in many on 
. lithe roads that lead to Rome": 
Look about you! See the menace 
to your country and your home. 
See the mothers bent and broken 
'neath their heavy burdens bowed; 
See the fathers! See the children! 
It's the weary, motley crowd--
Pitiful, emaciated, soul-appalling 
in thei r need! 
Crucified with the spikes of hunger 
on the sordid cross of greed! 
Know the product of such suffering 
isn't all your money buys. 
But the soul of the producer 
is a purchase-given prize; 
For whenever strikes are ordered 
and the flag of want unfurled, 
Human lives are being bartered 
in the markets of the world. 15 
The pro-labor poem by Fuller and the petty harrassment by 
~10ore and other officers indicates that the police themselves may 
have been divided over the dispute at the cannery. The important 
point, however, is that the police did not forcibly remove the 
pickets from in front of the cannery. Instead they allowed the 
strikers at least some degree of freedom in their protest actions. 
Po 1 i ce Pol i cy and t·1uni ci pa 1 Refol1l1 
A dramatic shift occurred on July 1st in the police policy 
with respect to the labor dispute at the cannery. i1ayor H. Russell 
Albee, a reformer, and a new administration, including a new police 
chief, were sworn in; also, the commission form of city government 
took effect on this date. The first act of incoming Police Chief 
John Cl ark was to order the stri kers to "qui t pi cketing • • • quit 
speaking ... quit parading, or else face a jail sentence." 16 
The striking women reacted to the chief's order by issuing a 
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statement of their own which read: "Bring on your injunction, bring 
on your patrol wagon and take us to jail, if that's the new police 
t 1117 sys em . • . 
\~hat caused the sudden change in police policy? Chief Clark 
would only say that he had received his instructions from "those 
higher~up." Hayor Albee and the other city commissioners were no 
doubt some of the persons to whom Clark vaguely referred as having 
formulated the new police policy. The mayor and all of the commis-
sioners were no doubt some of the persons to whom Clark vaguely 
referred as having formulated the new police policy. The mayor and 
all of the commissioners were at least inclined because of their 
social backgrounds to favor business interests in labor disputes. 
Albee himself was an insurance executive, while the rest of the 
commission was composed of a manager of a type company, a civil 
engineer, a manager of a department store, and an attorney.18 
In addition, these commissioners were not as accessible to 
the infl uence of members of the working cl ass as \'1ere the counci 1-
men which they replaced. The reason for the reduction in the 
political clout of the working class related to the replacement of 
district or ward representation by a system in which each commis-
sioner was elected city-wide. The commission form of government 
with its city-wide elections tended to dilute working class political 
power which traditionally had a ward or precinct locus in Portland. 
The decrease in working class power was revealed in the fact that 
two members of the Council in the Rushlight administration represented 
organized labor, whereas none of the commissioners in 1913 represented 
labor's interests. 
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The sheer number of city officials may have been another 
factor that contributed to the policy change. Formerly power was 
dispersed among 15 council members, but now power became concentrated 
in the hands of five commissioners. Although the mayor generally 
exercised authority over the police in both the council and the 
commission forms of government, there were considerably fewer 
officials who could create problems for a mayor in the role of 
Commissioner of Public Safety than there were for a mayor in the 
role of strong executive in the council form. In short, a mayor was 
likely to have a less obstructed reign over the police department 
under the commission as compared to the council type of government. 
In the case of t1ayor Albee, the process of establishing a pro-
business police policy may have been less cumbersome than the process 
would have been with a 15-person city council. 
Sources of influence besides the mayor and the co~ission also 
affected police policy. /\ clue as to the identity of these other 
sources can be found in a conversation held between a committee 
representing the strikers* and Chief of Police Clark on July 1, 
1913. The News interviewed three witnesses to this conversation 
and printed this reconstructed dialogue: 
*The committee consisted of Tom Burns, !1ary Schwab, and 
Mrs. McDonald. The first two were Socialists, while Mrs. McDonald 
was one of the striking cannery workers. Burns, a flamboyant 
and independent Socialist, was known as the "mayor of Burnside" 
which is an area in the heart of Port1and ' s skid road district. 19 
r~ary Schwab was an organi zer for the Soci a1 ist Labor Party.20 
As for r~rs. McDonald, no i nformati on on her background or 
activities could be found. 
Chief Clark: 
Committee: 
Clark: 
Committee: 
Cl ark: 
Committee: 
"You can speak on a vacant lot, but you 
can't speak on the street under the 
1 aw • . ." 
"Oh yes we can. You had better look up 
the 1 aw . . . II 
"The girls were offered a dollar a day.1I 
"They never recei ved such an offer. II 
"A girl can live on $6 a ~'1eek." 
"A girl can't live like a self-respecting, 
honest, white girl on $6 a week. You 
treat us like Chief Slover* did and 
you'll have no trouble in this town. You 
try to shut off free speech and He III fi 11 
your jai 1. "21 
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Clark's statement that the "girls were offered a dollar a day" 
is significant in light of the fact that this offer was not publicized 
until two days later. The "offer" to which Clark made reference 
was based upon an agreement between the Industrial ~Ielfare Commission 
and the Oregon Packing Company. Since Chief Clark cited this offer 
as part of the rationale for his policy, a brief exploration of the 
nature of the relationship between the Industrial Welfare Commission, 
the fruit packing company, and the Portland municipal government is 
in order. 
The Industrial l~elfare Commission was formed in the spring of 
1913 under an act which passed the Oregon State Legislature almost 
unanimously and without regard to political party affiliation. 22 
The act was sponsored by the Consumerls League of Oregon** and 
*E. A. Slover was the Chief of Police in the Rushlight regime. 
A sort of relaxed person, Slover made a practice of napping near the 
stove at police headquarters. As a police captain under the Albee 
administration, Slover was dismissed because of his alleged relation-
ships with vice interests in the latter part of 1913. 
**The Consumer's League of Oregon was composed of persons 
from the business and professional fields who generally shared a 
progressive ideology. 
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supported by the data contained in a policy research report authored 
by the same group entitled "Welfare Legislation for Honen and 
Mi nors ... 23 
The advantages of an Industrial Welfare Commission were 
stressed in the report issued by the Consumer's League. Some of the 
alleged advantages reflected a sort of "parens patrie"* perspective. 
For example, the report stated that the Industrial ~lelfare Commission 
would promote the welfare of the state of Oregon because it would 
"protect the women \,wrkers . from the economic distress that 
leads to impaired health and inefficiency.,,24 Other reasons given 
on behalf of creating the Commission \'1ere humanitarian in nature. 
It was pointed out, for instance, that the Commission \'/Ould "prevent 
exploitation of helpless women" and eliminate "sweating" in the 
state's industries. 25 
Still other alleged advantages of the proposed legislation 
involved benefits for employers. One supposed advantage was that 
a Commission would furnish women employees with a means of ob-
taining "the best minimum wages ... without recourse to strikes 
or industrial disturbances.,,26 In other words, a Commission would 
institutionalize and routinize conflict resolution, eliminating 
unexpected strikes that were harmful to employer profits and dis-
ruptive of employer planning schemes. A second advantage to the 
employers, according to the Consumer's League report, \,/as that a 
*Parens patrie refers to the idea that certain categories of 
people, especially juveniles, require the protection of the State 
which acts in the role of a surrogate parent. 
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Commission would enable employers "to prevent the undercutting of 
wages by less humane and considerate competitors."27 Translated into 
terms that certain employes could more readily understand, this meant 
that the Commission would assist the larger businesses in eliminating 
the small ones. 
As a whole, the report represented a blend of liberal 
benevolence, welfare statism, corporate capitalism, and Christian 
charity. In addition, the report contained elements of feminism. 
For example, the authors of the report emphasized that it was 
unreasonable and unfair to suppose that women can be paid sub-
standard wages because they \l/ere supported by men. As a corrective 
to this erroneous way of thinking, the authors pointed out that women 
served as the main breadwinners in many families. t1oreover, the 
authors asserted that "social justice" was not served when low 
wages were pai d to \'/orkers by reason of thei r womanhood and youth. 28 
The Industrial Commission law itself was one of the most far-
reaching welfare laws in the nation. The Commission possessed 
the statutory power to fix the wages, hours, and working conditions 
of all females and minors employed in any industry.29 In terms 
of the membership of the Commission, common sense indicates that 
industrial justice could only be served if representatives of both 
capital and labor were appointed to the Conrnission. This t'las only 
nominally the case. 
The first Commission consisted of Amedee M. Smith, 
representing the employers, ~1rs. Bertha ~1oores, representi ng the 
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the employees, and Edwin \~. O'Hara serving as Chairman of the 
Commission.* An inspection of the social backgrounds of the members 
reveals that labol' lacked bona fide representation on the Corrrnission. 
OIHara was the assistant pastor of the Cathedral of the Immaculate 
Conception; Smith was the third vice-president of the Realty 
Associates of Portland; Moores, the designated representative of 
labor, was the daughter of a pioneer sawmill operator, the sister 
of C. B. t·100res (who was the president of Moores Motor Car Co., and 
later a Republican candidate for Secretary of State in Oregon), 
and herself active in lithe commercial field ll and a prominent club-
woman. 30 
While the original purposes and eventual outcomes of some 
urban policies may be quite different, this was not the case with 
respect to the Welfare Commission. The Commission functioned just 
as it was planned to function. ~~ithin a few days after the strike 
commenced, the Oregon Packing Company submitted the question of 
wages to the Commission. Acting with lightning-like speed, the 
Commission announced on July 3, 1913 that it had reached an agree-
ment with management (not labor). The agreement was that a one 
dollar a day minimum wage would IIgo into effect immediately.1I31 
The Oregon Packing Company jumped at the Commission's first 
offer. As r·1anager r1cPherson of the company stated, IIwe did not 
wait 30 or 40 days, but immediately agreed. .. 32 The strikers, 
*No change occurred in the composition of the Commission 
from its inception to 1916. 
however, refused to agree to an arrangement to which they were not 
privy. Tom Burns, a member of the strike committee, responded to 
the offer in these words: 
The Industrial Commission which butted into this affair 
is composed mainly of parlor reformers, and it seems to me 
that their principal function is to break the strike. 33 
A consequence of the Commission's offer was that it assisted 
the company in managing in community's impression of the strike 
situation. By submitting the wage issue to a purportedly neutral 
body for arbitration, the company made it appear that it had dealt 
with the strikers in "good faith. II To the extent that this 
impression became accepted by various segments of the community, 
the company was able to increase its control over "third parties" 
to the labor dispute. Apparently, Chief Clark was one of those 
who was persuaded by the company's bureaucratic strategy. 
Police policy was shaped by other sources as well as the 
Industrial He1fare COlTrlission. The Portland Employer's .~ssociation 
and the Eastside Businessmen's Club* brought "tremendous pressures" 
to bear upon the mayor and the police chief to prohibit speakers 
from using the streets in the vicinity of the cannery.34 The 
Employer's Association allegedly hired spies and detectives to ask 
residents near the plant to complain about the pickets and the 
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strike committee to the police. Taking a less surreptitious approach, 
in a closed meeting with the mayor the Eastside Businessmen's Club 
*The Eastside Businessmen's Club was made up of persons who 
owned businesses on the eastside of Portland. 
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demanded "definite and decisive action froM the police department to 
end the meetings of the strikers and agitators and to keep them away 
from the packing pl ant. 11 35 
The Portland "Free-Speech Fight" and Anti-Radical Police Violence 
The pressures upon the police to put down the strike brought 
the first arrests at noon on July 9th. Three Socialists were 
arrested for speaking in front of the packing company; they were 
charged \'Iith "disorderly conduct II and "abusive language."36 Later 
in the day, ~~ayor Albee ordered Chief Clark to forbid picket lines 
at the site of the strike. As a result, more women were arrested 
that day, some of \'1hom were workers; t~ary Schwab was taken into 
custody four separate times. 37 By July 10th it was clear that the 
reform administration's police policy had ignited a "free speech 
fight. II 
The first police violence in the strike took place soon after 
the inception of the battle to preserve the right of freedom of 
speech in Portland. On July 13th the strikers were peacefully 
picketing in front of the cannery when the order to charge was 
given and six mounted officers galloped into the striking women. 
Several women were knocked under the horses' hooves and trampled, 
while another woman was crushed beb/een two horses. Three vlOmen 
~~re injured in this police attack and two women were arrested by 
the Portland police. 38 
The following day it was discovered that 30 police officers 
\'Iere hi ding in a barn close to the cannery; they vacated the barn 
after the owner ordered them to leave. 39 The police showed up en 
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masse again at the trial of Mary Schwab on the 15th \'Ihen a reserve 
force of police met 1,000 strikers and sympathizers who had marched 
to the courthouse to learn the outcome of the Schwab trial. Po1ice-
striker contacts were peaceful on the 15th, in part, because Schwab 
was acquitted of the charges against her. 40 
That evening, ten speakers were arrested in do\'Into\lm Portland 
in the typical I.14.W. free speech format--as one person was pulled 
off the soap box and arrested, another mounted the soap box and 
spouted ephithets damning the employing c1ass. 41 Mu1tnomah County 
Sheriff Thomas Word was in charge of pulling speakers off the soap 
box and escorting the I crimina1s" to jail. Tom Burns \'Ias charged 
with "using profane and abusive 1anguage" and the nine other 
persons were charged with "di sorder1y conduct. 1142 City pol ice 
assisted Hord's deputies in clearing the streets. 43 
On the 16th the police arrested three members of the strike 
committee while they were standing in front of the cannery.44 The 
same day, as rumors spread throughout the city that I.!~.W. gangs 
were headed for Portland to carryon the free speech figl1t,45 
~·layor Albee banned all street speaking except religious speeches. 46 
Deciding to test the A1bee ' s anti-free speech rule, about one dozen 
women strikers along with a few Socialist and I .W.I~. supporters 
assembled downtown in the evening on the 17th lito tell t:le people 
of this city something about conditions at the p1ant. 1I47 A 11arge" 
crowd (of an undisclosed size) also gathered around the wor:8n 
strikers, expecting to listen to the usual tirades against the 
inequities of the capitalist system. 
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Just before the public speaking was to conmence, the Sheri ff 
and a representative of the city police notified the women that they 
could not publicly discuss the strike. When the women tried to 
speak, a police riot* broke out in Portland. The Portland News 
described the activities of several groups of police, totaling 
around 200 men, in these colorful terms: 
A solid phalanx of blue-coats, extending from curb to 
curb, moved south on 6th street in close formation, 
ordering the tremendous crowds onto the side\l/alks, while 
at the same time a squad of patrolmen counter-marched 
on each sidewalk undoing the work of the main body and 
forcing the crowd off the side\'1alks again and back on 
the street .... This maneuvering was maintained for 
fully 15 minutes until someone made the discovery that 
a blunder had been made in aligning the forces .... 49 
[rlext, the mounted police] ... advanced in tHO 
straight ranks, one ahead of the other and one man to 
the horse. Up 6th ... came the 2 lines of police 
cavalry. IICharge" yelled some fellow in front of the 
Lotus saloon, and the mounted heroes eagerly entered the 
fracas ..• for fully 30 minutes pandemonium reigned. 
The police marched back and forth, the deputies moved up 
and down, gBd the mounted officers galloped hither and 
yon. . . . 
The Oregonian described the riot in less dramatic terms: 
When the police and deputies, after the first few 
minutes, failed to clear the streets, they were obliged 
to rush the crm'ld. ~·1ore than a score were hit with clubs. 
At least 50 others were struc~lby fists in the melee. 
t·1any were knocked down. . . . 
*According to an authority on police violence: 
An event is a police riot \'1hen roving bands [mobs] of 
policemen set upon nonprovocative persons and/or ~roperty 
in an excessively violent manner. When only one small 
group of policemen sets upon citizens and/or property in 
a single location it may be useful to call this a "police 
attack. II A "police riot" is any such event involving 
two or more attacks. "Nonprovocative persons ll are those 
who represent no signifi~§nt threat to life, physical 
safety or property . . • 
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Seventeen women, who were led by Dr. Harie Equi* and Mary Schwab, 
stood their ground in the teeth of a storm of violence. These women 
were intent on speaking even after the mounted charge and the mass 
clubbings. When they refused to go home as ordered by the police, 
Equi and nine other women were taken to the police station. At the 
station Equi stabbed patrolman Evans in the wrist with a hatpin. 
Evans had the wound cauterized at once since earlier in the day Equi 
had threatened to prepare such a weapon and dip it in a deadly 
virus. 52 Once Equi was corralled and brought under control, she 
Was held on four charges--"disorderly conduct," "inciting a riot," 
"carrying concealed weapons ," and "assault with a dangerous weapon."53 
Unfortunately for Equi, the pol ice were not finished with her. 
One of the other women prisoners in jail told of Equi IS brutalization 
by the city police: 
Dr. Equi was abused most shamefully., •.. When we 
arrived at the police station it seems that Chief Clark 
and his men took a special delite (sic) in tormenting 
her. She was roughly handled, and the language used 
toward her was vile. I think the people of Portland 
should know something about the way their Chief of 
Police addressed this little woman while she was at his 
mercy. I ne~~r heard such vile language as that man 
used at her. 
The aftermath of the riot was nearly as wild and unbelievable 
as the police riot itself. ~1ayor Albee strove to avoid notice of 
the battle between the authorities andr the protestors three days 
after the riot, announcing that he did not think there was a free 
*Dr. Marie Equi was a highly competent medical doctor who 
was extremely active in the class struggle in the state of Oregon. 
She campaigned for \'lomenls suffrage, participated in labor strikes, 
spoke out against World War I, and fought on behalf of many 
progressive and radical causes. Equi served as a financial 
benefactor and counsel to militant working men and \'lomen in her 
later years. 
speech fight "going on,"55 Yet, on the day prior to the ~1ayor's 
statement, the Chief of Police and the Sheriff passed down an order 
lito arrest all men and women who were on the streets without lawful 
business ,1156 r,loreover, at about the same time that the mayor was 
denying the existence of a free speech crusade, the police were 
busy arresting droves of men who did not have $10 and a "boi1ed 
shirt" as well as men who were wearing red (I.H.l·J,) ties. 57 The 
charge was the same for all of those snared in the police dragnet--
"vagrancy. II 
t,10st of the "vaggi ng, II as the pol i ce called it, was done by 
police detectives. On July 19th, for instance, a Portland police 
detective noted in his report book that he had worked "all day 
arresting I.W.W. who were vags as per orders,II58 The detectives 
did not exercise much selectivity in making these arrests. For 
example, it is instructive to examine the case of Gus Molkentin, 
a German workingman. ~·1olkentin had been a Portland resident for 
over 15 years, possessed a bank account of $400, and had worked as 
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a common 1 aboret' for many years. Like a great many Germans, 
Molkentin liked his daily mug of beer. He stepped into a saloon for 
that purpose on lluly 20th and had hardly finished his brew when he 
was accosted by a plainclothes policeman. "You're an I.W.H., 
arent' YOU," the policeman stated. Even though r·1olkentin denied 
the policeman's assertion, he was arrested, booked, and vagged. 59 
The free speech fight continued until the first week in 
November, although the cannery strike fizzled out at the end of 
July. By late summer the fruit.packing season was passed its peak 
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and the demand for labor was greatly reduced. These factors coupled 
with police repression contributed to the termination of the strike. 
As for the free-speech fight, when it reached a high level of 
intensity in late summer and fall, the city authorities, in effect, 
suspended the U.S. Constitution in Portland by prohibiting both the 
freedom of speech and the freedom of association. Despite the 
fact that the intent of this policy was to crush the free-speech 
fight, the extreme repression prompted local A.F.L. unions, 
influential middle class citizens, and some working class people 
to align themselves with Equi and others who had initially opposed 
the anti-free speech policy.GO 
In fact, the heavy dose of repression touched off drives to 
recall both Mayor Albee and Sheriff Word. Worse yet from the 
standpoint of the city's fiscal status, the fight against free 
speech cost the city of Portland thousands of dollars, disrupted 
the business of the police and other municipal departments, and 
blocked the transaction of public business in general. 61 In 
addition, personnel fatigue problems surfaced in the city police 
department. Many of the policemen had little opportunity to go 
home and sleeps and vacations were cancelled because of the heavy 
utilization of men in policing the cannery strike and the free 
speech fight. Moreover, members of the police department were 
compelled by Mayor Albee to work from 10 to 14 hours daily during 
the unrest of 1913-1914. Additionally, a two-day a month layoff 
which was allowed during the Rushlight administration was set aside 
by Albee. Mayor Albee was even warned about ove~/orking the city 
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police by the Oregon State Labor Commissioner, who told Albee that he 
would have to either reduce the number of hours worked per day by 
police officers or go to jail for violating a state law which limited 
public employees to an eight-hour work day!62 
The exploitation of police workers, the fiscal "crunch" of 
city government, and the growing public opposition to "police state" 
methods, however, did not halt the police violence. In fact, another 
police attack took place on October 29, 1913 when the police stopped 
a free speech meeting, pulling nine women off a soap box, one after 
another, and arresting them. Jean Bennett* was one of the women 
who was hustled into a police auto and driven to police headquarters. 
Bennett and the eight other women were held without charges and 
without bail.**63 
While the fracas with the nine women was occurring on a city 
street, r·1rs. Schwab climbed a telephone pole at a nearby inter-
section to deliver a speech; this stunt brought thousands of people 
to the intersection where Schwab's rhetoric was flowing freely from 
atop the telephone pole. Next, bm pol ice offi cers pulled her down 
from the pole and rushed her to jail in an auto. A large crowd 
started to follow Schwab to jail, but the crowd was met by a score 
of policemen who drew a rope across the street and began to club the 
heads of persons in the crowd. r10re than a dozen persons were 
*Jean Bennett was a middle class reformer who played a 
prominent role in the Portland free speech fight in 1913. 
**According to Mark Haller, the violation of suspects' civil 
liberties was a norm of police conduct in the early 1900s. See 
~~ark H. Haller, "Historical Roots of Police Behavior: Chicago, 
1890-1925, II Law and Soci ety Revi ew, 10 (Wi nter, 1976), p. 303. 
assaulted and injured by the police; most of these persons were not 
free speech crusaders. 64 Evidently, many of the injured persons 
were merely on the sidewalks and could not get away from the clubs. 
The community was outraged by this type of police action and 
Mayor Albee drew sharp criticism for the display of brute force by 
the police. Indeed, cOmTllunity "influentials" warned Albee that 
more serious protests against his anti-free speech policy and 
police violence were likely unless he ailowed Portland citizens 
the right to freedom of speech. 65 Albee finally lifted the 
restrictions on basic freedoms in early November of 1913 and the 
free speech fight was won. 
Police Work With Juveniles: A Cloak for the Dagger of Repression? 
It is important to appreciate the fact that proactive repres-
sion of the type that was executed by the Portland police in 1913 
was only one side of the urban police function in the early 
twentieth century. Preventive strategies were not incongruent 
with the police riots and the outright attacks upon strikers and 
protestors. Police work with juveniles was perhaps the best 
example of a preventive activity that was conducted simultaneously 
with iron-fisted, military-like police activities. 
The Portland Police Department initially became involved in 
working with juveniles in 1905 when lola Baldwin was hired to 
handle "wayward" girls at the lewis and Clark Exposition.* A 
*The lewis and Clark Exposition was a fair held in Portland 
in 1905 to commemorate the exp 1 orati ons of ~~eriwether lewi sand 
Wi 11 i am Cl ark. 
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Women's Protective Bureau was established in 1909 and Baldwin 
headed this new unit. The Bureau was staffed with women who were 
referred to as "operatives." Their work encompassed all requests 
which pertained to the welfare or safety of girls. The operatives 
investigated crimes by girls, supervised the aftercare activities 
of young women who had been processed through the justice system, 
and procured short-term employment for those who either appeared to 
be in trouble or who had been convicted of a crime.*66 
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To understand the relevance of the work of these early police-
women to the police response to labor radicalism requires that the 
policewomen be recognized for \'Jhat they were, namely "child savers."** 
As child savers, the policewomen were supposed to playa protective 
and rehabilitative role vis a vis children. The idea was the police-
women could save children from the criminogenic "evils" associated 
\'Jith the social life of the "dangerous classes" in the city. Hence, 
the duties of policewomen included the supervision and enforcement 
of laws pertaining to dance halls, skating rinks, penny arcades, 
pi cture shows, and other gathering pl aces for working class youth. 
The Women's Protecti ve Bureau in Portl and \'/as no di fferent 
from police-juvenile units in other cities in the respect that 
*Special treatment for young women was not a characteristic 
that was unique to the Portland Police Department. Girls bore a 
disproportionate share of the burden of juvenile justice in other 
cities as well during the Progressive era. For an historical inquiry 
into the practice of sexual discriMination against female juvenile 
delinquents, see Steven Schlossman and Stephanie Wallach, "The Crime 
of Precocious Sexuality: Female Juvenile Delinquency in the 
Progressive Era," Harvard Educational Review, 48 (February, 1978), 
pp. 65-94. 
**For an historical account of the role of the so-called "child 
savers" in the development of the juvenile court, see Anthony Platt, 
The Child Savers: The Invention of Delin uenc ,2nd Ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977 . 
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the Bureau exerted a wide span of control over the above-listed areas 
of the social life of working class youth. While the exact extent 
to which this control helped or hindered the youth supervised by 
the women operatives is not known. it would seem that at best the 
work of Baldwin's Protective Bureau may have had a minimal impact 
upon the lives of working class youth in view of the modest success 
of even the most high-powered police juvenile programs in the 1970s. 
At worst the Bureau's "protective" activities may have reduced the 
chances of working class youth for participation in the labor market, 
in educational institutions, and other vital areas of life.* In 
the final analysis both of these outcomes would have served the 
same end, namely the perpetuation of a system in which the working 
class was in a subordinate position to other ~ocial classes. 
In addition to controlling the social life of working class 
youth, the operatives dominated the process through which juveniles 
were channeled through the justice system. Since the policewomen 
ostensibly were there to "help" rather than to punish youth who 
became enveloped in "unwholesome" circumstances, it followed that 
they exercised a considerable amount of discretion in handling a 
child's case. Decisions pertaining to arrest. referral, institution-
alization, and other steps in official processing of a case tended 
to be governed by informal standards such as past experience and 
"maternal instincts" rather than formal constitutional protections. 67 
*The negative effects of the juvenile justice system upon 
youth are described by Edwin Schur in Radical Non-Intervention: 
Rethinking the Delinquency Problem (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1973). 
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Lola Baldwin and the operatives in the ~~omen's Protective 
Bureau dispensed justice to juveniles in accordance with the above-
described principles. The merits and methods of Baldwin's work went 
almost unchallenged for the entirety of her career. During her 
years of service she was accorded many honors for her contributions 
to both the fields of law enforcement and corrections.* Perhaps 
the only time that Baldwin's performance as a juvenile specialist 
was pub1ical1y criticized came in 1913, a time of labor and 
political unrest. 
Throughout the year of 1913 the Portland News received 
complaints about her work. The first complaint to be printed was 
authored by Jean Bennet, a free speech fighter. Mrs. Bennett 
became interested in the case of Lillian Larkin, a working class 
girl and one of Baldwin's "charges," after Bennett had met Larkin 
in the Portland jail (where Bennett and other agitators were 
confined for street speaking). Bennett criticized Baldwin's 
handling of the Larkin case in an "open letter" to the Portland 
community. Portions of this letter have been excerpted from the 
newspaper and are presented here in order to show the details of 
Bennett's criticism of Baldwin. 
An 18-year old girl by the name of Lillian Larkin was 
sentenced to 30 days in jail, in Vancouver, Washington. 
After serving 15 days she was paro11ed on good behavior 
and told to go to Lola Baldwin of Portland, and that she 
would find work for her till she could earn enough money 
to go to Spokane to her mother, who is seriously ill there. 
*Baldwin was a special agent (i.e., counsel) to seven governors 
of Oregon as well as a western represegtative to the national 
committee on prisons and prison labor. 8 
Instead of Mrs. Baldwin getting her work, she has 
sentenced her to three years, either in a II home II {where 
they operate a laundry by using convict labor, from 
8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and where these frail little girls 
are forced to wash and iron for their food only} or the 
state institution at Salem ..• 
. . • This mere child is denied an attorney [and has] 
absolutely no redress. She was g~mply railroaded, tried 
and sentenced by one lone woman. 
Seeking to right this alleged miscarriage of social justice, 
Bennett and the I.W.W. organized a move to obtain the release of 
Lillian Larkin from the Oregon State Industrial School.* Bennett, 
representatives of the I .W.W., and Larkin's roother Nere granted a 
hearing by the Oregon State Board of Control which was the official 
body that was responsible for the Industrial School. In a 
boisterous meeting on November 21,1913 the fight for Larkin's 
release developed into an effort by Bennett to discredit Balm~in, 
who at the time was both the Superintendnet of the police juvenile 
unit in the Portland Police Department and a member of the 
advisory board of the Industrial School. Bennett again charged 
that Ba1dltJin had "railroaded" the girl to the institution and 
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this time she inferred that Baldwin had certain conflicts of interest. 
Bennett suggested that Baldwin was referring girls in her official 
capacity as a policewoman to rooming houses and homes \>Jhich Ba1d\>Jin 
either owned or in which she had some other type of interest. The 
juvenile specialist denied all of these accusations in her own 
testimony. 70 
*The Oregon State Industrial School was a correctional 
facility for girls in Salem, Oregon. Convicted female criminals 
as well as non-criminals attended the "school" which stressed 
the importance of hard work and discipline. 
In spite of the serious nature of the charges introduced by 
Bennett and the I.~J.W., the Board of Control refused to pardon or 
parole the girl. The board justified its decision on the grounds 
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that the "evidence" showed that the girl was "romantically inclined," 
had Itan inclination for pi1fering," and suffered from "a craze 
for soldiers. 1171 At the close of the hearing, Bennett stated that 
the 1.\4.U. and herself would try to secure Larkin's freedom through 
an appeal to the courts. 
Three days later Lillian Larkin was released from the 
Industrial School in a mysterious turn of events. The first was 
that the truth about the Larkin case was somehow revealed to 
Bennett and the I.~J.W. They discovered that Larkin was "vagged" 
by the police when she initially arrived in Portland from Vancouver, 
Washington. The arresting officer then had turned her over to 
Baldwin for protection; Ba1d\'·lin, in turn, had sent Larkin'!direct1y 
to the Industrial School for the purpose of detention. 72 Bennett 
and the I.W.W., armed with this information, proceeded to post a 
bail bond of $3,000 for Larkin's release several days after the 
Board of Control hearing. Upon receipt of the bail money. the 
Board of Control officially discharged Larkin from the custody of 
the state of Oregon on November 24, 1913. 73 It appears that the 
Portland authorities also also dropped the case since there are no 
records of other hearings, trials, or incarcerations for Lillian 
Larki n. 
Lola Baldwin remained "under fire" from Bennett and the 
I.W.H. for the remainder of the year. .1\ corrmittee of ten women 
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presented the following petition, signed by several thousand citizens, 
to ~1ayor Albee in December of 1913: 
To Mayor Albee: We the citizens of Portland, state of 
Oregon do hereby demand the immediate removal from office 
of ~1rs. Lola Ba 1 dwi n, who has ch a rge of the ~~uni ci pa 1 
\~elfare of Public Safety for Young Girls. 
Our reaso~s for wanting her removal from office are: 
She is utterly heartless and cold blooded and not a fit 
person to be judge of human flesh and blood. She makes 
no attempt whatever to secure work for these girls, but 
railroads them to some institution as the easiest way 
out. She has never been known to make one kind remark, 
but instead every word she utters makes these girls 
despise her. 
We feel that a motherly person would have a tendency 
to make the girls better instead of worse.*74 
The petition fell on deaf ears in the Albee administration. 
Consequently, Bennett and the I.t~.l~. detennined that this was one 
"windmill" that they would not continue to tilt at, thus tenninating 
their short-lived crusade against Baldwin. 
*It is interesting to note that the radical reformers in 1913 
seem to have shared the stereotypical sex role notions of Baldwin 
and other more moderate reformers in the same era. 
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CHAPTER VI 
POLICE REGULATION OF THE UNEf4PLOYED: 
AN INTERLUDE BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL 
SKIRMISHES AND CLASS 
CONFRONTATION 
~-1obi 1 i zati on of the Unemployed 
After the riots and the free speech fights, there was no 
respite for the Portland and Seattle police from having to deal 
with the labor radicals. The economic crisis of 1913-1915 and 
its accompanying problems of unemployment, poverty, and hunger 
engendered a great deal of turmoil; as always, the I.W.H. was at 
the eye of the tornado of unrest and the police were charting and 
trying to control the I.~I.H.'S path. 
The police were faced with an entirely new set of problems 
related to labor radicalism when the I.W.W. began to agitate aMong 
the unemployed in 1913. The I.W.H.'S official strategy for organ-
izing the unemployed was as follows: 
. the unemployed should be organized to give them 
union principles, to enable them to go after what they 
need, yn~ to prevent them from being used to batter down 
wages. 
The Portland and Seattle i~obblies implemented this strategy 
by:..:!rming "unemployed leagues" (i.e., informal corporations). These 
organizations were comprised of unemployed as well as employed and 
non-union as well as union people. The registered membership in the 
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leagues exceeded 3,000 persons in each city by the end of 1913 which 
meant that about ona-third of the approximately 10,000 unemployed 
persons in each city were organized into the 1eagues. 2 
The activities of these unemployment leagues reflected the 
I.W.W.ls direct action principles. The leagues served as sort of 
"battering rams" that wet'e repeatedly thrust against the municipal 
governments in Seattle and Portland for the purpose of obtaining 
public relief for the unemployed. !·1ore specifically, the leagues 
petitioned city authorities to provide the unemployed with food, 
shelter, and jobs. 
Both the Portland and Seattle municipal authorities \oJere un-
accustomed to dealing with, let alone negotiating with the unem-
ployed segment of the community. Prior to 1913 the police, for 
their part, had little to do with la\tJ-abiding, unemployed persons. 
City officials had provided a limited amount of public works employ-
ment and local philanthropists had contributed money and other items 
as personal charity during previous periods of high unemployment. 3 
In turn, unorganized and jobless persons had passiveiy accepted 
doles of food, clothing, and jobs. This sort of "riel, man -
beggar man" relationship drastically changed once the unemployed 
became organized into leagues and began to assert themselves in a 
forceful and aggressive manner in 1913. 
At first the Seattle and Portland unemployed leagues utilized 
petitions and similar institutionally-legitimized techniques in an 
attempt to peacefully achieve their goals. Neither the city 
officials in Portland nor those in Seattle responded in a substantial 
130 
way to this strategy of "working within the system. 1I \~hat the un-
employed received from the municipal authorities in Portland and 
Seattle in 1913 was very similar to what poor people have obtained 
from governments since the passage of the English Poor La\'/* in 1834--
"a shabby pittance. II Relief practices in Portland and Seattle in 
1913 and early 1914 even reflected the influence of the English Poor 
Law which was based, in part, on lithe principle of less e1igibi1ity.1I 
According to this notion, relief allowances should be less renumerative 
and beneficial than regular wages and jobs in the private sector. 
The wage scale for persons in public works jobs in Portland was 
a classic example of the principle of 1I1ess e1igibi1ity.1I Portland 
City Cormnissioner ~~i11iam L. Brewster, a liberal Republican, com-
plained that II ••• the wages paid to the 'bums' are too high."S 
So Brewster used his power as the Commissioner of Public .l\ffairs 
to lower the wages of single men on public works jobs from $3.00 
a \'Ieek to $l.SO a week. H. E. Huston, an unemployed person and a 
member of the Portland Unemployed League, pointed out the farcical 
nature of Brewster's move in this letter to the editor of News: 
. A single man living in the very poorest of rooming 
houses cannot get a place to s~eep for less than a 
dollar a week, which leaves the magnificent sum of 
50 cents with wgich to supply the inner man and 
clothing ..•. 
The same principle was in operation in Seattle where many of 
the public works jobs were unpaid. 7 In addition, the Seattle 
*The English Poor Law or the Act of 1834 was one of the 
earliest instances of state involvement in the provision of relief. 
For an insightful analysis of the English Poor Law, see E. P. 
Thompson, The Makin~ of t~e English Working Class (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1966 . 
authorities tried to make the terms of employment as undesirable as 
possible. Seattle r·1ayor Gill, for example, told 250 unemployed men 
that the city would provide them with part-time, leaf-raking jobs, 
if, in return, they would ship their families to the county poor 
farm. 8 
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The "less eligibility" approach to the problem of unemployment 
failed to appease members of the leagues. The leagues continued to 
petition the city halls in Portland and Seattle, but the pattern of. 
governmental response was the same in both cities: meetings between 
the unemployed and the municipal authorities were held and promises 
were made about the provision of relief by the authorities, yet 
the promises were not kept.* 
As the trust of the unemployed in the city authorities waned, 
more direct and confrontational tactics were utilized by the organized 
unemployed. In Seattle a long line of 200 silent, hungry, unemployed 
men, standing outside of the chambers of the city council, apparently 
motivated the council to appropriate $7,500 for public works in late 
December of 1913. 9 Similarly, in Portland a "mob" of 400 unemployed 
men swarmed into city hall and compelled the city commissioner to 
house 1,000 unemployed persons in the Gypsy Tabernacle** and to 
appropriate $500 to purchase blankets and other necessities for the 
unemployed persons residing at the Tabernacle. 10 
*Although some part-time public employment was provided in 
both cities, the number of jobs and the hours of employment fell 
considerably short of what was pledged by Portland and Seattle 
authorities. 
**The Gypsy Tabernacle was a building where revival meetings 
were held in Portland. 
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Perhaps the high point of the militancy on the part of the 
unemployed was the march of the "Hungry Hundred" on January 8, 1913. 
The Hungry Hundred was an. army of nearly 2,000 persons who walked 
from Portland to Salem, Oregon, demanding that the Oregon state and 
the Portland municipal governments create jobs in the public sector 
for unemployed persons. Led by Minnie Parkhurst Rimer,* \'Iho was the 
only woman in the Hungry Hundred, the unemployed started t~eir march 
in downtown Portland; as they strode by the Portland city hall, some 
of the unemployed persons yelled and jeered loud enough to interrupt 
a session of the city commissioners. After this bit of mischief, 
the Hungry Hundred left the city without any interference from the 
pol ice. 11 
Administrati ve and Statutory r1ethods of Contro 11 ing the Unemployed 
It soon became evident to municipal authorities that simply 
providing a little aid to the unemployed did not stop the protest 
of the leagues and armies of unemployed. ~10reover, the authorities 
began to be concerned about the I.W.W. element within the ranks of 
the unemployed in mid-January 1914. Even though the leaders of the 
Hungry Hundred disclaimed any I.t~.lL connections or sympathies, the 
Portland newspapers and the public suspected that the trek to Salem 
in quest of jobs was another demonstration engineered by the loW.lL 
This suspicion seems to have been justified in view of the fact 
that the majority of the recruits in the army of unemployed were 
*Minnie Parkhurst Rimer and Ed Rimer, her husband, were the 
"commanders" of the army of unemployed. 
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under 25 years of age, single, and foreign born. 12 The army definitely 
fit into the Wobbly mold and city officials knew it. 
As for the unemployment leagues in Portland and Seattle, the 
IJ-J.W. attempted to keep a "low profile" in these organizations. In 
Portland it was clear that Wobblies were among the early leaders of 
the unemployed in the Portland Unemployment League,13 \'Jhile it is 
also known that the Seattle Hobblies were among the founders of the 
Seattle Unemployment League. Then, too, the radical identities of 
the Wobblies in the Seattle league were exposed through the vitu-
perati ve and rhetori ca 1 attacks that they made upon Seattle ~1ayor Gi 11 .14 
Portl and Corrani ssi oner Brewster was one of those \'Jho fel t threat-
ened by the marri age that had been consunmated bebJeen the unemployed 
and the I.WJL Brewster's views on the unemp·,loyed were made clear 
in the following brief statement which he presented at a meeting \'Jhere 
relief practices were discussed by city officials and the public: 
... 1 advocate putting the "screws" on and shipping 
them i.e.,[the unemployed out] .•• besides it is of 
a great benefit for the community as a whole to get rid 
of them, as it gives the Socialist and the I.H
1
W. 
agitators such a large field to work in • . . 5 
Concerns about the I.I~.W. recruiting among the unemployed gave 
impetus to the adoption of another strategy for dealing \'Jith the 
unemployed. Using the police as a new means of sustaining the 
established order, the authorities began to apply administrative 
as well as statutory methods against the unemployed. The admin-
istrative methods were unofficial and sometimes illegal procedures 
for managing the unemployed t!1at \'/ere at the disposal of the 
municipal authorities. The statutory methods were ways cf handling 
the unemployed that were prescribed in ordinances and laws.* 
Three events in Portland involved the utilization of admin-
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istrative methods. The first event consisted of police interference 
in a protest march of the unemployed. On January 12, 1914, a 
second armY of unemployed began a march to Salem in quest of jobs 
and publicity. The armY was detained in Portland for a short time 
when a squad of police rushed the armY, pushing and punching its 
members in a spectacle of police brutality.16 In explaining the 
behavior of the police in this encounter with the unemployed, a 
Portland patrolman remarked: 
... don't blame the officers. These Men are under 
orders from headquarters to beat up the unemployed. 
Blame the administration. 17 
A second example of administrative met~ods involved the un-
employed who were housed in the Gypsy Tabernacle. City and county 
police drove 1,200 unemployed men out of the Tabernacle into a 
driving rain on the night of January 20, 1921. 18 The men probably 
survived the night by sleeping in jails and railroad cars. As for 
food, many of the men no doubt searched for their supper and break-
fast in garbage cans. Again, the city police participated in this 
rather inhumane fiasco at the behest of city officials. Chief of 
Police Clark revealed that he had initially rejected a request from 
the Sheriff's office to move the unemployed out of their shelter. 
*The terms "administrative methods" and "statutory methods" 
were first coined by Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward in 
Re ulatin the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: 
Vintage Boo s, 1 71 • 
According to Clark, he \'las forced to act later when Mayor Albee's 
secretary ordered him to assist the Sheriff in the evacuation of 
the Tabernacl~. 19 It can be surmised that the impetus for this 
action came from ~1ayor Albee and COl111lissioner Brewster, who earlier 
had jointly issued a "work or jail" ultimatum to the Tabernacle 
residents on January 14th. 
In addition to the particular methods used to regulate the 
poor, a special unit within the Portland Police Department was 
created in response to the protest of the unemployed. The unit 
was called a "reserve squad" when it was first introduced on 
December 10, 1914. This unit came to be known as the "red squad" 
in 1919.?0 
Originally, the Portland reserve squad featured a reactive 
strategy since it remained at pol i ce headquarters ready "at a 
moment's notice to quell any disturbance. 1I Restaurant rushing 
which typically consisted of unemployed men entering a restaurant, 
eating a meal, and then informing the owner that the mayor would 
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pay for the meal was cited by Chief of Police Clark as being one 
type of disturbance for which the reserve squad would be used. The 
Chief also noted that he expected that the reserve squad would be 
dealing with restaurant agitators on a large scale "due to the large 
number of men in town and the scarcity of work.,,21 Only a few 
technical details about the reserve squad were released in 1914. 
Chief Clark revealed that the reserve squad would be ample strength 
to handle II any thing in the nature of a riot." Also, he disclosed 
that the reserve were on duty until 10:00 p.m. and that a night 
reserve would be established in the future.*22 
Statutory methods of regulating the unemployed were used by 
both Portland and Seattle authorities. Insofar as the police were 
concerned, the power of arrest was an important way of dealing 
with the unemployed. ~'Jhen the unemployed resorted to the tactic of 
restaurant rushing, for example, the police agencies in both cities 
responded by arresting the consumers of "free food" on the charge 
of "di sorder1y conduct. 1123 
The police also arrested persons for "disorderly conduct" in 
situations where they perceived that the civil order was being dis-
rupted or disturbed. A bizarre incident that occurred in Portland 
on December 29, 1913 exemplifies this use of statutory methods. 
Early in the day, a woman who gave the name of Dr. Marie Equi** 
*Special details and units, similar to Portlandls reserve 
squad in structure, existed in the Seattle Police Department prior 
to 1914, but Seattle radicals had to wait several years for their 
own red squad. As to the question of why the Portland police 
formed a quasi-red squad before the Seattle police, two conjectural 
points might be considered. First, the level of unrest, as 
indicated by newspaper reports of restaurant rushing, demonstrators 
and protest marches, seems to have been higher in Portland than in 
Seattle in 1913-1915. It may be that higher levels of unrest call 
forth more extreme structural changes in police organizations. 
Second, a greater concern for structural reform among Portland 
authorities as compared to Seattle authorities may have been 
responsible for the earlier introduction of the quasi-red squad in 
Portland. More specifically, r~ayor Albee and the other Portland 
authorities who advocated a commission form of government, with 
its stress on specialization and expertise, may have been more 
inclined than the Seattle authorities to support specialization 
in the police and other city departments. 
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**With regard to the possible role of the real Dr. Equi in the 
prank, leaders of the unemployed said that they did not think that she 
was the one who had sent the invitation over the phone. However, 
Julia Godman Ruutilla, a labor radical herself and one of the late 
Dr. Equi IS close friends, stated that she would have "to take the 
fifth amendment" when she was asked whether or not such a move was 
part of Equils repertoire of tactics. 25 
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called the hall of the Unemployed League, promising that there would 
be free meals provided for the unemployed at a local church. Several 
hundred men then marched to the church in anticipation of eating 
free food. Upon their arrival there, however, the unemployed were 
told that dinner at the church had been prepared for members of the 
Rotary Club rather than for members of the Unemployment League. 
After the throng turned away from the church, 40 of them went to 
police headquarters to demand meals. When the police refused to 
feed them, the leader of the group became noisy and was arrested for 
"di sorder1y conduct. 1124 
The enforcement of ordinances prohibiting vagrancy constituted 
another way in which statutory methods were part of the police re-
sponse to collective action by the unemployed. Again, both the 
Portland and Seattle police exercised their power of arrest in 
charging unemployed persons with the crime of vagrancy. In most 
instances, the only crime committed by those arrested for vagrancy 
was that they were destitute and out of work. The case of Raymond 
Crosby, who was arrested, charged, and sentenced to jail for 
vagrancy in 1914 seems to be representative of the vagrancy cases 
processed through the criminal justice system in Portland. This 
letter from Crosby's wife, Inez, provides insight into the admin-
istration of injustice that occurred as a result of the use of 
statutory methods. 
Dear Judge [Henry E.l McGinn: Little Licia is starving, 
and I ain't strong enough to work. She's only 3 years old, 
and it ain't good for little girls like that to starve. 
11m starving too, but that don't matter any. Youlve got 
my man up there in jail and he ' l1 stay there a long time 
yet if you don't help me. He ain't done nothing wrong 
at all, and I know he hasn't. l~ould you take my work 
for it judge and let him out of jail? Licia needs him 
badly, and I need him, too. 26 
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The Portland police seem to have placed special emphasis upon 
making vagrancy arrests to control the unemployed. Table I shows 
that vagrancy arrests in Portland increased steadily from 1912 
through 19i5 and then decreased rather sharply in 1916 and 1917. 
Vagrancy arrests constituted over 13 percent of all arrests in 1912, 
exactly 14 percent in 1913, almost 15 percent in 1914, and over 16 
percent in 1915. Arrests for the same charge decreased after 1915 
from more than 16 percent of all arrests in 1915 to slightly more 
than 10 percent in 1916 and to over 9 percent in 1917. 
Year 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
upon 
1912 
TABLE I 
VAGRANCY ARRESTS r~ADE BY PORTLAND POLICE, 
1912-191727 
Vagrancy Other Charges Total 
N % N % N % 
2,190 13.43 14,121 86.57 16,311 100.00 
2,254 14.00 13,844 86.00 16,098 100.00 
3,319 14.96 18,869 85.04 22,188 100.00 
3,314 16.12 17,245 83.88 20,559 100.00 
1 ,216 10.09 10,830 89.91 12,046 100.00 
963 9.70 8,969 90.30 9,932 100.00 
The Seattle police do not seem to have placed as much reliance 
vagrancy arrests as did the Portland police. Statistics from 
indicate that only 20 of the 17,078 arrests made by the Seattle 
police \'1ere for vagrancy.28 In other words, vagrancy arrests accounted 
for less than two percent of the total number of arrests made in that 
year. (Data for the years 1913-1917 were not available for use.) 
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The difference in the utilization of vagrancy ordinances by 
the Portland and Seattle police may have been due, in part, to the 
somewhat different public relief practices in the respective cities. 
Whereas in Portland, both the "criminal and non-criminal male element" 
tended to be handled in a similar fashion with a lock-up in jail ,29 
in Seattle the unemployed had the opportunity to \'Iork two days a 
week in exchange for free room and board at a publ-ic institution. 
According to Seattle Mayor Gill, the provision of public \'Iorks even 
though it was unpaid work, " ... eliminated the vagrant element 
which we,;would have on our hands. 1130 
Understanding Police Methods of Regulating the Unemployed 
The best way to understand administrative methods, such as 
those used in Portland, is to examine the functions they served for 
the economic and political order. Piven and Cloward theorized that 
administrative methods operate so as to enforce low-wage work. 
They claimed that authorities treat some of the poor in a degrading 
and punitive manner in order to both deter other unemployed persons 
from engaging in politics or idleness and to influence unemployed 
persons to offer themselves to any employer on any terms. 3l 
Although no data on the intentions of the Portland authorities could 
be found, Piven and Cloward's functionalist interpretation of 
administrative methods provides at least a plausible explanation for 
the harsh and brutish behavior of the Portland police in relation 
to the Hungry Hundred and the residents of the Tabernacle. 
As for the significance of statutory methods, it is again 
useful to examine the larger political and economic arrangements 
in Portland and Seattle. A starting point is the realization that 
140 
the economies of both cities were dependent upon the lumber industry.32 
Between 1913 and 1916 overproduction was a constant problem in the 
lumber industry, causing many workers to enter the already large 
ranks of the unempioyed. The owners logging camps and lumber mills, 
however, did not complain about the unemployment problems associated 
with overproduction since the ideal labor force, from their perspec-
tive, was one in which many unemployed stood in reserve for work 
in the lumber industry. With a substantial number of workers held 
in reserve, the lumbermen could hire employees for relatively low 
wages and discharge them with relative ease. 33 
From the point of view of the municipal authorities, however, 
having an "industrial reserve army" was probably viewed as a IInecessary 
evil II under normal ci rcumstances. .l\fter all, the city coffers lost 
revenue in the short run because of the practice of doling out 
welfare to the unemployed. Still, some advantages (i.e., higher 
tax revenues, easier access to loans, etc.) accrued to city govern-
ments in the long run as an indirect result of the process of 
capital accumulation in the lumber industry. 
The problem, however, \'1as that an industrial reserve army, 
especially an army headed by radicals, was m~inly a headache for 
municipal authorities in times of economic crisis. In these hard 
ti mes the authori ti es needed more than "stop-gap, II emergency 
welfare reforms to handle the protest of organized, unemployed 
persons. The criminal justice system was one mechanism that was 
used to control the "surplus" workers. When the criminal justice 
system was invoked in Seattle and Portland as a partial solution 
to the problem of unemployment, the authorities, in effect, 
"criminalized" the surplus labor force by charging the unemployed 
with vagrancy* and by thus handling them as if they were real 
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criminals. In short, the process of arresting and jailing unemp1oy-
ed persons in Portland and Seattle for the period 1913-1915 con-
stituted a "crimina1ization of the surplus labor force." 
How well did these police methods work in terms of regulating 
the unemployed? Overall, it does not appear that police repression 
of the unemployed effectively accomplished the ends of the 
authorities in either city. The unemployment leagues and armies 
were able to force more welfare concessions from the city officials 
in a shorter period of time than had probably ever been granted 
before in Portland and Seattle. Then, too, the demise of the 
movement for public employment in these two cities resulted more 
from tacti ca 1 errors made by the 1. W. H. than from the acti ons of 
the po1ice. 34 
In explaining the general ineffectiveness of police methods 
in handling the radicalized unemployed, it is fitting to borrm'l a 
*The application of vagrancy laws in Portland in the early 
twentieth century resembled the administration of these same laws 
in England from the enactment of the first vagrancy statute in 
1349 to the present. In both cases the enforcement of vagrancy 
laws served to protect the interests of powerful social classes 
and institutions. For an analysis of the origins and uses of 
vagrancy laws, see ~/il1iam J. Chambliss, "A Sociological Analysis 
of the Law of Vagrancy," Social Problems, 12 (Summer, 1964), 
pp. 67-77. 
phrase from R. H. Tawney's study of public relief, repression, and 
the English poor in the sixteenth century. Tawney observed that: 
liThe whi p has no terror for the man who mus t look for work or 
starve. 1135 
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CHAPTER VI I 
FROM LOCAL TO NATIONAL CONTROL OF THE CITY POLICE? 
Localism and Po1ice-I.W.W. Encounters in 1916 
The year 1916 was a time of testing for the Seattle and 
Portland police as the struggle of the I.W.W. against the establish-
ment order entered a more virulent phase. At this time, war orders 
ended economic stagnation and the labor market tightened. "Mons"i:eru 
mass conventions of the I.W.W. were held in Seattle and smaller 
gatherings of militant workers assembled under the auspices of the 
IJLW. in Portland. In both cities the result was the same: the 
I.W.t~.'s aggressive organizing among lumber, maritime, and a 
miscellanea of other working groups produced a substantial growth 
in membership in the I.H.~J. 
Lumbermen and other busi nessmen in the Pac; fi c ~lorthwest also 
developed a more organized and unified front in order to protect 
their interests from the potential onslaught of the labor radicals. 
Their movement paralleled the intensified organizational activity 
of the I.W.W. The ~Jashington State Employers Association,* for 
example, brought lumbermen together to discuss the th~eat of organized 
"The ~Jashington State Employer's Association was made up of 
Hest Coast emp~oyers from Washington, Oregon, and California who 
organized themselves in order to fight the I.W.W. in particular and 
organized labor in general. 
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labor on January 11,1916 in Seattle. l In a similar meeting lumber-
men committed themSelves to the "open shop" and founded the Lumber-
men's Open Shop Association in Portland.*2 
Police relations with labor radicals in Seattle and Portland 
retained a localistic cast in 1916 amidst the organization-building 
movements of the I.W.W. and the lumber interests. Local economic 
and social, as well as criminal interests continued to influence 
police actions in both communities. In Portland a waterfront 
strike during the summer of 1916 was the most notable event 
involving the Wobblies and the police. The International Long-
shoremen's Association (I.L.A.), several Portland shipping companies, 
and the I.W.W.**were the principal parties in this labor dispute. 
The dispute was handled mainly by county sheriff's deputies; in 
fact, it was a lisped al" deputy who became the bane of the troubles 
in this strike. 
The strike situation in biief was this: the I.L.A. strikers 
picketed the docks, but the employers hired "special" deputy sheriffs 
to protect non-union men when they passed through the picket line. 
Inasmuch as these deputies were paid by Employer's Association, 
they could not be expected to impartially police the strike. Hhen 
the special deputies flourished guns. flashed badges, and taunted 
*The Lumbermen's Open Shop Association was a group of Portland 
lUr.1ber employers whose main goal was the establishment of "open 
shop" conditions in Portland. 
**The 1.\4. W. was i nvo 1 ved in the capaci ty of an agi tati ona 1 
"thi rd party"; the \~obb 1 i es attempted to recrui t members of the 
I.L.A., an A.F.L. affiliate, into the I.W.W. 
the strikers with four-letter expletives on August 4th, it became 
all too clear whose side the deputies were on. 3 
Not only the strikers, but Mayor Albee and Chief of Police 
Clark registered opposition to this kind of behavior on the part 
of the special deputies. Albee publicly asserted that it was the 
"duty of the city to police the waterfront."4 The mayor also 
disclosed that he had always been against the deputizing of company 
employees as special officers. Finally, he announced that Chief 
Clark had personally informed r·1r. McCusker, the secretary of the 
Employer's Association, that he would persuade the city council 
to add 25 more men to the police force in exchange for the removal 
of special deputies from the strike scene. It should be noted 
that prior to this time the city council had refused to appropriate 
money to hire additional policemen. However, at the council 
meeting on the 19th, Albee argued that more patrolmen were needed 
to police the strike situation on the waterfront. It was only 
on this representation that the ordinance appropriating money 
for police salaries was passed by the council. 6 
The deployment of these extra officers revealed something 
about the behavior of the street policemen who had been handling 
the labor dispute. Since the beginning of the strike, the I.L.A. 
had complained about inexperienced patrolmen "slugging!! and other-
wise "roughing up" strikers. Police administrators evidently 
concurred with the I.L.A.'s allegations because the new men were 
utilized on quiet beats, thus releasing the older and more 
experienced officers for duty on the waterfront. 7 
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Even after the substitution of official police for special 
deputies, strike conditions sizzled on the waterfront. The presence 
of city police at the strike scene became conspicuous in the case 
of a IIscab ll who shot and severely injured one of the strikers. The 
police arrested the scab, charged him with lIassau1t with a deadly 
weapon ll and with lIintent to ki11,11 and then placed him in jai1.8 
More importantly, the I.W.W. accused the city police of allowing 
scabs to carry guns. 9 The police denied this cnarge, b~t an order 
by a Federal Court judge lent some credence to the I.W.W.'s claims 
about IIgun-toting scabs." In a court order pertaining to I.L.A. 
picketing, the judge chastized the shipping companies for hiring 
men and providing them with guns. 10 
The behavior of the city police did not emerge as an issue in 
the dock strike again. It is worthy of note, however, that police 
detectives engaged in a considerable amount of surveillance activity 
at I.W.W. functions at the same time that patrolmen were policing 
the dock strike. The I.H.W. press reported that If1ybulls"* and 
"stoo1 pigeons"**\\erenoticeab1e at a number of organizing and fund 
raising meetings. 11 Since only local police were cited as being 
present at these meetings, it can :be assumed that federal involve-
ment in these endeavors was minimal in 1916. 
For the Seattle police, the most significant encounter with 
labor radicals in 1916 came in the police department's participation 
*In i~obb1y jargon a f1ybu11 was an undercover police 
detective. 
**A stool pigeon is a civilian who acts as an informer for 
the police. 
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in the events surrounding the Everett r1assacre. * It was a Seattle 
police officer who relayed information from two Pinkerton agents to 
the Snohomish County officials that "a boatload of I.H.W. men and 
women were leaving for Everett. 1I12 It was also the Seattle police 
who handled the survivors of the slaughter that occurred in Everett. 
The police took nearly 300 uninjured members of the I.~~'\L and 3 
women organizers into custody, placing them in the Seattle jail. 13 
From the standpoint of local sources of influence on police 
behavior, the actions of Hiram C. Gill, who was re-elected mayor 
in 1914, were more significant than those of the police. Gill 
released a statement to the press in which he exonerated the I.W.W. 
for the violence in Everett and condemned the Everett authorities 
on November 8, 1916. His criticism of the Everett officials was 
trenchant, calling them "imbeciles" and denouncing their incon-
sistency in the handling of the I.l~.l~. Furthermore, he directed 
the carrying of 300 blankets and a supply of tobacco to the loW.H. 
prisoners in jail. 14 
The Seattle Chamber of Commerce and some other corrrnunity 
influentials took offense at this kind of treatment for the loH.IL 
The Chamber and some prominent citizens formed a loose alliance 
and sought to discipline Gill. They attempted to recall him for 
a second time and to discredit him by charging him with taking 
*The Everett r1assacre involved the ambush and shooting of 
Hobblies by Snohomish County Sheriff Donald Mc~ae and vigilantes 
at the docks in Everett, WaShington on November 5, 1916. The 
Wobblies had traveled to Everett from Seattle via boat for a 
protest meeting. 
bribes from bootleggers. This time, however, the recall effort 
failed to win the support of the community.15 
Actually, the recall and the corruption matters may have 
served as a guise for a larger issue which aggravated the Chamber 
of Commerce, namely the conspiracy that conservative businessmen 
perceived to exist between city politicians, vice operators, and 
labor radicals. The conspiracy idea consisted of the fact that 
George F. Vanderveer served as the attorney for ~layor Gi 11, the 
IJ~.W., and local bootleggers, and the partial truth that Gill 
"supported" the I.l~J~. after the Everett tragedy. It was only a 
small leap of faith for some persons to take the position that 
vice interests, the I.W.W., and city politics were linked through 
the personages of Gill and Vanderveer. 16 
This conspiracy notion was logically deficient in that no 
evidence was ever cited to indicate that the major, the vice 
proprietors, and I.W.W. leaders ever met or plotted together in 
order to further their common interests. Whether there was a 
conspiracy involving the I.W.W. or political rule exclusively by 
Gill and the Farrell machine, the essential point is that local 
forces shaped the operation of Seattle's municipal government in 
1916. 
The Great Lumber Strike of 1917 and the City Police 
The localistic hue of policing in 1916 was modified in 1917. 
150 
The alteration in the traditional local character of the city police 
was, in part, due to labor unrest. The year 1917 marked the I .H.H. 's 
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first real taste of power in the Pacific Northwest. At this time, 
the I.W.\~. focused its organizing efforts on the Northwest timber 
and mill workers, launching the Lumber Horkers' Industrial Union No. 
500 in ~·1arch 1917. At its inception the lumber workers' union had 
a membership of 11,000 persons. 17 
Demanding an eight hour day, improved living and working 
conditions, and increased pay, the I.W.~I. set July 17 as the date 
for a strike in the lumber industry. General unrest in the woods, 
however, began in early April; by mid-summer almost all of the 
members of the A.F.L.'s Brotherhood of Timber Horkers had walked 
off their jobs along with the members of the I.W.H.'s Lumber 
Workers' Union. The strike was almost immediately a success in the 
logging camps, while only a few scattered mills throughout the 
Northwest continued operations. 18 The effects of the I.W.W.-led 
strike were devastating inasmuch as it virtually paralyzed the 
lumber industry in the Pacific tlorthwest. 19 
Even before the strike had gathered its full momentum, the 
major lumber firms in the Pacific Northwest had made definite, 
cooperative plans about how to cope with the unrest. The lumber 
industry's top executives determined early that they would refuse 
to concede the eight-hour day.20 In order to maintain the ten-
hour day, the employers established the Lumbermen's Protective 
Associ ati on. The ~Ieyerhaeuser corporati on and about 60 other 
companies joined the association, pledging to penalize any member 
which granted the eight-hour day and to threaten firms which 
refused to assist them. 21 Additionally, the mill owners, packing 
a fund of $500,000, met in rooms of the Industrial Employer's 
Association Office in Seattle on July 16, 1917 and laid out plans 
to fight the demand of an eight-hour day.22 
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With the aid of the county police, private police, state 
officiais, soldiers, and vigilantes, the employers set out to offset 
the power of the militant lumber workers. At first, the Seattle 
and Portland police played only a secondary role in the employer's 
campaign to defeat the I.W.W.-contro11ed strike. County sheriff's 
departments, national guard units, special battalions of Spanish 
}~erican War Veterans, and military personnel carried out the majority 
of the anti-I.W.W. missions that occurred during the early and mid-
summer of 1917. These forces conducted mass round-ups of Wobblies,23 
carried out raids on I.W.W. hal1s,24 patrolled vulnerable sections 
of railroad 1ines,25 and guarded mountain passes in anticipation of 
an i magi nery i nvas i on by IIhordes of 1. t~. W . s. 11 26 These acti vi ti es 
took place largely in Washington and to a lesser extent in Oregon 
lumber camps and rural communities where there \'las a great deal of 
unrest in the early phases of the strike. 
Both unofficial and quasi-official Vigilante groups* were 
also very active in this first surge against the I.l'J.H. One 
vigilante attack upon an I.W.W. hall was foiled by the Seattle 
*Groups such as the Minutemen and the Patriotic League 
operated in Washington with the support of Governor Ernest Lister. 
The t-1inutemen consisted of 2,000 to 3,000 men, mostly Spanish-
American l~ar Veterans, who made arrests, collected intelligence 
information, interrogated I.W.W. members and other radical suspects, 
raided I.W'\~ gathering places, and held prisoners for the authorities.~7 The Patriotic League was composed of patriotic 
citizens in various Washington c~Mnties. The League was not used 
in any major anti-I.W.H. forays. 
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police on Saturday evening, June 16th. The unusual raid-prevention 
course of police action proceeded as follows. On June 13th the I.W.W. 
learned that the U.S. Marines were planning to wreck the I.W.W. hall. 
Laying this information before r4ayor Gill, the I.W.W. demanded 
protection. Although Gill informed the I.W.W. that he doubted the 
reliability of their source of information, a sufficient number of 
police were available to repulse the attack when a "l arge number of 
soldiers and marines" tried to gain entrance to the I.W'\4. ha1l. 29 
In the end, however, the Wobb1 ies were the losers. \~hi le 
the raiders were trying to force their way into the I.W.\~. head-
quarters, one of the vigilantes was shot in the leg. As soon as 
the shot was fired, all 51 Wobblies who were in the hall at the 
time were placed under arrest by the Seattle police in spite of the 
fact that the police did not know who fired the shot. Three soldier-
vigilantes were also arrested, and all of those arrested were taken 
to the city jail. In addition, the police locked up the I.W.~J. hall 
for the next two days. The Wobblies were losers in another sense 
as well. By halting the I.l~.\~. meeting in the hall, the vigilantes 
had at least hindered the planning-organizing-recruiting scheme of 
the Wobblies. 
On a number of other occasions the Seattle police proved to 
be ineffective in preserving the labor radicals· right to freedom 
of association. On August 1, for instance, a joint meeting of the 
Socialist Party and representatives of the American Federation of 
Labor was broken up by soldiers. The police were able to protect 
Kate Sadler, a leader of the Socialist Party in Seattle, and the 
rest of the labor radicals at the meeting. 3D Still, the police 
dispersed the entire crowd, including the Socialists and the union 
leaders, thus ending the meeting which was presumably one of the 
vigilantes' purposes in the first place. 
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The Portland police became yoked into the anti-I.W.W. campaign 
when the strike activity heightened in Oregon in August. Just prior 
to the time that logging operations became hampered along the 
Columbia River and most of the mills closed in Portland,3l Mayor 
George L. Baker proclaimed that an "iron hand" would meet the I.W.W. 
in Portland. At a conference of federal, state, county, and city 
officials elaborate plans were formulated to squelch any attempt 
of the I.W.W. to interfere with the operation of the mills, 
factories, or ship-building plants of the city. 
With regard to the police, Chief of Police John Clark 
stati oned si x men at the Eastern and \~estern Lumber Company and 
two men at the InmiJ.n-Poul sen mi 11; other mi 11 s were protected by 
one policeman each. A number of officers were also held on reserve 
at the police station in anticipation of trouble. This left only 
four officers patrolling beats on the east side and five officers 
on the west side in Portland. 32 
In addition to this reacti~e strategy, the Portland police 
commenced an offensive mission against the I.W.~J. On the streets 
of Portland, a police dragnet swept through lodging houses and 
various I.W.W. gathering points in search of Wobb1ies. Scores of 
workers and I.W.W. organizers were arrested and charged with petty 
offenses by the city police. Portland police even dredged up that 
"old chestnut," the vagrancy law, as one means of railroading men 
to the Portland rockpile.*33 "Peddling handbills (urging mill 
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workers to strike) without a license" 34 and "using profane language" 35 
were two of the other charges frequently employed by the police for 
arresting Wobblies. 
FY'om the authori ti es' poi nt of vi ew, one of the negati ve 
aspects of this particular dragnet was that non-union as well as 
union workers were arrested; the experience of being arrested and 
thrown in jail may have antagonized some of the non-union men, 
perhaps making them more inclined to join the I .~I.W. The case 
of Valentine Adamik, an Austrian mill worker, exemplified the 
indiscriminate character of the police dragnet in 1917. Adamik 
was found by police in a basement near the Eastern and Hestern 
Lumber Company's mill where 50 men had walked out two days earlier. 
He'was arrested, charged with vagrancy, and ordered to appear in 
court. Even though he protested to the judge that he \'1as not a 
striker, but had been laid off because he was sick, the judge 
ordered the police to hold Adamik until he could prove he was a 
"steady worker." t~hile it is not known if Adamik joined the I.W.W. 
later, it was noted in a report of his court hearing that Adamik was 
angry and displeased with his treatment by the police. 36 
*During the Great Lumber Strike of 1917 the rock quarry 
at Rocky Butte (which is now the location of the Multnomah County 
jail) was utilized as a "sub-jail" in order to handle the over-
flo\,1 of 1. W. W. pri soners. 
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Federal Intervention Into the Policy of the Great Lumber Strike 
Labor's solidarity remained intact despite the repressive 
methods of the Portland plice and other governmental authorities in 
the Pacific Northwest. What was needed to break the strike, 
according to the employers and the local patriots in Seattle and 
Portland as well as the city and state political officials, was 
federal intervention on a massive scale. The owners of logging, mill, 
and shipbuilding firms, who were reaping huge profits during the war, 
communicated this idea to federal officials through local U.S. 
attorneys who were based in Seattle and Portland. 37 Other community 
influentials also called for federal assistance to crush the strike. 
The Reverend ~,'ark A. ~'1athews of Seattle's Fi rst Presbyterian Church, 
for example, wrote to Thomas H. Gregory, the U.S. Attorney General: 
[the] .•. Kerensky overthrow [had been] largely 
planned, schemed, and executed in the city of Seattle. 
if the military authorities had concurrent jurisdiction 
when the civil authorities broke down, they could 
arrest these fiends, court martial, and shoot them. 38 
Colonel M. E. Saville, the head of the military police at 
Camp Lewis, Washington, authored a report on the situation in Seattle 
which was no doubt taken more seriously by the Wilson administration, 
than Mathews' letter. Saville wrote that: 
.•. a vice ring, a pro-German ring, and an I.H.W. 
ring with interests interwoven and backed by political, 
financial, and religious eleMents of great strength 
were in control in Seattle, and that city was the 
pivotal point of all I.WJ~. activities in the Northwest. 39 
The significance of Saville's report is that President Wilson 
read it and that Hugh Campbell Wallace, a Democratic national 
committeeman from Washington and a friend of the President's, told 
Hilson that Saville's interpretation of the linkages between 
Seattle politics, vice, and the lol~.l~. was correct. 40 
National and international forces also weighed heavily in the 
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federal government's decision to intervene into local police affairs. 
For one thing, President Wilson was aware that loW.N. strikes inter-
fered with wartime lumber production and that as a consequence, the 
strikes limited the supply of airplanes and ships that could be 
used to achieve war aims. Northwest businessmen hammered away at 
this fact in their reports to federal authorities. 41 
Pres i dent \~i 1 son I s own pol iti ca 1 ideology is another factor 
that should not be underestimated. He was committed to the idea 
that the spread and growth of Bolshevism and revolution had to be 
prevented in order to preserve the international framework in which 
the United States capitalist system could develop to its fullest 
capacity.42 With the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 
of 1917, he resolved to fight against revolution on both the inter-
national and the domestic fronts by assisting counter-revolutionary 
forces. 43 
For these reasons on September 6, 1917, the U.S. government 
took a major step toward trying to exert control over the poliC'ing 
of labor unrest in Seattle and Portland as well as in the rest of 
the country. i10st of the loW.W. offices and halls of any prominence 
throughout the United States were raided by U.S. marshals, who were 
assisted by local police on this date. Orders for the raids came 
directly from U.S. Attorney General Gregory, the head of the U.S. 
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Department of Justice* and a member of President Wilsonls Cabinet. The 
raids in various cities were synchronized so that they all took place 
at noon; presumably, the purpose of this timing was to prevent any 
warning from one place to another. 44 
The I.W.W. hall, the district headquarters of the Lumber 
Workers I No. 500 and No. 700 unions and the office of the Industrial 
Worker in Seattle were all entered and approximately the same minute 
by U.S. officials accompanied by Seattle police. At the I.H.W. hall 
the police ordered 150 members of the I.W'\~. to vacate the hall 
whi l.e a search was conducted. r~any papers and other types of property 
in the hall were seized by federal officials.**45 
The intricacies of the raid on the office of the Industrial 
Worker were described in this eye-witness account of C. E. Payne, 
the editor of the I.W.W. newspaper. 
Two pol ice offi cers entered the Industri a 1 Worker' offi ce 
with the U.S. official close behind them ••.• When the 
policemen were well within the room, and it was seen that 
there would be no resistance to them, the U.S. official 
came from behind them and gave the editor a type-written 
document of several pages and stated that he had come to 
seize everything in rooms 24, 25, and 40 in the Union Block. 
*The Justice Department was not the only federal bureaucracy 
that triad to suppress labor radicalism at this t"ime. The Inunigration 
Service detained and deported alien Wobblies, the Postal Service denied 
mailing privileges to the I.~·J.W., and the War Departmentls Loyal Legion 
of Loggers and Lumbermen (4 Lis) and Spruce Division increased spruce 
production, and undercut the I.~J.W. IS support among timber workers. The 
4 Lis was a government-sponsored uni on that was formed on November 28, 
1917. The Spruce Division 'lias a corps of Army officers who acted as 
recruiters for the 4 Lis and as military police to harass and other-
wise discourage I.W.W. and A.F.L. organizers from recruiting ventures 
in the lumber camps. 
**Three weeks after the raids, the federal government arrested 
a large nuni>er of I~obblies. In the time between the raids and the 
arrests federal investigators had used confiscated I.W.W. literature 
in order to prepare cases under the Espionage Act. 
While McDonald [the Secretary of the Seattle I.W.W.) was 
reading the document and the police officers and the U.S. 
official began piling letters, pictures, typewriters, 
office equipment, books and records indiscriminately into 
boxes to remove to the ~tfices of the United States 
District Attorney .••. 
There was no mention of the offices of the Industrial Worker 
in the warrant, but there were several references to Solidarity, the 
I.W.W. magazine, which was published in another building. 47 Yet, 
both offices were indiscriminately raided. From these facts, it 
is clear that there was little heed given to the Fourth Amendment in 
this raid. Indeed, it appears that the raid was conducted under 
one of the broadest search warrants ever issued by the American 
judiciary.48 
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The raid on the I.W.W. headquarters in Portland followed the 
same pattern as the raids in Seattle. A U.S. marshal, a force of 
secret service agents, city police, and deputy sheriffs entered the 
I.l~.W. headquarters, frisked the 100 l~obblies present, searched for 
seditious literature and firearms, and seized the Wobblies' I.l~.H. 
membership cards. 49 The ~lobblies were ordered to leave the building 
and then everything with which the I.W.W. was conducting business--
account books, library printing presses, letters and office furniture, 
pictures, and characters--was hauled a'l,ay in trucks. 50 
After the September 5th raids, the ties between federal 
authorities and the municipal authorities in Seattle and Portland 
became more noticeable. One indication of these connections is that 
the police departments in both cities assisted federal law enforce-
ment officers in a series of raids. Seattle police detectives 
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collaborated with federal officials in a raid on rooms rented by the-
1.t~.W. in a hotel in November of 1917. Six thousand feet of dynamite 
fuse* and a load of books, membership lists, correspondence and 
other documents were seized in this raid, although no arrests were 
made. 5l A similar raid was conducted on I.W.W. rooms in another 
hotel several weeks later. Federal agents, assisted by the Seattle 
police, confiscated a "truckload of literature and documents" in 
this raid. 52 Another raid was carried out by U.S. marshals and the 
Seattle police on December 20, 1917. This time the police arrested 
six persons and seized mimeographs, typewriters, and other property 
that was essential to the operation of I.W.W. business. 53 
Still another raid was conducted in Seattle on December 21st. 
Federal and city police boarded the Russian ship, the Shilka, and 
searched it for a mYthical $100,000 in gold that was supposedly to 
be used in defending 1. W. W. pri soners and for muni ti ons that \'Iere 
allegedly to be employed in starting a Bolshevik Revolution in the 
United States. 54 In point of fact, the Shilka was not carrying any-
thing more explosive than a cargo of licorice root, peas, and beans!55 
Aside from the raids, instances of federal influence over the 
activities of the Seattle and Portland police are not as easily 
discerned. Nevertheless, it appears that the tentacles of the 
federal government protruded into police affairs in other ways. To 
be specific, the size, organization, and morale of the Portland police 
department as well as the public's safety from criMinal victimization 
*It was discovered later that the I.W.W. did not own the 
dynami te fuse. 
seem to have been affected by changes in the department made as a 
result of requests by the federal government. Portland Mayor Baker 
admitted that the size of the police force was increased by 75 men 
in 1917 in order that the police could perform the work required of 
them by the federal government. This work involved the protection 
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of shipbuilding plants and the other important war industries in 
Portland. From the local authorities' point of view, the industries 
needed to be protected against the "sabotage" of I.W.H. organizers 
who were seeking to recruit maritime workers as well as the potential 
sabotage of bona fi de pro-German supporters who may have \'/anted to 
destroy plants, ships, munitions, and other war-related paraphernalia. 
The deployment of policement at the Portland shipyards 
carried some consequences that apparently were not anticipated by 
either the city or federal officials. First, patrolmen who guarded 
the shipyards began to complain about their own low pay and some 
even deserted their jobs. 58 A major reason for the discontent among 
the street policemen was the difference between the $100 a month 
pay of patrolmen and the $40 a week pay of corrmon laborers in the 
shipyards. 59 Second, the attrition in the ranks of patrolmen coupled 
with the need to utilize large numbers of police at the sites of war 
industries reduced the police department's capacity to perform law 
enforcement and service functions. This fact was brought out in a 
newspaper expose on the police in which it was revealed that every 
division of the poli.ce bureau was working "shorthanded. II r1any of 
the beats were reported to be left uncovered or to have been so en-
larged that it was impossible for a policeman to patrol them with any 
degree of effectiveness. 60 
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In terms of organizational change, a "war emergency squad" was 
formed by the Portland police in response to requests from the 
federal government. According to Mayor Baker, the purpose of the 
squad was lito r.1ake Portland clean for soldiers. 11 61 In other words, 
the squad was supposed to "protect" U.S. soldiers from the lIevils 
of gambling, drinking, and prostitution."62 The real function of 
the war emergency squad may have been something quite different from 
the publicized purpose. There is evidence that many officers 
assigned to the squad had little conception of their duties. 63 More-
over, the names of several of the members of this squad show up con-
sistently on the lists of police who participated in the raids on the 
I.W.t~. halls and headquarters in Portland in 1917. 
Linkages between the Seattle police and federal authorities 
were more tenuous and obscure than those in Portland. Still, the 
federal government emerged in an important police case against local 
vigilantes, significantly influencing the outcome of the case. A 
brief digression is necessary to limn the general contours of the 
relationship between the vigilantes and the federal authorities in 
this case. Beginning with the wrecking of the Pigott Printing 
Concern on January 5, 1918, several vigilante attacks were made on 
I.W.lL and Socialist newspaper publishing and distributing sites. 64 
The self-appointed, civilian law enforcement officers wreaked a 
considerable amount of property damage in each attack; no suspects 
were taken into custody for any of the vigilantes were riding 
roughshod over the city. Understandably, the citizenry began to 
complain about a lack of "1aw and order" in Seattle. l4hen the Seattle 
police arrested two menDers of the r1inutemen on January 12, 1918 on 
a charge of being the "ringleaders" of the mob that had wrecked the 
Pi gott Printing Concern,* it was clear to the people of Seattl e that 
the police were attempting to regain control over the city.65 
Federal involvement in the handling of the vigilantes came 
163 
in the form of Major C. P. Stearns' effort to obtain special treatment 
for the two ~1inutemen suspects. Stearns convinced the prosecuting 
attorney that the men were blameless on account of theii~ membership 
in Stearns' own Spruce Division. Both Stearns and the prosecuting 
attorney defended the men's actions, asserting that theoir crimes 
were motivated by patriotism. 66 When a farce of a trial in a city 
court ended in the judge freeing the suspects on the ground of their 
"emotional insanity" (allegedly caused by seditious articles 
published by the radical press), it was obvious that federal 
tampering had influenced the verdict.** 
Police transgressions against the civil liberties of labor 
radicals is another area in which the federal government and the 
city police had a close relationship. Portland police working in 
conjunction with federal authorities, for example, concocted an 
arrangement for keeping LW'\4. members locked-up. The police would 
arrest a Wobbly on an "open charge, II stating that the ~40bbly was 
*The Pigott Printing Concern was the publishing office for 
the Industrial ~/orker and the Seattle Call, a Socialist newspaper. 
**r!;inutemen agents were assured that they had the Uni ted 
States government and the Department of Justice behind them in their 
work of ferreting out radical activities, according to Seattle 
t·1i nuteman Harry S. \'Iil son. 68 . 
being "he1d for investigation" by federal agents. If the evidence 
in the case did not warrant prosecution under federal laws, the city 
courts stepped in and convicted the l~obb1y on vagrancy or some other 
public order offense. This practice was exemplified in the case of 
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26 Wobb1ies who were arrested in a federal raid on the Portland I.W.W. 
hall. After federal authorities determined that there was insufficient 
evidence to convict the men in federal court', they were handed over 
to municipal court for trial on public order offenses. 67 
The Seattle police had similar relations with the federal 
authorities and they were equally abusive of the civil liberties of 
Wobb1ies. Excesses of police power were evident in a po1ice-loW.lL 
encounter that occurred on January 16, 1918. A brief melee of police 
brutality was ignited when a street policeman arrested two I .\~>W. 
women for selling copies of the Industrial Horker. ~lhen the news 
spread to the I.W.W. hall, two other I.W.W. women and a large number 
of lumberjacks went onto the streets to sell papers. This new 
group of paper salespersons was met by a platoon of 32 police, who 
snatched papers from the hands of news agents, tore up the papers, 
and clubbed Wobblies as well as a non-union man who was wearing a 
liberty bond button. 69 At the end of the fray27 of the paper-
distributing Wobb1ies were arrested on the charge of "passing out 
circulars without a license" (i.e., handbills were inside the news-
paper), while the two women who were first accosted by the police 
were held on an "open charge," pending investigation by the U.S. 
Immigration Service. 70 
Police-I.W.W. Contacts in 1918: A Reexamination 
This kind of blatent lawlessness on the part of city police 
upset some authorities in the U.S. Justice Department. Hhen 
Clarence L. Ream2s was appointed as a special assistant for all war-
related crimes in Seattle, he was assigned the twin responsibilities 
of annihilating the I.H.W. and IIcleaningll up the law enforcement 
operations in Seattle as ~eil as Portland. 71 Reames himself 
expressed disgust over the lack of concern for even the rudimentary 
elements of due process in the conduct of police business in Seattle 
in the spring of 1918. 
When I reached Seattle every public officer, federal, 
state, and municipal, including members of the Fire 
Department, and all volunteer organizations exercised the 
privilege of unceremoniously arresting citizens, aliens, 
and alien enemies and throwing them unceremoniously into 
jail, where they were booked for investigation by the 
Department of Justice. 72 
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Reames' first actions in Seattle were to order the tennination 
of seizures without warrants and to try to induce all police organ-
izations, official or otherwise, to make no arrests vJithout the 
approval of the Seattle office of the Justice Department or the 
United States marshal. 73 Since the city police turned most of the 
arrested l~obblies over to federal authorities for prosecution, Reames 
though that this order would cause the police to alter their search, 
seizure, and arrest practices. 
Studying the behavior of law enforcement personnel in Seattle, 
historian William Preston posited that Reames thoroughly centralized 
all anti-radical activities in his office. However, Preston qualified 
his position, admitting that "lapses ll occurred in the implementation 
of Reames' po1iCy.74 How tight was the federal government's control 
over the Seattle and Portland police during the spring and summer of 
19181 While it is impossible to conclusively answer this question 
because of data limi~ations, it is exceedingly doubtful that federal 
officials exerted as much control over the city police as Preston 
implied they did. 
There was at least one flaw in Reames' policy. He appears 
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to have assumed that unlawful local police practices could be halted 
merely by the withdrawal of federal support in obtaining convictions. 
Implicit in this line of reasoning is the notion that the police 
intervene into a situation solely for the purpose of prosecution. 
Yet, the Seattle and Portland police often took action against the 
I.W.W. for purposes other than prosecution in 1918.* 
r~ore important i nsofa r as Fri edhei m' s stance is concerned, 
is the fact that the Seattle and Portland police continued to engage 
in many of the same practices after Reames' appointment as they 
did before the U.S. Justice Department tried to make Reames a sort 
of law enforcement czar in the Pacific Northwest. The Seattle 
police, for instance, made numerous arrests of Wobblies along the 
Seattle waterfront in r~arch 1918. 75 It was probably not coincidental 
that sorre of the I.W.W. leaders, who were arrested on lIopen charges,1I 
were taken into custody at a time when the I.W.W. was organizing 
waterfront workers into a union. As for the arrested rank-and-file 
*Wayne R. La Fave pointed out that police make arrests for 
purposes other than prosecution in his benchmark study of police 
decision-making. See La Fave's Arrest: The Decision to Take a 
Suspect into Custody (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965). 
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Wobblies, most of them could not afford bail so they were packed like 
sardines into the Seattle city jail. 76 The purpose of the arrests 
in these cases seems to have been to disrupt the activities of I.W.W. 
organizers and to incapacitate rank-and-file Wobblies. 
Portland police also made arrests for reasons other than 
prosecution. In April 1918 an I.W.W. organizer was arrested while 
77 he was speaking to a crowd and held on an "open charge." Breaking 
down the I.W.W.'s mobilization capacity seems to have been the 
purpose for arresting this Wobbly leader in Portland. The police in 
Portland also made arrests in order to gather intelligence information 
about the I.W.W. Wobb1ies were grilled by police interrogators in 
some instances while they were held under the guise of being used 
"t " " 78 as W1 nesses 1n upcom1ng cases. 
Still other purposes for making arrests were evident in the 
behavior of the Seattle police. Chief of Police Joel Warren led 
series of raids that were carried out almost exclusively by Seattle 
city police without the assistance of federal police. The first 
raid in the series resulted in the arrest and jailing of 213 
Wobb1ies on "open charges." Chief Warren himself stated that the 
objective of this police action was to assist in the "successful 
prosecution of the war. 1179 
Intimidation was introduced as an acknowledged purpose for 
police actions in the fifth raid of the series in Seattle in June 
of 1918. Carrying carbine rifles, Seattle policemen under the 
direction of Chief Warren raided an I.W.W. meeting in the woods 
near Seattle. One police officer intimated that the heavy 
artillery was necessary for a "mora1 effect."80 The fi fth rai d may 
have had other purposes as well as intimidation. In view of the 
fact that this was the fifth different meeting place raided by the 
police in as many raids,8l it appears that they may have been trying 
to interfere with the I.W.W. 's routine business operations. Then, 
too, the arrest of 32 persons in this raid served to incapacitate 
some of the most radical workingmen in the Seattle shipyards. 
To recognize that certain police practices remained intact 
in spite of federal encroachment into some aspects of policing labor 
wars is a necessary analytic step in unraveling the subtleties of 
local resistance to the nationalization of the city police. For 
a more complete appreciation of the limits of federal control, it 
is necessary to briefly explore the role of the local political 
power-holders in shaping police policy. 
George L. Baker and Ole Hanson were respectively the mayors 
of Portland and Seattle for the period under consideration.* Both 
Baker, in his roles as Mayor and Commissioner of Public Safety, 
and Hanson, in his position as Mayor, had formal responsibility for 
the police. Both were "strong" mayors in the sense that they seemed 
to possess informal as well as formal power in their relations 
with the police. In a word, both men "directed" the police depart-
ments in Portland and Seattle. 
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It was Baker who set down police policy for dealing with the 
Wobb1ies when they extended the lumber strike into Portland and other 
*Baker was the Mayor of Port1 and from 1917 to J.dy 1933, 
while Hanson served as Mayor from 1918 to August 28, 1919 at which 
time he resigned from office. 
parts of Oregon. It was also Baker who told Chief of Police N. F. 
Johnson to "handle these agitators [i.e., Wobblies] in the severest 
manner possible."82 Hence, Baker as well as the Portland police 
were r~sponsible for the illegalities and excesses in the police 
methods. 
Ole Hanson exercised as much control over the Seattle police 
as Baker did over the Portland police. Indeed, the series of raids 
during the summer of 1918 in Seattle appear to have been ordered by 
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Hanson. Hanson publicly took II credit" for the first raid, announcing 
that it was part of his campaign promise lito rid the city of I.W.W. 'S."83 
Like Baker, Hanson apparently deserved the credit and criticism for 
police actions vis a vis the Wobblies. 
The immoderate police policies toward the Wobb1ies that 
were devised by these two mayors between 1917 and 1919 were greatly 
influenced by the ideological currents of "Americanism" which 
flowed throughout the United States in the World War I period.* 
Both Baker and Hanson were convinced that the I.W.W. had planned 
the Great Lumber Strike of 1917 for the explicit purpose of under-
mining the nation's war aims. To Baker the Wobblies were Itraitors,"84 
while to Hanson they were "Red revolutionists."85 Without question 
*According to Mayor Hanson's own four-page definition of 
Americanism, the tenn meant 11iberty," "self-government," "equality," 
II democracy , II "conti nuous progress, II 111 aw, II 1I1ove of fellow man ,II 
"hope," "optimism," "family love and family life," "one wife and one 
country," "increased production and iDcreased prosperity for all," 
"strong national government," "protection of private rights and 
property," "strength," "preparedness and universal training," "morality," 
"God and good," "truth,1I IIreason," "proof by experience~" "success," 
"equal suffrage," "reward for individual effort," "full and equal 
justice," "universal and free education," and "human rights." For 
more of Hanson's thinking on the subject of Americanism see his 
Americanism Versus Bolshevism (New York: Doubleday, Page, and 
Company, 1920). 
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the wartime patriotism of these two powerful local figures pushed them 
in the direction of advocating and supporting repressive police methods. 
While it would be a mistake to completely discount material 
interests in explaining police behavior in 1918, it does appear 
that purely economic forces were of secondary importance behind the 
over-powering presence of the Americanism ideology. This assel"tion 
is based on the fact that no evi dence was found to support the 
proposition that the excesses of city police power in 1918 were due 
to the influence of lumbering or other business interests upon the 
police. Yet, the fit between the mayor's ideological convictions and 
the needs of the employing class in the two cities as well as the 
authorities in the federal government was so nearly perfect that 
in the final analysis it must be recognized that Americanism, as it 
was reflected in the police efforts to suppress labor radicalism, 
assisted the economically dominant class in accomplishing the larger 
goal of perpetuating the capitalist system. 
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CHAPTER VII I 
POLICING THE SEATTLE GENERAL STRIKE 
The Problem of Defining Labor Radicalism 
The Seattle General Strike in 1919 afforded the defenders of 
corporate capitalism some of their most perilous moments in the 
twentieth century. The first line of defense for the forces of order 
in the General Strike was manned by the city police. From the 
winter of 1918 through the summer of 1919 the Seattle police were 
deeply immersed in a battle against the labor radicals who sponsored 
and participated in the General Strike. 
In policing the General Strike Seattle law enforcement 
officers faced a perplexing situatiJon in which it must have seemed 
to them that all working persons were radicals. This was because 
the term "radical" had a very broad application in the context of 
the Seattle labor movement from 1918-1919. Even members of the 
local A.F.L. unions in Seattle were regat'ded as being radicals by 
the national headquarters in 1919,.1 The concern about radicalism 
in the Seattle A.F.L. was not without substance in fact. It has 
been estimated that 95 percent of the rank and file members in 
A.F.L. unions in Seattle felt that the workers should control the 
industries instead of the employers. 2 Moreover, the prevalent 
sentiment among Seattle A.F.L. union members was that all working 
persons had a natural relationship toward one another as "cl ass 
brothers ... 3 
From the standpoint of the Seattle police, the ideological 
diversity within the local A.F.L. labor movement was of critical. 
importance. Three general groupings--the "conservatives," the 
"radicals," and the "progressives"--were recognized within the 
Seattle labor movement. The conservatives tended to favor a 
practical, incremental approach to improving the working person's 
lot, usually within the confines of the private property system. 
The second group, the progressives, served as a buffer between the 
~onservatives and the radicals. The progressive's policy 
stressed organizational solidarity and integration, while 
reflecting elements of both the conservative and the radical 
perspectives. As for the radicals, this group of workers demanded 
rapid and far-reaching changes in the position of labor in society. 
The radical group itself consisted fo three subgroups: the "free-
wheeling" radicals with no outside organizational ties; some 
Wobblies who simultaneously held I.W.W. and A.F.L. cards and 
participated in the actions of A.F.L. unions; and the "incipient 
communists" (the CC!1i11unist Party of the United States was not 
formed until August-September 1919) who had strong Bolshevik 
inclinations and who were also active in A.F.L. affairs. 4 
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The police also had to cope with the activities of those 
Wobblies who operated solely as members of the I.W.W. Additionally, 
the police dealt with a variety of socialist and anarchist groups 
which often became involved with the labor movement. The situation 
was made all the more confusing for the police by the fact that 
many labor radicals had multiple affiliations. For example, a 
large number of persons were members of the A.F.L., the I.W.W., and 
the Socialist Party at the same time, although the exact number of 
these types of labor radicals is unknown and cannot be reliably 
estimated due to the lack of data. 
The Seattle Police and the Labor Radicals in the Winter of 1918 
Setting aside the somewhat abtruse issue of defining labor 
radicalism, it is useful to examine police actions before, during, 
and after the General Strike. This longitudinal view allows for an 
appreciation of how police policy changed in accordance with shifts 
in the balance of power between labor and capital. Police behavior 
in the period preceding the General Strike was much the same as 
police behavior in the first part of 1918. In line with Mayor 
Hanson's campaign promise to "get rid of the I.W.W.," the Seattle 
police persisted in their efforts to repress the Wobblies through 
the winter of 1918. 
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The milder side of this repression consisted of the suppression 
of the Wobblies' basic constitutional rights. The Seattle police 
has a relatively easy task in obstructing the Wobblies' freedom to 
associate with one another. To bar the I.W.W. from local meeting 
halls, all the police had to do was apply some pressure to the 
owners of the halls. Pressure came in the form of police threats 
to arrest the owners or have their building condemned by city 
officials. This tactic worked to near perfection as many property 
owners refused to allow Wobblies to rent halls for meeting purposes. S 
Limiting the effectiveness of the I.W.W. press called for a 
considerably greater amount of police effort than did restricting 
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the I.W.W.'s associationa1 activity. Street police were ordered 
to patrol the streets, looking for Wobblies selling I.W.W. literature. 
To perform this task well, patrolmen had to be able to distinguish 
Wobb1ies and their printed matter from the other persons and 
literature that circulated on the streets. This was not an ability 
with which all patrolmen were blessed. On at least one occasion 
a street policeman arrested a member of an A.F.L. union who was 
selling the literature of his own union. The man was charged with 
"peddling I.W.W. papers," but later released when it was discovered 
that he was not an I.W.W. member. 
This tactic of trying to stop the distribution of I.W.W. 
materials was not uncommon in Seattle. Newsboys were often taken 
into custody en masse by the Seattle police. In December 1918, 
for example, Sergeant P. F. Keefe arrested three newsboys and 
three I.W.W. members in a round-up of persons se11ing the I.W.W. 
newspaper. Following these arrests, Chief of Police Warren was 
asked to explain the reason for suppressing the I.W.W. 's distribution 
of literature. He stated that the cause of police action against 
the I.W.W. was "sedition" by the I.W.W.7 
Squelching the Wobb1ies~ freedom of speech was an even more 
onerous task for the police than trying to render the I.W.W. press 
ineffective. The main problem for the authorities was differentiating 
between the words and deeds of Wobb 1 i es. r4ayor Hanson commi tted 
a very foolish error in this regard. On the evening of December 23, 
1919 the General Secretary of the I.W.W. told the Mayor in a phone 
call that "the battle is on." Hanson and police officials interpreted 
180 
this to mean that the I.W.W. was contemplating an attack on police 
headquarters. Civic officials were so obsessed with this impression 
of the meaning of the secretary's wrods that a force of police 
reserves was lined up ready to repel mythical Wobbly marauders on 
December 24th. The r·1ayor and a bevy of city officials also were 
present at police headquarters that night, waiting to witness a 
battle that never took place. 8 
Police methods such as amassing large numbers of reserves, 
threatening the owners of meeting halls, and arresting newsboys 
clearly were not sufficient for the purpose of suppressing the 
Wobblies' freedom of speech. The motor-mouth, Gatling 'gun-like 
verbal skills of the Wobblies along with their tactical expertise 
acquired in free speech fights, made it necessary to use more 
forceful methods in order to silence them. More harsh methods of 
repression were used on the participants in an open-air rally on 
January 12th. The result was that a peaceful meeting degenerated 
into a violent, ugly disturbance because of overzealous police 
action. 
The meeting, sponsored by several union locals and the 
Socialist Party, commenced with speeches supporting the Bolshevik 
Revolution. Toward the end of the meeting after five men had 
spoken and a little girl had read a poem, one of the city detectives 
sneaked out of the crowd and called a police inspector at head-
quarters. He notified the inspector that "their language is getting 
too strong." Police Captain Searing was dispatched to the meeting 
place and ordered by the Chief of Police to use his own judgment 
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as to whether the rally should be adjourned. When he arrived at the 
meeting, Searing announced to the crowd that the meeting was over. 
As the crowd walked away from the meeti ng a rea ~lId began to form 
a parade, a wagon with a red flag attached to it drove by. Someone 
raised the cry: IIThere she is! There's the only flag!1I In a flash, 
almost everyone in the crowd took off their hats to the emblem of 
Bolshevism and then the crowd began singing lithe Red Flag,1I an 
I.W.W. song. 10 At this point, Walter C. Smith, an I.W.W. agitator, 
and an editor of the Industrial Worker, gathered part of a throng 
of five to six thousand persons around him. Observing Smith's 
success in gaining the crowd's attention, Captain Searing tried to 
apprehend Smith in order to, in Searing's words, IIni p in the bud 
any furhter demonstration. 1I Before Searing could achieve his 
objective, he was attacked by the persons who had surrounded Smith. ll 
Searing was saved from serious injury by the arrival of IIsquad 
after squad of police,1I but the heads, arms, shoulders, and shins 
of many persons in the crowd were not spared from the blackjacks 
and sticks wielded by both city and military police; many of these 
police had burst onto the scene from a hiding place in a building 
nearby the meeting site. 12 By the end of this orgy of violence, the 
police had broken up the parade and had arrested 13 persons for 
IIdisorderly conduct. II The Seattle ~1inutemen, who had been conducting 
spy work during the meeting, helped the police in the arrest 
process by determining who among the participants was the most 
radical and therefore, the most disorderly. 13 
Several days later the police were again called upon to keep 
down the Wobblies. This time the event was an outdoor meeting 
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which had been organized to protest the police tactics used at the 
January 12th rally. In preparation for this second open-air meeting, 
the police reorganized three shifts in order to have a large number 
of policemen available "in case of trouble." In addition, dozens 
of new clubs were distributed among the emergency details in the 
Seattle Police Department. 14 
Approximately 500 militants and from five to six thousand 
spectators turned out for the meeting at which speakers called for 
the resignation of Mayor Hanson and the removal of Chief of Police 
Warren. Once again, a parade was formed after the speech-making 
and again the police intervened to stop the parade. However, this 
time the police, not the protestors, struck the first blows. The 
militants, who were leading the parade, were set upon by a small 
armY of police, including 14 mounted policemen, 4 auto trucks 
containing 50 police armed with carbines, and 5 squads of police on 
foot with night sticks. In addition, the city police were assisted 
by about 300 citizens who had been sworn in as special police.
15 
Unfortunately, the outcome of this clash of labor radicals 
and Seattle police is unclear. Newspaper accounts of this event 
varied from the Times' report of no police violence16 to the 
Post-Intelligencer's ambiguous observation that the crowd was 
"swept before" the police17 to the Star's portrayal of a full-
blown police riot. 18 Although there is no way to assess the relative 
merits of each account, it strains the imagination to think that 
the police, given their perfonnances in handling a similar meeting 
on the 12th, could mobilize such a large body of men, come face to 
face with the radicals, and not club a few heads. 
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On the same night as the protest meeting, the Seattle Metal 
Trades Council* ordered a strike by the men working in the shipyards.** 
The main issue in the strike was the union's demand of an increase 
in pay for unskilled workers. Skilled mechanics and machinists, 
who were drawing higher wages than the unskilled workers, joined 
their less fortunate co-workers in a strike which actually began 
on January 21,1919.
19 
Many of the 35,000 workers who walked out of the shipyards 
in this strike were extremely radical even in the context of the 
Seattle labor movement. This was because a large number of Wobblies 
worked in the shipyards (because it exempted them from fighting 
the II capitalists' war ll ) and many of these Wobblies also belonged to 
the metal-trades unions. The radicalism of shipyard workers was 
also demonstrated by the t1etal Trades Council's sponsorship of the 
Soldiers, Sailors, and Workingmen's Councils.***20 
*The Seattle Metal Trades Council was composed of represen-
tatives from the local metal trades unions in Seattle. 
**Although Seattle labor called upon its fellow unionists in 
Portland to join the strike, the Portland Metal Trades Council did 
not comply with the request from the Seattle r1etal Trades Council. 
***The Soldiers, Sailors, and Workingmen's Councils ostensibly 
were established to provide assistance to soldiers and sailors who 
had returned from the war. It appears, however, that the Councils 
were also designed for the purpose of creating ideological divisions 
within the ranks of military and ex-military personnel. In effect, 
the Councils were the American edition of the Bolshevik soviets. 
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Following the shipyard workers' walkout, a fast turn of events 
occurred within a span of 13 days. First, the Seattle Central Labor 
Council* approved a request by the Metal Trades Council for a general 
strike throughout the city in sympathy with the shipyard workers' 
strike. Second, the rank and file members of Seatt1e's local A.F.L. 
unions voted to support a general strike. Third, a General Strike 
Committee of 15 persons was appointed to manage the strike. 
Gearing Up for the General Strike 
The General Strike Committee began planning for the strike on 
February 2nd. The committee transacted a heavy vol ume of busi ness 
in an all-day meeting; its decisions touched upon nearly every 
aspect of life in Seattle. Such extensive planning was necessary 
because the strike was not to be merely a shutdown of the city 
services; instead, workers in different trades made arrangements 
to provide essential services to the public. 
Police protection, for example, was to be furnished by the 
strikers. In making preparations to police the city, the strike 
committee had the audacity to announce that a planned increase in 
the size of the Seattle police force for the strike would be 
unnecessary since the strike committee had "perfected" plans to do 
its own policing on behalf of organized labor. Additionally, the 
committee placed a "voluntary" 8:00 p.m. curfew on the city and 
*The Seattle Central Labor Council consisted of represen-
tatives from the local A.F.L. unions. The Council was a very 
powerful force in Seattle politics in 1918-1919. 
publicly warned the strikers not to cause any disturbances that 
might turn the public away from the side of organized labor. 22 
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To work out the details of how labor would police the city, 
the Committee appointed a three-person Law and Order Committee which 
was headed by Frank A. Rust. Rust, who was the manager of the 
Labor Temple Association* and reputed to be a "conservative" labor 
leader, may have been one of the most radical persons to ever 
undertake the responsibilities of police management. He reportedly 
told C. B. Fitzgerald, who was a member of the Seattle city council 
at the time of the General Strike, that: 
I am not for revolution now. I am afraid it cannot win, 
but if I though it could win, I would be for it down the 
line. 23 
Prior to the strike, Rust's most -1mportant activity 'tlaS the 
recruitment of union men, who had served in the U.S. Army or Navy, 
to do police work during the strike. These former military men 
formed a group which came to be known as the War Veteran Guards. 24 
While the General Strike Committee laid plans to provide 
vital services, city authorities were deeply involved in the process 
of making their own plans. Mayor Hanson and Chief of Police Warren 
played the most important roles in designing police policy for the 
strike. Not surprisingly, Hanson's decisions were partially 
influenced by his own super-patriotism. From Hanson's patriotic 
point of view, the shipyard strike and the general strike were part 
of a larger conspiracy to foment a revolution in Seattle. The 
*The Labor Temple Association was a group of persons 
responsible for the Seattle Labor Temple. The Temple itself was 
a building dedicated to the service of labor. 
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mayor believed that a "strange body of men,1I linearly half a hundred,lI 
had gathered in a pool hall in the village of Linnton, Oregon and 
had laid plans to overthrow the U.S. Government. According to 
Hanson, the IIrevo1utionistsll had selected the shipyard strike as the 
starting point, the general strike as the follow-up move, and the 
revolution as the IIfina1 b1ow. 1I25 Hanson identified the conspirators 
as being the members of a "secret soviet." This small minority, 
in his view, exercised a disproportionate amount of power in the 
Seattle labor movement. Hanson, who often attended Central Labor 
Council meetings, made the following observations in regard to the 
"red" machinations in wielding power inside of the A.F.L. labor 
movement: 
The Reds intentionally prolonged union meetings until 
almost dawn. When the home owner and the family man was 
forced to go home, they [the Reds] remained and toward 
morning did exactly as they pleased ..• [often passing] 
revolutionary resolutions. . • At eleven p.m. the 
meeting would be American, at midnight it would be fifty-
fifty, while at two in the morning, only the Reds 
remained, with sometimes a few so-called conservative 
leaders who were too cowardly to raise their voices in 
defense of their country.*26 
The demands of businessmen and civic notables weighed just 
as heavily upon Hanson's mind as the alleged plots of mysterious 
conspirators in 1919. Prior to the strike Seattle businessmen 
called upon the Mayor to put the entire city under martial 1aw. 27 
Powerful men in municipal government, such as C. B. Fitzgerald, also 
pressured Hanson to take a firm stand. against the General Strike. 28 
*The sans culottes used similar tactics to exercise power in 
the French Sections in the 1790s. For a detailed account of how a 
militant minority grasped the reins of power and controlled the 
majority, see Richard Cobb, The Police and the People: French 
Popular Protest, 1789-1820 (New York: Oxford university Press, 1970). 
Hanson's actual preparations for the General Strike proceeded 
on a gigantic scale. He wired the U.S. Secretary of War, asking 
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him to IIstand ready with government troops" in case the IIrevolutionists" 
displaced the city authorities from the seats of power; he requested 
state troops from Governor Ernest Lister; and he threatened to 
deputize 10,000 citizens as special police. 29 As a result of his 
efforts, federal troops were deployed in the following manner: one 
battalion of the First Infantry was stationed nearby as a reserve; 
another battalion and a machine gun company was dispatched to an 
armory, and smaller detachments were ordered to guard strategic 
points, such as the electrical power-distribution centers. State 
troops that were sent to Seattle were stationed in another local 
armory.30 As for the civilian or special police hired by the city, 
Hanson informed a New York Ti mes reporter that: IIWe organi zed 
1,000 extra policemen, armed with rifles and shotguns, and told them 
to shoot on sight anyone causing disorder .•. 1131 
Actually, the plans for the utilization of special police were 
somewhat more detailed than Hanson made them out to be. Chief of 
Police Warren planned to appoint special police to patrol residential 
IIbeats,1I freeing the experienced policemen from these beats and 
allowing them to be prepared to cope with any strike-related 
emergencies. With this type of deployment, the police hoped to 
have a "man covering every street block" and to IIbreak up downtown 
32 
assemb 1 ages. II 
Chief Warren, working behind the scenes, assumed a critical 
place in the pre-strike planning. Warren's actions, like those of 
other police officers, were affected by his personal, on-the-job 
experiences. t10st of Warren's law enforcement experience prior to 
becoming Seattle's Chief of Police came in his role of a confrere 
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to Bat Masterson and Wyatt Earp in the frontier days of Spokane Falls, 
Washington in the late 1800s. Warren has even been described as an 
"old Indian-outlaw hunter" because of his dealings with various 
types of frontier characters. 33 
Wily, old Chief Warren may have known how to suppress labor 
radicals better than any of the other city officials. Warren 
summarized his thinking on the police response in General Strike 
in these words: "I figured it out this way. If the I.W.W. have 
one gun each, we ought to have from three to thirty for each of our 
offi cers. 1134 
Warren devised a two-pronged "out-gL!n-em" strategy. First, 
to minimize the number of guns for the radicals, Warren comandeered 
raids on pawn shops and hardware stores prior to the strike in 
Seattle. The Chief claimed that these raids netted all the guns, 
the powder, and the ca rt ri dges th at had been scattered II from he 11 
to breakfast. 1135 
Second, Warren stockpiled an enormous amount of military 
weaponry that could be used by the city police to break the strike. 
He secured machine guns, mounted them on trucks, and enlisted the 
services of discharged soldiers to man the guns during the strike. 36 
These IImachine guns on wheels" were a particularly ominous symbol 
of Warren's draconian police planning. These weapons were, in poir.t 
of fact, motor trucks with barricaded sides, consisting of sand bags 
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roped to the borders of the truck, with machine guns mounted in the 
center, allowing for a complete "sweep" of the street. The sand bags 
were piled high in the front of the truck to protect the driver, 
while the wagon of the truck was large enough to hold ten men. 37 
The General Strike and Police Coercion 
The beginning of the strike itself was low-keyed compared to 
the hyperactivity of the pre-strike period. Mayor Hanson described 
the first day of the General Strike this way: 
At ten o'clock, February sixth, a strange silence fell 
over our city of four hundred thousand people. Street car 
gongs ceased their clamor; newsboys cast their unsold papers 
into the street; from the doors of mill and factory, store 
and workshop,·streamed sixty-five thousand workmen. 
School children with fear in their hearts hurried homeward. 
The 1ifestream of a great city stopped. 38 
The first major general strike in the United States was thus 
set in motion by the forces of radical labor. From the outset, the 
General Strike was basically led by the A.F.L., while the I.W.W. and 
the Socialist Party also participated in it. The forces of order 
also swung into action on the first day of the strike. Before 
nightfall on the 6th, thousands of business and professional men 
as well as non-union workers, flocked to the Seattle City Hall to 
enlist as special police. 39 Additionally, the plans of the Mayor 
and the Chief of Police were implemented almost immediately by the 
entire 447-man city police force, more than 1,000 sworn volunteers, 
and hundreds of county, state, and federal police. 
A peculiar added feature of the police response involved a 
squad of special policemen who guarded Mayor Hanson's office in the 
City Hall building. It was reported that City Hall "swannedll with 
special policemen and detectives and that guards were stationed at 
every door. 41 Whi le the exact reason for making a fortr'ess out of 
City Hall is not known, it may be that Hanson was reacting to 
statements previously made by enthusiastic Wobb1ies. Perhaps, for 
instance, the words "let's hang Hanson," which were spouted in his 
face at one Central Labor Council meeting, had stuck in his mind. 
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With regard to the policing of the city during the strike, the 
maintenance of order and the apparent cessation of repl~essive actions 
against labor radicals were two of the most remarkable aspects of 
the General Strike. It appears that the city was more orderly during 
the strike than under ordinary conditions. The police court docket 
sank from the nonn of about 100 cases a day to 32 cases on the first 
day of the strike, 18 cases on the second, and 30 cases on the next 
two days combined. None of these cases was in any way related 
to the strike. 42 
What were the reasons for the maintenance of order? Mayor 
Hanson argued that peace was secured by the amassing of police. "The 
knew we meant business and they started no trouble," he boasted in 
one of his public statements. 43 In other words, Hanson took the 
position that a tremendous increase in the city, county, state, and 
federal police in Seattle had a deterrent effect on the strikers' 
decisions to create disorder and to commit illegal acts. Based on 
the findings of contemporary studies on the relationship between 
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increases in police manpower and crime rates, however. this position 
must be deemed to be highly questionab1e.* 
A more feasible explanation of the orderliness of the strike is 
that labor's solidarity and organization served to instill in the 
strikers a set of "inner controls" which constrained anarchistic and 
criminogenic inclinations. The individualistic, self-centered 
orientation of workers ~nder capitalist relations of production 
seems to have been replaced by a class-conscious identify that 
fostered self-discipline on behalf of the collective welfare of 
organized labor. In other words, the strikers abstained from behavior 
that might have been injurious to labor's cause because they were 
loyal to the co-operative ideals of the General Strike rather than 
to the "privatism" of the capitalist order. 
The effective operations of the 300-man War Veteran's Guard 
supplemented these social-psychological controls. These men served 
under the authority of organized labor, not under the authority of 
the municipal government of Seattle. Interestingly, labor asserted 
the Mayor Hanson had offered to deputize the War Veteran's Guard. 
but th at the offer was refused by the Executi ve COl111li ttee .44 The 
Committee evidently realized that if the Guard was deputized, it would 
take orders from the mayor and not from it. 45 
*Robert J. O'Connor and Bernard J. Gilman compared the results 
from seven studies of increases in police manpower and crime. They 
concluded that while five of the studies showed a very small deterrent 
effect, limitations in the data used in all seven studies preclude 
any certainty about the deterrent effects of police manpower on crime 
rates. See Robert J. O'Connor and Bernard Gilman, liThe Police Role 
in Detering Crime, II in James A. Cramer (editor), Preventing Crime 
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 90. 
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What did the War Veteran's Guards actually do in order to keep 
the peace? Working eight-hour shifts both day and night, the labor 
guards wore white armbands to designate their status. Their crowd 
dispersal tactics differed drastically from those used by the city 
police. Carrying no weapons of any sort, the Guard used "mora1 
suasion" instead of force to control large groups of people. The 
success of this tactic is reflected in t!'t~ i".bsence of any violence 
during the strike. 
Another notable feature of the General Strike was that the 
campaign of police repression that had been directed at labor 
radicals temporarily stalled during the strike. Evidently, the 
police did not dare to interfere with the A.F.L. strike. 46 Still, 
the city police did initiate some actions against the more radical 
elements within the labor movement. For example, Walker C. Smith 
was arrested on the third day of the strike. He was charged 
with "distributing printed matter with the intent to incite a 
riot" for his part in the circulation of "Russia Did It," a pamphlet 
urging shipyard workers to take control over the shipyards. 
The quarters of the International Weekly, a left wing news-
paper, were raided by the Seattle police on the same day as Smith 
was taken into custody. Three persons were arrested and held for 
federal investigation in this raid. Also, the police seized a 
large quantity of copies of the latest edition of the Weekly along 
with several thousand copies of the pamphlet "Russia Did It." A 
police spokesperson explained the raid as being "in pursuance of 
the police policy to suppress all forms of I.W.W. and Bolshevik 
1 i terature. 1148 
Despite the arrest of Smith and the police raid upon the 
International Weekly, there appears to have been some decrease in 
the level of the repression of the I.W.W. This impression is based 
upon the seemingly high number of raids, attacks, and other po1ice-
initiated acts in the months of December and January and the near 
absence of these types of police action at the time of the General 
Strike. This cannot be conclusively established, however, due 
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to data limitations and to the possibility of a IIregression effect.lI* 
If the police were not rounding up Wobb1ies and other labor 
radicals during the General Strike, \:!hat were they doing? One 
thing is clear. The Seattle police did not change their allegiance 
from the authorities' side to the strikers' side. Following the 
strike Mayor Hanson, who considered himself to be an expert on 
the subject of loyalty, gloated that IISeatt1e has 450 policemen of 
whom every man is loyal and true ....• .49 The police, rather than 
acting on the basis of the class interests they held in common with 
the strikers, chose to adhere to the orders of the Mayor, the Police 
Chief, and other police administrators. By virtue of this acquiescence 
to the established authority relations, the police wound up doing the 
"dirty work ll of the shipping companies and the municipal government. 
Not only did the police execute the plans formulated by the Mayor 
and the Chief of Police, they also were key participants in events 
that hastened the end of the strike. 
*If a regression effect were in operation, the abnormally 
high number of police raids and other police-initiated acts against 
the I.W.W. prior to the strike would be expected to decrease during 
the General Strike w~rely because of the force of statistical 
probability. 
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The distribution of the Seattle Star under armed police guard 
had an important impact on public opinion about the strike. Whereas 
before the General Strike the press as well as various community 
groups seemed to be supportive of the shipyard workers' strike, the 
public mood turned against the entire Seattle labor movement at 
about the same time as front-page editorials in the Star urged 
opposition to the General Strike. The Star's influence on the 
public during the General Strike was heightened by the fact that 
it was the only paper to be widely circulated during the first few 
days of the strike. The front page of the February 7th issue 
of the Star, for example, may have had an especially damning effect 
on the General Strike. It carried a proclamation from Mayor Hanson 
in which he threatened to forcibly intervene in the strike and 
implored the citizenry to show their IIAmericanism. 1I50 It is con-
ceivable that public sentiment would not have shifted to favor the 
authorities as swiftly if this issue had not been distributed 
throughout the city in trucks and cars protected by police armed 
with machine guns. 51 
The police were an important force in the General Strike in 
a larger sense as well as in regard to the shift of public opinion. 
Indeed, the tremendous imbalance in the coercive power at the 
disposal of the city authorities compared to the strikers may have 
been the deciding factor in ending the General Strike of February 
11,1919. The significance of both the presence of legions of 
police fortified with arms, and Simultaneously the absence of any 
similar body of labor supporters with the means to forcibly compel 
compliance with labor's wishes cannot be exaggerated in explaining 
the termination of the strike. 
An inspection of the content of Hanson's proclamation on the 
second day of the strike and of the strikers' reaction to it lends 
support to this perspective on the end of the strike. The r~ayor 
flaunted the city's police power in the proclamation. 
We have fifteen hundred policemen, fifteen hundred 
regular soldiers from Camp Lewis, and can and will secure, 
if necessary every soldier in the Northwest to protect 
life, business, and property.52 
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Anna Louise Strong,* a member of the General Strike Committee, 
made it plain in her memoirs that Hanson's threat to use coercive 
means to stop the strike weighed heavily on the minds of the strike 
leaders. Strong offered this analysis of the thinking of the 
committee during the strike: 
All of us were red in the ranks and yellow as leaders. 
For we lacked all intention of real battle; we expected 
to drift into power ..•• The general strike put into 
our hands the organized life of the city--all except the 
guns. We could last only until they started shooting; 
we were one gigantic bluff. That expert in bluffing, 53 
Ole Hanson, saw this on the second day of the struggle. 
Essentially, this description of the interaction between Mayor 
Hanson and the committee seems to indicate that the repressive power 
of the State was a definite force in determining the outcome of the 
General Strike. Care needs to be taken, however, so as not to over-
state the importance of the police in the General Strike. Other 
*Anna Louise Strong was a feature editor on the staff of the 
Seattle Union-Record in 1919. She had a middle class background, 
earning a Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. Strong became 
radicalized through her work with persons opposed to World War I. 
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social forces also contributed to its termination. Especially 
consequential in this regard was the patriotic and ideological basis 
of the state as it was exemplified in the anti-strike media campaign 
of the Seattle Star and in the r,1ayor's pleas to the Americanism of 
the public. 
Post-Strike Police Repression 
No sooner was the strike over than the city and county police 
arrested 39 men, including 31 I.W.W. members, on February 13, 1919. 
Twenty-seven of these men were held and prosecuted under Washington's 
new "criminal anarchy" act. * Most of these arrests were made in 
conjunction with raids on the I.W.W. headquarters. In one raid the 
police stationed a plain-clothes detective in the office of the 
I.W.W. secretary; the undercover officer then arrested Wobblies as 
they came into the secretary's office to pay their dues. After 
this "mission" was completed, the police closed down this headquarters 
as well as the other I.W.W. offices in Seattle. 55 
The Socialist Party headquarters (which served as a base of 
operations for many persons who supported the General Strike) and 
the Equity Printing Plant (which had printed the leaflet "Russia 
Did It") were also raided by the city police soon after the General 
Strike. The police closed down the print shop, later allowing it 
* Criminal anarchy was defined in a Washington state law to 
consist of: lithe doctrine that organized government should be over-
thrown by force or violence or by assassination of the executive 
officials of the government or by any unlawful means. The advocacy 
of such doctrine ... is a felony." The remainder of the description 
of this law is contained in Session Laws of the State of Washin ton, 
Sixteenth Session, Chapter 174 January 3, to Marc 9, pp. 
518-519. 
to reopen, but placing the plant under 24-hour police surveillance. 
The police opened the shop in the morning, censored its operations 
during the day, and locked it up at night in the course of their 
surveillance activities. 57 
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Harassing police raids continued through the spring and summer 
of 1919. The recurring pattern of police-I.W.W. interaction con-
sisted of a raid, closure of the I.W.W. hall, a reopening of the 
hall by the I.W.W., and then another raid. A slightly new twist 
was given to this pattern after the police raided and locked up the 
I.W.W. hall on June 23rd. This time a court order forced the Seattle 
police to remove the locks from the door of the I.W.W. hall. Mayor 
Hanson, not one to be outfoxed by the I.W.W., procured an order 
from the city Health board to clo~e down the hall on the grounds of 
"unsanitary conditi ons. 11 58 
Surprisingly, the labor radicals were not miffed by the return 
of heavy police repression after the strike. Harvey O'Connor, the 
editor of the International Weekly, made this point in discussing 
the Wobblies' perceptions of the Seattle police . 
. . . they [the Seattle police] had not perfected the 
details of the "red squad" operation. Their dragnets were 
large-meshed and their operations notoriously clumsy, so 
much so that the Wobblies referred to them as "town clowns" 
and the parody on their operations exhibited in Keystone 
Kop movie comed~9s excited the resibilities of the 
general public. 
While O'Connor's point about the post-strike police raids not 
bei ng as effecti ve as the red squad acti vi ti es whi ch \'-Iere to come 
later in 1919-1920 is valid, it is a mistake to think that being 
arrested for "crimina1 anarchy" and taken into custody by the Seattle 
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police during the aftermath of the General Strike was a pleasant 
experience. One instance of police brutality occurred in the course 
of the raid on February 13, 1919. This brutality was revealed in 
testimony offered at the James Bruce tria1.* The famous I.W.W. 
attorney George Vanderveer asked Seattle police Sergeant P. F. Keefe 
if he had seen another officer strike a Wobbly in the jaw during the 
raid on the 13th. This exchange between Keefe and Vanderveer 
ensued: 
Keefe: They had a little argument. 
Vanderveer: Is that what the police call a little argument? 
The man was not prompt enough in obeying the 
po1iceman ' s orders and so he hauled off and 
struck him in the jaw? 
Keefe: Yes ... , [but} he didn't hit him as hard 
as he ought to. 61 
Another police encounter with labor radicals that was marred 
by violence and brutality took place on July 21, 1919. During an 
outdoor meeting of the Workers, Soldiers, and Sailors Council, 
several Seattle police attentively listened to various speakers 
criticize U.S. intervention in Russia. At the end of the meeting, 
however, what had been a situation of the police simply maintaining 
their presence was transformed into a small-scale police riot. Just 
as the meeting adjourned, 24 police, in groups of 6, same down 
through the crowd at the meeting and commenced "sapping heads right 
and left." A short time later, an automobile loaded with police 
armed with long, baseba11-bat-1ike clubs, appeared on the street. 
*James Bruce was one of 27 workers charged wi th "criminal 
anarchy." He was tried on May 19,1919 and acquitted by a jury on 
June 5, 1919. Charges against the rest of the defendants weore 
dropped after the IInot guiltyll verldict was rendered in the Bruce 
case. 60 
This automobile drove onto the sidewalk and with its occupants on 
the running board headed into the crowd, running down everyone who 
could not get out of the way. The police on the running board hit 
whomever they could reach as the automobile slashed through the 
crowd. 
The driver of that automobile, patrolman Frank Braillard, 
recalled the incident this way ·60 years later: 
And he [Chief of Police Warren] says, "11m having a 
hell of a time down on Washington street ..• you take 
your three men and your car and go down there. II I 
sai d, "What do you want me to do?" He sai d, "Break up 
that riot. I don't care. II He was tough too, he was a 
tough old boy ... I took my 01 little Ford, "Lizzie," 
a Model T. I jumped the sidewalk. I run em all off 
the sidewalk with the62ar. I didn't care if I hit anybody or not . . . 
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With one band of police on the streets driving the crowds onto 
the sidewalks and another group of police in the automobile driving 
them off again, it is easy to visualize the slaughter that must have 
taken place. Scores of injured persons, some of them knocked 
unconscious, were carted away from the riot scene. At least four 
persons were arrested by the pol ice on the charge of "di sturbi ng the 
peace" and one person was arrested for "resisting an officer."63 
Raiding and rioting against labor radicals was just one aspect 
of police behavior during the post-strike period. The Seattle 
police also employed a reactive strategy. On the first day of the 
trial of James Bruce, for instance, the Seattle police received 
a supposed tip that 35,000 Wobblies were planning to storm the 
courthouse. Responding to this tidbit of crime news, the police 
stationed a body of officers in the corridor entrance to the 
200 
to the courtroom, had a mounted squad in readiness, and held a 
reserve of over 100 patrolmen and detectives at police headquarters. 64 
In light of the fact that no I.W.W. rescue missions took place at 
the court, this example of reactive strategy might better be termed 
as "overreacting." 
What was the reason for the intensification of police repression? 
The information filed in the criminal anarchy cases of many of those 
arrested following the strike stated that the accused had acted: 
.•. in concert and in pursuance of a common unlawful 
and felonious purpose and pursuant to a common understanding 
among themselves did then and there willfully wrongfully, 
feloniously, and anarchistically advocate, teach, and 
advise the duty,. necessity, and propriety of overthrowing 
the organized government of the United States of America, 
the government of the state of Wash~ggton, and the govern-
ment of the city of Seattle •..• 
What is striking about the criminal anarchy cases is that none 
of the arrested men had any connection with either the Central 
Labor Council which called the strike or the General Strike 
Committee which took responsibility for the conduct of the strike. 66 
Of the 27 defendants held on the charge of criminal anarchy, 22 
were members of the I.W.W. and 5 were members of the Socialist 
Party.67 How these men, without an iota of control over the strike, 
could have overthrown the government remains a mystery. 
The real leaders of the General Strike apparently were 
protected from the police by virtue of their established position 
in the mainstream of the Seatt1e A.F.L. labor movement. Of the 15-
member Executive Committee of the General Strike Committee, only 
two persons \'iere viewed as being radicals and they were not members 
of the I.W.W.68 No city police action was taken against any of the 
members of the Executive Committee.* Of those individuals outside 
the committee who played a prominent role in the strike, only 
Leon Green was an avo\lled radical. Green, who was tabbed by the 
federal authorities as being a "dyed-in-the-wool Bolshevik," was 
sought by the Seattle police. A warrant was issued for his arrest 
on the charge of criminal anarchy,69 but the police could trace 
Greenls movements only until February 9th, after which time he 
disappeared from Seattle. 70 
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Mayor Hanson definitely wanted to prosecute someone on account 
of the strike. Hanson devoted three pages in Americanism Versus 
301shevism to caricatures of the leaders of the strike. He then 
lamented the fact that these leaders were neither arrested nor 
prosecuted by any authoritative bOdy.7l As substitutes for the 
leaders, Hanson apparently targeted the Wobb1ies to be the recipients 
of official vengeance. To quote Hanson: 
We closed up every "Wobbly" hall in town. We di dn It 
have any law to do it with so we used nails .... We didnlt 
need any more law than we did to stop the red flag. We 
just stopped it.72 
But why were the Wobblies chosen to be the "scapegoats" of 
the General Strike? It appears that they received the brunt of 
the post-strike repression, in part, because of a radical purge 
that occurred in the Seattle labor movement. Immediately following 
the strike, the Seattle press demanded that the A.F.L. rid itself 
*Un1ike the city police, the federal authorities went after 
the strike leaders, arres'ting Anna Louise Strong and other editorial 
staff members of the Union-Record on sedition charges. These 
charges against Union-Record staff members were later dropped by 
the government. 
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of radicals. 73 local A.F.l. officials appeased the local media, 
issuing public denouncements of radicals. For instance, B. F. Naumann, 
the chairman of the Executive Strike Committee at the Central labor 
Council, declared that: " ••• men who get up on this floor [in 
the Council] and boldly declare that they are revolutiodsts will 
not be tolerated here ••. "74 
The withdrawal of the A.F.l. 's support for the I.W.W. placed 
the Wobblies in a position that was similar to the one they occupied 
prior to the strike--the status of being politically marginal in 
relation to the mainstream of the labor movement. This marginal 
status left the Wobblies without a political power base. From the 
perspective of the authorities, the Wobblies' lack of power meant 
that they could again be repressed with minimal costs. In short. 
the Wobblies were probably the politically safest and the most 
logical scapegoats from the point of view of Mayor Hanson and the 
other offi ci al s. 
REFERENCES--CHAPTER VIII 
1. Robert Friedheim, The Seattle General Strike (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 29. 
2. Papers on Industrial Espionage, Report of Agent 106, March 7, 
1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Library), cited by 
Friedheim, OPe cit., p. 29. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Friedheim, Ope cit., pp. 37-50. 
5. Union Record, December 23, 1918, p. 7. 
6. Union Record, December 21,1918, p. 2. 
7. Union Record, December 21, 1918, p. 4. 
8. Union Record, January 4, 1919, p. 2. 
9. Daily Times, January 13, 1919, p. 1. 
10. Daily Times, January 13,1919, p. 1. 
11. Ibid. 
203 
12. Ole Hanson, Americanism Versus Bolshevism (New York: Doubleday, 
Page and Company, 1920), p. 30. 
13. Friedheim, Ope cit., p. 19. 
14. Star, January 16, 1919, p. 1. 
15. Post-Intelligencer, January 17,1919, p. l.; Star, January 17, 
1919, p. 1. 
16. Times, January 17, 1919, p. 1. 
17. Post-Inte11igencer, January 17, 1919, p. 1. 
18. Star, January 17, 1919, p. 1. 
19. Post-Inte11igencer, January 22, 1919, p. 1. 
20. Freidheim, Ope cit., pp. 40; 68; 12. 
21. Star, February 4, 1919, p. 2. 
204 
22. Ibid; February 6, 1919, p. 2. 
23. Hanson, Ope cit., p. 42. 
24. History Committee of the General Strike Committee, The Seattle 
General Strike in Root and Branch (ed.), The Rise of Workers' 
Movements (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1975), 
p. 235. 
25. Hanson, Ope cit., pp. 59-61. 
26. Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
27. Star, February 7, 1919, p. 1. 
28. Freidheim, Ope cit., p. 118. 
29. Hanson, Ope cit., p. 82; Star, February 5, 1919, p. 1. 
30. Friedheim, Ope cit., p. 30. 
31. New York Times, February 9, 1919, p. 1. 
32. Star, February 6, 1919, p. 2. 
33. Paul C. Hedrick, liThe I.W.W. and Mayor Hanson," The Unpartizan 
Review, XII (July-December, 1919), pp. 35, 39. 
34. Ibid., p. 43. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Hanson, Ope cit., p. 82. 
37. Star, February 7, 1919, p. 1. 
38. Hanson, Opt cit., p. 84. 
39. Hedrick, oQ. cit., p. 41. 
40. Star, February 7, 1919, p. 1. 
41. Ibid. 
42. History Committee, Ope cit., p. 258. 
43. Ibid., p. 259. 
44. Ibid., p. 262 
45. Friedheim, Opt cit., p. 126. 
46. Ibid., p. 138. 
47. Daily Times, February 9, 1919, p. 1. 
48. Ibi d. 
49. Hanson, op. cit., p. 83. 
50. Star, February 7, 1919, p. 1. 
51. Friedheim, op. cit., p. 131. 
52. Star, FebrlJary 7, i9i9, p. 1. 
53. Anna Louise Strong, I Change Worlds (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1935), p. 82. 
54. Star, February 14, 1919, p. 1. 
55. Ibid.; History Committee, op. cit., p. 269. 
56. Star, February 15, 1919, p. 1. 
57. Harvey O'Connor, Revolution in Seattle: A Memoir (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1964), pp. 239-240; History Committee, 
op. cit., p. 269. 
58. Industrial Worker, July 9, 1919, p. 1.; Hanson quoted in 
John G. Brooks, Labor's Challenge to the Social Order (Port 
Washington: Kennikat Press, 1971), pp. 364-365. 
59. Harvey O'Connor, op. cit., p. 147. 
60. Industrial Worker, May 24, 1919, p. 1. 
61. Industrial Worker, June 11,1919, p. 1. 
205 
62. Interview of Frank Braillard, former Seattle police officer by 
Bruce Rayborn, Portland police officer, Seattle: March 10, 1979. 
63. Industrial Worker, July 30, 1919, p. l. 
64. Industrial Worker, July 11, 1919, p. l. 
65. Industrial Worker, r·1ay 4, 1919, p. 1. 
66. Hi·story Conunittee, op. cit., p. 269. 
67. Industri a1 Worker, May 24, 1919, p. l. 
68. Friedheim, op. cit., p. 99. 
69. Star, February 14, 1919, p. 1. 
70. Daily Times, February 13,1919, p. 1; Star. February 14,1919, 
p. 1. 
71. Hanson, OPe cit., pp. 92-94. 
72. Hanson quoted in Brooks, Ope cit., p. 365. 
73. Friedheim, Ope cit., p. 148. 
74. Star, February 13, 1919, p. 1. 
206 
CHAPTER IX 
THE "RED" HUNTING MOVEMENT AND RED SQUADS 
Red Hunting as a Social Movement 
The response of the Seattle and Portland police to labor 
radicalism in 1919-1920 consisted of a ruthless searching out and 
deliberate harrassment of the members of the I.W.~J. and every other 
radical organization that was known to exist in the municipalities 
of Seattle and Portland. The general aim of police action was to 
extract the "disloyal," "subversive," and IIrevolutionary" element 
from American society. In effect, there was a "witch hunt II in ", 
Seattle and Portland in 1919-1920 and the Wobblies, Socialists, 
and Communists were treated as though they were witches. 
Red hunting was not limited to Seattle and Portland; it was 
a nationwide social movement comprised of a web of interrelationships 
between businessmen's interest groups, the government, patriotic 
societies, and police organizations. l The manifest goal of this 
movement was the defense of the American way of life against its 
enemies, but its latent goal was the curbing of domestic radicalism. 
The repressive actions of the Seattle and Portland police in 1919-
1920 are understandable only as part of this elite-sponsored social 
movement which was mainly conducted on a national level. 
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The single most important feature of the setting for the police 
repression of the so-called "reds" was the international manifestation 
of radicalism in the form of the Bolshevik Revolution. After the 
Revolution in Russia, the U.S. government and media expressed 
extreme hatred and antagonism toward the Bolshevik political party. 
One of the main reasons for this anti-Bolshevism was a class con-
sciousness on the part of the economic and political leaders in the 
U.S. Believing the Bolshevik propaganda about a world-wide over-
throw of capitalism and the abolition of private property, the U.S. 
government and business-dominated media perceived that the Bolsheviks 
were of and for the workers and peasants of Russia.*2 This 
perception was incongruent with the dominant political and economic 
interests in the U.S. and their elitest conception of the necessity 
of inequality. For this reason, it appears that there was no chance 
of concil i ati on between the U.S. power hol ders who were determi ned 
to preserve their privileged position and the Bolshevik party 
\AJhich from its propaganda seemed to be hell bent on a "world 
proletarian revolution." 
Domestic class relations on the national level in the U.S., 
while not as crystallized as international class relations, were 
still wracked with discord and conflict. After World War I, a more 
class conscious, more sophisticated group of economic leads,s than 
existed before the war erected an anti-union front that was composed 
*While history has shown that this was an incorrect perception 
on the part of the political and economic leaders of the U.S., this 
misperception is important because the ways in which the powers that 
be defined situations in 1919-1920 had real consequences for them as 
well as for other social classes. 
of welfare capitalism and Americanism. 3 The employers seem to have 
understood the benefits and the necessity of making welfare-type 
accommodations to labor better after the war in view of their post-
war amenability to conceding shorter hours and increased wages to 
workers. 
Americanism provided the employers with an offensive weapon 
that they utilized as the spearhead for a union-busting drive. The 
employers' basic strategy was to create the impression that labor 
was "red." This strategy was implemented by organizations that 
were created to eliminate labor's closed shop in cities where a 
closed shop situation existed and to destroy unions in cities where 
open shop conditions already prevailed. 
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Associated Industries and the Waterfront Employer's Association, 
for example, were two organizations which led the open shop campaign 
in Seattle in 1919-1920. Roy John Kinnear, a corporate executive 
and the President of the Seattle-based Associated Industries preached 
that: 
[labor unions had] .•• drifted into the control of 
the radical, the un-American, the charlatan who ..• 
was ready to direc4 labor into paths leading to extreme conclusions ... 
The words of Kinnear and the other leaders of the open shop 
campaign were apparently heeded by the press as well as the public 
since the anti-union movement soon became identified with Americanism. 
In fact, together the ideas of the open shop and the refusal to 
recognize unions as collective bargaining units.became known as the 
"American Plan" in many cities. 
In Portland., the anti-union movenent was usually referred to 
as the American Plan, although the official name of the anti-union 
organization in Portland was "The League to Establish Industrial 
Democracy. II Since Portland was already an open shop city in 1919-
1920, the League's activities centered on breaking up existing 
unions. Elton Watkins, an attorney and a former special agent in 
the Department of Justice's Secret Service,5 directed these 
activities. By misrepresenting himself as an official of the 
federal government who held the power to deport aliens and by 
using other unscrupulous tactics of labor espionage, Watkins was 
able to intimidate foreign-born as well as native-born members of 
the A.F.L.-affiliated Tailor's Union and Bakery Worker's Union in 
Portland in 1920. Watkins ' actions helped to bring about the 
eventual destruction of these unions. 6 
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The subterfuge of the League for Industrial Democracy and other 
IIfrontll organizations in the employer's anti-union campaign was in 
sharp contrast to the highly visible actions taken by the federal 
government in order to smash labor radicalism and other forms of 
radicalism. It is very useful to recognize the interdependent 
relationship that existed between the federal government and the 
employers in this regard. The close connections between employers 
and high-ranking governmental officials stemmed from at least two 
sources. First, the interests of political office-holders and 
employers were logically linked together by virtue of the 
dependence of both on the political economy of capitalism. The 
campaign contributions of business interests to politicians, the 
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finances to operate the bureaucratic machinery of the state, and even 
the privileged positions of the elected officials themselves were 
connected to functioning of the capitalist system. To support 
the Wobblies, who advocated "worker control" and other radical 
reforms, must have seemed like a suicidal stance to the political 
power-wielders in 1919-1920. 
Second, the federal government had become very dependent upon 
the large industrial corporations as a result of the government's 
heavy reliance upon the factories, the technology, and the money of 
major industrialists in waging World War 1.7 Even before the 
war, President Wilson predicted that: 
War means autocracy. The People we have unhorsed will 
inevitably come into control of the country for we shall 
be dependent upon the steel, ore, and financial magnates. 
They will run the nation. 8 
Wilson's analysis proved correct, the industrialists knew it, 
and they utilized their advantageous position to secure the govern-
mentis support in an effort to undermine the position of labor. 
President Wilson himself was a key supporter of the anti-union 
movement even before it was in full swing in 1919. Wilson 
identified organized labor as being among the "disloyal" groups 
in the U.S. in an address on June 14, 1917. 
Do you not now understand the new intrigue, the 
intrigue for peace, and why the masters of Germany do 
not hesitate to use any agency that promises to effect 
their purpose, the decit of the nations? • . . They 
are employing liberals in their enterprise. They are 
using men in Germany and without as their spokesmen 
••• socialists, the leaders of labor, •.. 9 
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The media provided an additional means through which the 
economicall,y dominant class could influence the federal government's 
policy with respect to labor radicalism. The content of the 
nation's major newspapers helped to establish the anti-union front 
in 1919-1920. 10 A perusal of the verbiage used in the reporting 
of some of the great events invol ving 1 abor during the peri od 
supports this point. On the second day of the Seattle General 
Strike, for instance, the Chicago Tribune predicted~ "it is only a 
middling step from Petrograd to Seattle. 1I For the six month period 
following the General Strike it was commonplace for major newspapers 
to refer to labor strikes as being IIcrimes against society.,,12 
Newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal went even further. For 
example, in the midst of the Boston police strike in September 
1919, the Journal screamed that "Leni n and Trotsky are ri ght on 
their way. 11 13 A similar tactic of linking organized labor to 
Bolshevism in order to discredit labor was followed by the New York 
Times, One day after the Centralia tragedy* in November 1919 the 
Times alleged that there was IIproof that Leni n himself had di ctated 
Bolshevik operations in this city .... 1114 
The major newspapers' attack upon Russian Bolshevism was even 
more venomous than their bombardment of domestic labor radicals. 
The New York Times seems to have been the main purveyor of anti-
Bolshevik innuendos and misrepresentations. The Times' distorted 
*On Armistice Day 1919 four American Legionnaires in a 
patriotic parade were shot down by Wobblies when the Legionnaires 
attempted to raid the I.W.W. hall in Centralia, Washington. 
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reporting of the Bolshevik Revolution prompted Walter Lippmann and 
Charles Merz to conduct a study of the content of the Times' reportage 
of the Revolution. Their concluding observations underscore the 
rabid anti-Bolshevism of the New York Times. 
The Russian lie is the father of lies. For lie, damned 
lie, it has been. It was a lie that the people of Russia 
were calling for milita~ intervention. It was lie that 
they believed in Kolchak and Denikin. It was a lie that 
they did not prefer the Soviet government to anything 
offered them by the Allied generals and the monarchist 
cliques .•. 
And because these lies were the base of a policy of law-
less invasion, disgraceful intrigue, bloodshed, devastation 
and famine, they have had to be established by every device 
known to panic and credu1ity.15 
Gi ven the coi nci dence of in teres ts between the economi ca lly domi nant 
class and the political leaders as well as the media's pressure 
upon the political leaders, the federal government's policy toward 
radicals from late 1917 through the 1920s was almost predictable in 
advance solely on the basis of material interests and the dominant 
powers' perceptions about those interests. In terms of the govern-
mentis actual policy, the Wilson administration decided to crush 
the I.W.W. in September 1917,16 marked the Bolsheviks in the U.S. 
17 for suppression in November 1919, and targeted the Communists in 
the U.S. for raids in January 1920. 18 
As for organized labor, its position vis a vis the economically 
dominant class was one of retrenchment. Although increases in the 
cost of living and a desire for the institutionalization of the 
principle of collective bargaining spawned 3,600 strikes in 1919 i 
workers won only a few of these strikes. Then, too, Samuel Gompers 
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and other A.F.L. leaders attempted to consolidate their own power 
through attacking the unorthodox weapons of radical labor such as 
the general strike and through currying the favor of business and 
government by supporting anti-labor radical measures both during and 
after the war. 20 
While the A.F.L. was retrenching, the I.W.W. was declining in 
power in 1919-1920. For a variety of reasons the I.W.W. was no 
longer a presence in the national struggle between the forces of 
labor and capital. 2l The power of the I.W.W. decreased markedly in 
the Pacific Northwest; when the economic boom of World War I 
busted in 1919-1920, logging companies, mills, and shipyards in 
the Northwest began to employ fewer and fewer workers. 22 The 
crushing defeats of the Wobblies and other labor radicals in both 
the Great Lumber Strike of 1917 and the General Strike in 1919 also 
contributed to the demise of radical labor in the Pacific Northwest. 
By the spring of 1920 the last-hired, first-fired Wobblies were 
largely eliminated as a force in the labor movement in Seattle and 
Portland. 
The Socialist party and the Socialist Labor party, like the 
I.W.W., were moving in a backward direction after World War I. In 
Seattle and Portland, both Socialist parties vanished as political 
factors in late 1919 and early 1920. 23 The Socialists' loss of 
strength was, in part, due to factionalization within the Socialist 
party. In fact, in 1919 a substantial number of persons left the 
Socialist party to join the Communist movement. 24 
The Communist movement itself ~ad a national membership 
of approximately 70,000 persons in 1919. 25 The Communist 
Party and the Communist Labor Party were the two main organizations 
of the Communist movement in the U.S. The Communists' labor-
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related activities mainly consisted of a great deal of propagandizing 
among immigrants and groups of unskilled and unorganized workers. 
Despite its efforts to IIraise the consciousness" of the American 
working class, the Communist revolutionary line never mobilized 
the grass roots support of working men and women in 1919 on a level 
that was even comparable to the success of the I.W.W. and the 
Socialist parties in earlier years. 26 
Demobilization and Participation in the Red Hunt 
The Communists, like other ~adica1s~ were reluctant participants 
in a one-sided battle in which they assumed a defensive posture. 
Although industrialists and political officials were the main 
aggressors, third parties to the battle actually carried out much 
of the repression in 1919-1920. These third parties were drawn 
from both the working and middle classes. 
To understand the role of these third parties in the 
repression of the postwar years, it is first necessary to grasp the 
meaning of what has been labeled as the "Great Demobilization." 
The Great Demobilization involved the discharging and disbanding of 
the resources that had been utilized by the U.S. government to 
carryon World War I. The historian Frederic L. Paxson described 
the Great demobilization as follows: 
... demobilization was upon the United States, more 
completely without foreknowledge than mobilization had 
been nineteen months before. There are moments in the 
history of mobilization in which the government of the 
United States looked like a madhouse; but in demobil-
ization there was lacking even the madhouse in which the 
crazy might be incarcerated. 27 
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Paxton's point was simply that demobilization after the war 
was largely unplanned and disorganized. In addition, demobilization 
had a destabilizing effect upon the U.S. economY. Demobilization 
affected the labor market in a general way, for example, when the 
men discharged from military service and the workers laid off from 
jobs in defunct war industries milled around unemployment offices 
in 1919. 28 Despite the unemployment problems associated with 
demobilization, large portions of both working and middle classes 
seem to have fared well and continued to do so throughout 1919. 29 
The harsh effects of demobilization were borne, for the most 
part, by the salaried clerks, civic officials, professionals, and 
the police. The inflation produced by the rapid growth of profits 
during the war and the rapid economic destabilization had an 
especially devastating impact on these occupational groups. The 
wages of workers in these groups kept pace neither with prices 
nor the income of workers in other occupational groups. Workers 
in these groups, whose income had either not increased or minimally 
increased during the war, had a very difficult time balancing a 
fixed income against the rising cost of living and managing to 
keep their spirits up in the face of the fact that their standard 
of living was falling compared to the standard of living of persons 
in other occupational groups.3D 
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The police and other public employees were perhaps the hardest 
hit by demobilization. In fact, the police and municipal workers 
in many cities were worse off economically after World \~ar I than 
at any time since the Civil War. 31 Salaries of the Portland and 
Seattle patrolmen, although increasing through gradual increments 
for the period of 1912 to 1921, did not increase enough to suit the 
street police in these cities. 32 Indeed, low salaries surfaced 
as an acute problem within the Portland police department in 1918 
when many patrolmen deserted their$lOO a month jobs and procured 
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higher paying employment in other working class occupations. 
Public employees were 'precluded from much 
progressive protest about their situation by their lack of organi-
zatioo. 34 A case in point is the attempt of the Portland police to 
unionize in 1919. Demanding an increase in salaries and an inter-
change of day and night shifts, members of the Portland police 
force threatened to organize a union as early as the fall of 1917. 35 
The Portland City Council 'finally took action on the issue of police 
unionism on April 28, 1919. 
On this date, by a vote of four to one the City Council adopted 
a resolution intended to prevent the police from affiliating with 
the A.F.L. The resolutioi'i provided that any police officer joining 
the proposed union was to be dismissed from this job' "for the good 
ofl the service.,,36 This resolution was supported by Mayor Baker and 
the entire council with the exception of one commissioner who cast 
the only dissenting vote. 37 Since no police union was organized in 
Portland in 1919-1920, it appears that the resolution served its 
purpose. 
Workers in these declining occupational groups were not 
similarily constrained from participation in reactionary collective 
action. To the contrary, workers in these groups were simulated to 
conservative political action in order to protect and to defend 
their eroding material base.* Then too, many workers in these 
declining occupations may have been inspired to participate in 
right-wing politics by the Americanism ideology that was rampant 
throughout the U.S. 
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Some persons from professional occupations, like Elton Watkins 
of Portland, were power brokers in organizations which represented 
a blend of anti-unionism and super-patriotism. Organizations such 
as the Better America Federation,** the American Defense Society, 
and the League to Establish Industrial Democracy featured a rather 
unique division of labor. While corporate interests and individual 
businessmen kept workers afloat economically by pumping money into 
the organizations to fight the open shop and to defame the labor 
movement,38 the professionals, in turn, facilitated the repressive 
policies of the dominant economic and political interests by spying 
on reds and by propagandiz~rg t'le public on the virtues of 100 
percent Americanism and on the dangers of radica1ism. 39 
*Samuel P. Huntington has made the point that declining social 
forces are often galvanized into right-wing political action. For 
a more complete analysis of declining and rising social forces, see 
Samuel P. Huntington, "Post-Industria1 Politics: How Benign Will 
It Be?" Comparative Politics, 6 (January, 1974), pp. 163-191. 
**The Better America Federation, the American Defense Society, 
and the League to Establish Industrial Democracy are only a few 
examples of this type of organization. The American Legion and the 
Ku Klux Klan, though not exclusively patriotic organizations like 
those listed above, also aided in the anti-1abor/anti-radical 
crusade. 40 
The police were another occupational group whose members 
participated in the red hunting movement. Federal police were 
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highly visible participants due to their raiding, arresting, in-
carcerating, and deporting of radicals. Much of this type of activity 
centered around the "Palmer Raids" of November 7, 1919 and January 2, 
1920. While the Palmer Raids themselves were planned by U.S. 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, special agents of the U.S. Bureau 
of Investigation actually performed the repressive acts that comprised 
a "reign of terror ll against domestic radicals. 
Working under J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the Justice Depart-
mentis General Intelligence (anti-radical) Division, these federal 
police officers arrested many persons illegally, conducted illegal 
searches and seizures, acted as lIagent provocateurs,1I administered 
beatings to prisoners, and held many persons incommunicado in filthy, 
overcrowded jails during the Palmer Raids. 4l The federal police 
were usually assisted in their activities by city police. 
Red Squads as Social Movement Organizations 
At the same time that the federal government was displaying a 
sustained drive against Wobblies and other radical types, municipal 
governments were cooperating in the movement to curb radicalism. 
On the state level, legislatures passed criminal syndicalism, 
criminal anarchy, and red flag laws.* City police, often operating 
is special units called red squads, enforced these laws. The purpose 
of these squads was to watch over, to harrass, and to intimidate 
left-wing radicals and union organizers. 42 
*Red flag laws prohibited the display of red flags in public. 
Seattle and Portland were two of the cities in which police 
red squads were fonned to do battle with the "reds." As one might 
suspect, the exact dates on which the red squads were introduced 
into the Portland and Seattle police agencies are unknown. The 
creation of a red squad was officially announced to the Portland 
public in a press release on January 6, 1920,43 while the existence 
of a red squad was unofficially disclosed to the Seattle public in 
219 
a news story about a police raid on November 18, 1919. 44 These dates, 
however, are not in accord with other data bearing on the earliest 
days of red squad activity in Portland and Seattle. The activities 
of a quasi-red squad in Portland, as indicated earlier, were fairly 
pronounced from 1914 through World War 1. 45 As for the Seattle red 
squad, it appears that certain officers within the Seattle police 
department were assigned the task of handling the cases of Wobblies 
as early as February 20, 1918. 46 Given the disparity between the 
publicly released dates for the inception of red squads and the 
actual occurrence of somewhat specialized anti-radical activities, 
it appears that both city police agencies attempted to conceal the 
real origins of red squads. 
When the police wanted it to be known that the red squads 
were in action, almost a fanfare introduction was given to the new 
units. Portland Mayor Baker called the creation of the red squad 
the "most important change made" in the organi zati on of the pol i ce 
department;47 the Seattle police as well as the Portland police were 
conspicuously careful about providing the names of red squad members 
to the press whenever the squad conducted a raid or made a major 
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"pinch" on radicals. The names of Lieutenant Harvey Thatcher and 
Sergeant P. F. Keefe, the respective heads of the Portland and Seattle 
red squads, appeared so many times in print from 1919-1920 that 
they surely must have become household words in residences through-
out the Pacific Northwest. 
All of the publicity about the "patriotic" activities of the 
red squad probably served the purpose of maintaining the commitment 
of Thatcher, Keefe, and'the other squad members to the main goal 
of the red squads which was to ferret out radicals. The incentive 
of public recognition may have reinforced the values of Americanism 
which were already deeply held by some members of the red squads. 
Harvey Thatcher. a former soldier and a member of the American 
Legion Post No. 1 in Portland, revealed his personal anti-radical 
attitudes in this note to Chief of Police Jenkins: 
The Communist and other undesirable characters: Since 
the drive on Communists there has been 97 of them arrested 
and this move is without doubt the work of Crime Prevention. 
This type of individual has no regard for our country and 
any crime that they may be able to commit does not mean 
anything to them. 48 
As an organizational unit within the Seattle and Portland police 
departments, red squads must be viewed as part of the effort of 
municipal reformers to overcome the decentralization of the police 
function. The red squads in each city consisted fo a leader and 
at least one other full-time member. The permanent red squad members 
were often assisted by patrolmen on a temporary, part-time basis. 
Leaders, who were mere lieutenentsand sergeants, as well as the 
patrolmen in red squads took orders only from the top police 
administrators in Portland and Seattle. 
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Portland Chief of Police Leon V. Jenkins, who was appointed 
by Baker in 1920, revealed in his memoirs that the two members of 
the Portland red squad worked directly out of his office. 49 Jenkins 
also strongly implied that this centralization of police work that 
had preciously been done by patrolmen working out of the precincts, 
resulted in "keeping activities of radicals and racketeers down 
to a minimum. 11 50 The Seattle red squad appears to have been afforded 
a similar position within the police department. This is mainly 
a surmise based on the fact that the Seattle Chief of Police had an 
intimate working relationship with the Seattle red squad, 
occasionally leading the squad on raids. 
Sources of Influence on Red Squad Activities 
To a large extent, the environment of the red squads determined 
the actions and practices of squad members. The red hunting movement 
itslef comprised one segment of this environment, while the other 
major segment of the environment was the society in which the move-
ment existed. Since the red hunting movement seems to have been 
directed and supported by the dominant political and economic 
interests it is useful to explore the red squads' activities vis a 
vis the specific national, local, and state interests which sponsored 
the movement. 
National political leaders had perhaps the greatest influence 
upon the functioning of the red squads. The Department of Justice's 
policy of targeting Bolshevism for special attention in November 191951 
seems to have largely determined the volume of certain activities 
for the red squads. Seattle's red squad, for example, was more 
active in raiding and dragnet operations than Portland's red squad 
in 1919-1920. One explanation of this difference between the two 
is that the Workers' Union of Soviet Russia* was very active in 
Seattle, at this time, whereas the Bolshevik element was not nearly 
as strong in Port1and. 52 
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The influence of the Department of Justice was also manifested 
in the tactics and procedures utilized by the red squads in both 
cities. For the most part, red squad members served as "foot soldiers" 
in the raids on the radicals' secret headquarters** and in the 
dragnets for specific types of radicals in Portland and Seattle. 
In a typical raid the red squad would enter a hall or meeting 
place accompanied by two patrolmen, a special agent of the Bureau 
of Investigation, and sometimes an inspector from the Immigration 
Service. Then the red squad would arrest suspects, search the 
premi ses, and sei ze property. Fi na lly, the red squad woul d take the 
suspects to jail where they were held for investigation on open 
charges and later were interrogated several times by federal 
authorities. 53 If the federal authorities failed to glean sufficient 
information to either deport the suspects or prosecute them under 
the Espionage or Sedition Acts. the suspects were turned over to 
*The Workers' Union of Soviet Russia was comprised of Russian-
born workers, some of whom may have b~en agents of the Bolshevik party 
in Russi a. 
**By April 1920 the I.W.W. had gone "underground" in Seattle. 
The I.W.W.'s secret headquarters included hotel rooms, private homes, 
and various other hiding places. 
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the county attorney, who either proceeded against the suspects under 
the criminal syndicalism, criminal anarchy, and vagrancy laws, or 
released them from custody.54 
Dragnets tended to be longer in duration' and more discriminating 
in character than raids in 1919-1920. In a dragnet the norma~ 
procedure was to send the red squad and several patl"olmen onto the 
streets for several hours or even several days in search of ~ 
particular type of radical. The alleged radicals were arrested and 
then treated to the same detention in jail, interrogation, and 
prosecution as the radicals who were taken into custody during a 
raid. In general, dragnets seem to have been utilized more often 
in 1919-1920 than in previous periods. The increased use of 
dragnets may be partially attributable to the fact that the I.W.W. 
and the other radical organizations were constantly on the move in 
an attempt to evade the police. These moving targets were probably 
more difficulty marks for the police than were the stationary radical 
organizations which existed prior to 1919. 
Although a raild and a dragnet were di fferent procedures for 
the Seattle and Portland police, the two tactics became intermixed 
on at least one occasion. With Sergeant P. F. Keefe's red squad 
leading the way, a small army of federal and municipal police spent 
the entire night of January 19, 1920 rounding up Russians in 
Seattle. Three hundred and sixteen Russians were netted by the 
armY of red hunters which included a Commissioner of the Immigration 
Service, a special agent of the Bureau of Investigation, 14 
imnigration inspectors, and 100 city policemen along with the red 
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squad. The army raided restaurants, hotels, and pool rooms in a 
working class district in Seatt1e. 55 When 289 of the 316 suspects 
were released from custody the next day by immigration authorities, 
it was evident that this police mission lacked the discriminating 
characteristic of many of the other dragnets conducted by red squads 
in 1919-1920. Additionally, the all night collection of police 
activities on the 19th was considerably longer than the usual 15 
to 20 minute raid. 
Red squads also held property as well as persons for inves-
tigative purposes. t1embership lists, address books, and letters 
were seized and then utilized to track down radicals. 56 Financial 
records were also taken by the police in order to find out the names 
of the contributors to various prisoner's defense funds. In 
addition, thousands of I.W.W. five dollar gold pins were con-
fiscated, presumably in order to sap the financial resources of the 
I.W.W.57 Over and above all of this, the police continued their 
earlier practice of seizing and destroying literature, business 
supplies, and office equipment in order to disrupt the business 
operations of radical organizations. 58 
The real g'ems mined by the red squads, however, were neither 
gold nor dollars. "Discoveries" of sinister plots to overthrow the 
government, of rival societs,59 and of secret agreements between 
the I.W.W. and Lenin60 were the most highly prized things seized by 
the Portland and Seattle red squads. Although it is true that 
there was a flurry of propaganda and other related activities by 
members of the Bolshevik party and by workers who sympathized with 
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the principles of the Bolshevik Revo1ution,* the alleged plots and 
agreements unearthed by the red squads were more 1 ike "inventi ons II 
than "di scoveri es. II 
It is a mistake to cavalierly dismiss these fabricated stories 
as merely hoaxes for they served a useful purpose for the red squads. 
By making the radicals appear to be more powerfu1.and more organized 
than they really were, the red squads, in effect, ingratiated them-
selves with the dominant economic and political interests that 
wanted to see all varieties of radicalism stamped out. That is, it 
is assumed that the red squad members exploited the local power 
wielders' concern about "reds" for personal gain and in order to 
strengthen the organizational domain of the red squads within the 
Seattle and Portland police departments.** 
Apparently, this is precisely what happened with respect to 
the Portland red squad. Not only did it demonstrate organizational 
resilience by remaining in existence long after the I.W.W. excitement 
had ebbed in the city, but individual members of the red squad also 
reaped personal gratuities from employers for performing labor 
espionage activities. Two of the red squad's money-making schemes 
were revealed in a report on the Portland red squad by the Oregon 
*It is a fact, for instance, that the Workers' Union of 
Soviet Russia, a soviet-like organization, had local representatives 
in Seattle in 1919. It is also true that about 400 members of the 
Seattle International Longshoremen's Association (I.L.A.) tr;'ed 
to stop the flow of arms from the por~ of Seattle to the "white 
forces" in Siberia in September 1919. 1 
**J. Edgar Hoover was one of those who was able to parlay the 
concerns of propertied interests and national political leaders into 
an increase in pe fsona 1 pOWf!r and an enlargement of the resource base 
of the Bureau of Investi gati on. See Mi chael R. Bel knap, liThe Mechani cs 
of Repression: J. Edgar Hoover, the Bureau of Investigation and the 
Radicals, 1917-1925, Crime and Social Justice, 7 (Spring-Summer, 1977), 
pp. 49-58. 
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Chapter of the National Lawyer's Gui1d.*62 It is important to 
recognize that both of these arrangements involved Portland employers 
exerting direct influence over the activities of the red squad. 
The first scheme consisted of the squad providing "labor spies" 
for private employers. The procedure for hiring police investigators 
was for the employer to approach the head of the red squad and to 
request a spy; the spy was then supplied by the red squad but paid 
by the employer. Under this arrangement those members of the red 
squads who were also under the hire of businessmen, received their 
usual salaries from the city of Portland as well as additional money 
from industrial emp10yers. 64 
Another red squad scheme was to provide employers with '[' 
information on the political affiliations of the union employees 
in exchange for monetary contributions to the secret coffers of 
the red squad. In the process of determi ning whether or not a person 
was a "red," squad members used the squad's red files** and based 
their decisions on personal definitions of what constituted "patriotic 
Ameri cani sm, II "radi cal ism, II and II Communi sm. II Although the 
consequences of this operation are not known, it is suspected that 
*A1though the report covered the period of 1934-1937, one of 
the authors of the report claimed t~at the same schemes discove6~d 
in 1938 were in operation on an even larger scale in 1919-1920. 
Even if these schemes were not utilized by the red squad until 
1934-1937, the proposition that the squad's spectacular "tales" 
about radicals in 1919-1920 endeared them to the local elites and 
had the consequences of facilitating the acquisition of resources 
for individual and organizational aggrandizement would retain its 
plausibility. 
**The red files listed the liberal and radical affiliations 
of all persons suspected of being radical. 
the branding of union employees as Wobblies or Communists resulted 
in the firing of many of them by employers. In this respect, the 
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red squad's activities had the appearance of deliberate anti-unionism. 65 
As for the sources of local influence, no evidence could be 
found to indicate that red squad activities were shaped by other 
political or economic interests. The role of local interests in 
influencing red squad functions in Seattle is unclear. Nonetheless, 
it is a reasonable conjecture that Mayor Hanson had a hand in the 
activities of the Seattie red squad in view of his own self-pro-
claimed super-patriotism and his personal outrage about a bomb that 
was delivered, allegedly by Il reds,1l to his office on April 28, 1919. 
The influence of political leaders in Washington and Oregon 
on red squads was more palpable than the influence of powerful 
interests at either the national or the local level. Criminal 
syndicalism laws passed by the Washington and Oregon state legis-
latures were the main source of the red squads~ law enforcement 
authority. Indeed, the investigation and arrest of Wobblies, 
Socialists, and Communists was a proper and legal police function 
under the criminal syndicalism laws in both states. 
The Washington state legislature passed its first criminal 
syndicalism law in 1917, but Governor Ernest Lister's veto post-
poned its implementation until the next legislative session in 
1919. In 1919 the legislature adopted the law over Lister's veto 
and despite the protests of labor-supported King County* 
*Seattle, a bastion of labor power in the state of Washington, 
is located in King County. 
representatives by a vote of 85 to 6.66 George Cotterill, a King 
County state representative and a former Seattle Mayor, opposed 
228 
the bill because he felt that "criminal violence" could be prevented 
by a IIl ess sweeping bil1."67 In other words, Cotterill was concerned 
that the tentacles of the criminal syndicalism law would grasp 
members of the A.F.L. as well as the Wobblies. Most of the other 
representatives were apparently unaware of the implications of the 
bill or were too stirred with the passions of the hunt to take a 
stand against measure whose principles clearly violated the U.S. 
Constitution. 
Then, too, opposition to the bill would not have been IIgood 
politics ll since the media as well as most of the predominantly 
rural populace in Washington supported its passage. In this regard, 
it is important to note that electoral pressures in the state in 
1919 almost mandated that some type of criminal syndicalism law be 
passed by the legislature. In short, given that public opinion 
was strongly in favor of a repressive policy toward radicals, the 
state government was constrained to legislate that type of policy 
into existence.* 
As far as the Seattle red squad was concerned, the content of 
the new law was more important than its origins. The new law 
defined criminal syndicalism to be an doctrine advocating: 
*Andrew Hopkins made a similar point in his analysis of the 
findings from five case studies of pressure groups and the law in 
Australia. For a more detailed discussion of these studies, see 
Andrew Hopkins, IIPressure Groups and the Law,1I Contemporary Crises 
3 (January, 1979), pp. 69-82. 
crime, sedition, violence, intimadation, or 
injury as a means or way of effecting or resisting any 
industrial, economic, or political change. If a 
person joined or associated with any organization 
that had these purposes, he/she came under the 
jurisdiction of the law. 68 
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The Washington legislature also passed another criminal 
syndicalism statute which outlawed "sabotage." Sabotage was defined 
as the attempt to obstruct or injure any business hiring wage 
earners with the intent to impair the owner's control over the 
enterprise. 69 
In effect, the criminal syndicalism laws made active member-
ship in the I.W.W. a felony punishable by incarceration in the state 
penitentiary. The same laws were used against members of the 
Communist Labor Party in 1920. Authorities in Washington utili?ed 
these new laws extensively, obtaining 86 convictions under them 
in the 13 years following the passage of the laws. 70 
In Oregon, the state Bar Association, conservative Republicans, 
~nd the state's major newspapers supported the passage of a criminal 
syndicalism law. 71 The Bar Association was most vehement in its 
sponsorship of criminal syndicalism legislation, demanding that a 
law be drafted which would: " ... check and stamp out Bolshevism, 
anarchism, I.W.W.ism and all other isms that are subversive of sound 
and stable government. 72 
The first criminal syndicalism bill to be introduced in the 
Oregon legislature was presented by K. K. Kubli, a Republican repre-
sentative and a politician who was backed by the Ku Klux Klan for most 
of his political career. After Kubli 's bill was tabled, a more 
stringent bill was introduced and was approved by large majorities 
in the Senate and the House in February 1919. The Senate vote was 
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nearly unanimous in favor of the bill, although there was some minor 
opposition in the House from representatives of organized labor who 
argued that a criminal syndicalism law could adversely affect all 
unions. 73 
In terms of state-wide public opinion, the passage of the 
criminal syndicalism law seems to have reflected the sentiments of 
the vast majority of Oregonians. The Oregon law defined criminal 
syndicalism as follows: 
The doctrine that advocates crime, physical violence, 
arson, destruction of property, sabotage, or other unlaw-
ful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or 
effecting individual or political ends or as a means of 
accomplishing or effecting individual or political ends 
or as means of effecting individual or political revenue, 
or for profit. 74 
The Oregon authorities, like the Washington authorities, 
vigorously enforced their criminal syndicalism law. It has been 
estimated that 184 persons, most of them members of the I.W.W., were 
arrested on criminal syndicalism charges in Oregon between February 
1919 and December 1920. 75 The Portland police used the law to 
arrest Wobblies selling newspapers on the streets76 and to justify 
raids on the I.W.W. hall in February 1919. 
The Portland red squad also made use of the criminal syndicalism 
law in 1919 and through the 1920s. Late in 1919, red squad members 
played a highly visible role in the Multnomah County Deputy District 
Attorney's anti-radical campaign which resulted in the arrest of 
several prominent Wobb1ies, one of whom was also the organizer of 
Portland's Soldiers', Sailors', and Workingmen's Council, and three 
members of the Communist Labor Party.78 The red squad assisted the 
District Attorney in this campaign, arresting several of those who 
later were prosecuted in court. 
Organizational Maintenance and,Goa1 Transformation in Red Squads 
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The fear about radi ca 1 ism 'tha't apparently had moved ti1E'~ 
citizens in Washington and Oregon tc support the passage of criminal 
syndicalism laws had ended by 1920, according to one of the foremost 
experts on the period of 1919-1920. 79 Yet, the red squads in 
Portland and Seattle remained in existence long after the pub1ic~s 
concern about Bolshevik invaders had passed away. In fact, the 
Portland red squad appears to have been more active in the period 
of 1921-1922 than in the preceding two-year period. 
This anomalous state of affairs can oniy be understood if 
the red squads are viewed as organizational units within the larger 
elite-sponsored red hunting movement. The existence of movement 
organizations, such as red squads, is not solely determined by the 
public. Instead, these organizations appear to be greatly influenced 
by the pwoerful interests which sponsor them and by internal 
bureaucratic forces. Barring the occurrence of any cataclysmic 
events in the larger society, these types of movement organizations 
can remain in existence so long as the organizations maintain their 
internal stability and retain their utility to their sponsors. In 
sum, unless there are internal problems or a powerful interest 
withdraws its support, the organization is likely to survive at 
least until the goals of the organization are reached. 
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In the case of the Portland red squad the goal of suppressing 
radicals was not completely realized in 1920 even though the public's 
fears had dissipated by that time. In order to attain its goal, the 
Portland red squad stayed in existence to suppress the I.W.W.-led 
strike of longshoremen in 1922. After the red squad and hundreds 
of other Portland police had squelched this strike by arresting 
the entire membership of the Marine Transport Workers local union 
of the I.W.W.,* the original goal of the Portland red squad may have 
been accomplished. However, the squad was able to remain in existence 
because the squad and local elites established new goals (e.g., 
spying on union employees and identifying radical employees) which 
served to sustain the squad's organizational life. 
The essential point to bear in mind here is that the activities 
of the red squads seem to be best understood as the outcome of an 
interactive process, mainly involving the dominant political and 
economic interests as well as the labor radicals. Then, too, class 
relations, the functioning of the governmental apparatus and the 
rationality of the processes through which resources were mobilized 
and goals were transformed in response to the problem of labor 
radicalism also need to be emphasized in order to explain red squad 
operations. Above all, by focusing on the social movement aspects 
*For a description of the police response to this strike, see 
William W. Pilcher, The Portland Lon shoremen: A Dis ersed Urban 
Community (New York: Ho t, Rlne art, and Winston, 8- 9. 
of the red squads j it is possible to better appreciate the roots of 
the repressive collective action of the Seattle and Portland police 
in 1919-1920. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER X 
CHECKING SOME PROPOSITIONS ABOUT THE 
POLICING OF LABOR WARS 
The Class Base of Police Repression 
The labor radicalism that developed from 1900 posed an 
increasingly dangerous challenge as to the police insti-
tution which guarded that~order. Having described the 
ways in which this challenge was met by the police in two cities, 
it is now useful to examine the major findings from the study of the 
Seattle and Portland police in light of the theoretical framework 
that was developed in the first part of the dissertation. 
Class relations, including economic as well as political 
factors, are an appropriate starting point for this appraisal of how 
the empirical data on police response bear upon the propositions 
in the framework. Can the response of the Seattle and Portland 
police to the protest of labor' i~adica1s be explained by reference 
to economic factors alone? The answer is IIno.1I Economic factors 
by themselves do not provide an adequate understanding of police 
response in Seattle and Portland; still, these factors did exert a 
great deal of direct and indirect influence upon police policies 
and actions. 
The indirect influence of economic factors upon police response 
was far more important than their direct influence. Indeed, the 
particular issues around which both the labor radicals and the 
employers organized grew out of class relations. These issues 
included free speech, exploitive working conditions, worker control 
of industry, Americanism, and the open versus closed shop. It was 
in response to clashes between social classes and interest groups 
over these issues that the Seattle and Portland police were 
mobilized into action from 1912-1920. 
One particular area where police actions may have been 
indirectly shaped by economic forces is the ideology of political 
officials and police authorities. Similarities between the belief 
systems of Mayors Baker and Hanson and the economically dominant 
class seem to have had a decisive effect on police policy during 
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the Great Lumber Strike of 1917. Although it is reasonable to posit 
that the super-patriotic and anti-radical thinking of the mayors was 
nurtured in an educational system whose function was to socialize 
persons into the acceptance of ideas supportive of the capitalist 
system and reinforced by a media whose content was largely shaped 
by members of the economically domi.nant class, no hard data were 
collected in this study to establish these connections between 
class power, ideology, and police policy. 
The direct influence of economic factors, although less 
pronounced than their indirect influence, was still evident in 
police-radical encounters. For one thing, direct influence was 
revealed in the employers' ability to control the actions of special 
police and members of red squads. Additionally, employers provided 
direct input into the formulation of police policy by virtue of their 
occupancy of policy-making roles on state labor regulatory commissions 
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and to a lesser extent in municipal government. The Oregon State 
Welfare Commission, for example, was composed of persons from business 
backgrounds who possessed elite social credentials. More to the point, 
the content of this regulatory agency's policies pertaining to the 
cannery strike reflected the backgrounds of the Commission's 
members. 
The direct influence of economic interests upon the police 
policies devised by city officials was less clear than in the case 
of the Welfare Commission. While all of the Seattle and Portland 
mayors from 1919-1920 were drawn from business-related oCCl.~pations, 
their policies did not always benefit the economically dominant class. 
Indeed, police policies under Portland r·1ayor Rushlight aild under 
Seattle Mayors Gill and Cotterill at times were incongruelilt with the 
immediate goals of some employers. In order to understand the 
policies of these mayors it is necessary to consider political 
factors. 
The more purely political aspects of class relations from 
1912-1920 definitely played a part in shaping the police response. 
Linkages between class power, state power, and police actions 
were critical in this regard. In fact, it seems that the two key 
political facts in this study were the inability of the political 
powers that be to respond to the legitimate demands of unorganized 
cannery workers, unemployed persons, and striking lumber workers, 
and concurrently, the willingness of the holders of political power 
to mobilize repressive force against militant workers and radical 
political people who dared to challenge the status quo. 
Antithetical political constituencies in the case of the 
Cotterill administration, the structure of a commission form a 
government in the case of the Albee mayorality, and the war aims 
and international goals of the national political-economic leader-
ship largely seem to have shaped the policy options available to 
the Seattle and Portland authorities. In general:then, these 
political forces helped to forge the context in which police policy 
was formulated and police strategy and tactics were carried out. 
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In regard to the heavy doses of repression that were admin-
istered within this context, a confluence of political and economic 
forces was responsible for police actions. Speciffcally, it is 
necessary to inspect two of the social processes that were in motion 
during the period of 1912-1920. One of these processes can be 
referred to as the IIconsolidation of power. II It should be remembered 
that police policies in 1912-1913 alternated between toleration of 
labor radicals and repression of them. These policy shifts do not 
seem to have been due to the factor of political party affiliation 
since there was no consistent relationship between a mayor's party 
affiliation and the police policy under his administration. The most 
tolerant police policies, for instance, were established in 1912-
1913 by Mayor Cotterill, who was a Democrat and by Mayor Rushlight, 
who was Republican. 
What explains the tolerant policies of some city authorities 
in 1912-l913? This tolerance may have stemmed from the weak ties 
that existed between economic and political interests in 1912-1913. 
During these early years of confl i ct the 1 umber IIbarons, II the 
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shipping magnates, and other major economic interests were neither as 
well-organized themselves nor as conscious of the necessity of protec-
ting their interests through the control of the state apparatus as they 
were in later years. Then, too, the levels of labor unrest and inter-
national class conflict were lower in 1912 than in the post-1916 
years. Additionally, it is doubtful that these large corporate concerns 
could have dominated the municipal governments of Portland and Seattle 
in 1912-1913 even if they had wanted to do so. Working class union 
people, middle class merchants, and other community interests appear 
to have had too tight a grip on the reins of city government in these 
years to have had power wrested away by outside industrial concerns. 
Evidence supporting the latter point can be found in the way that 
the 1913 power struggle was resolved between the Seattle Times, repre-
senting the interests of both the legal and illegal business entrepre-
neurs, and Mayor Cotterill, representing organized labor, middle class 
Progressives, and the municipal government itself. The final resolu-
tion was actually a stalemate with neither side emerging as the winner. 
The implications to be drawn from this political clash are two-fold. 
First, the police policy of minimal intervention during this power 
struggle is in line vlith the proposition that a conflict between class 
and state interests promotes a policy of toleration for labor radical-
ism. Second, in regard to the point at hand about the process of 
consolidating power, it is obvious that class and state interests were 
not firmly united in Seattle in 1912. Stated in another way, the 
economic power of those who owned the forests~ the mills, the shipping 
companies, and the vice operations had not yet been translated into 
political power. 
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What happened to change the power relations between 1912 and 
1917? A series of events at the local, state, national, and 
international levels altered the power arrangements in both Seattle 
and Portland. Some of these events such as the Great Lumber Strike 
of 1917 heightened the class consci.ousness of employers and other 
businessmen, impelling them to pressure municipal officials to use 
the police to blunt the radical threat. Other events such as World 
War I made governmental authorities more susceptible to these 
pressures because of the extreme dependence of the state upon major 
industrial and business concerns. Still other events like the 
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 tended to increase the awareness of the 
state authorities and the major business and industrial firms insofar 
as the necessity of protecting the capitalist system from the 
reovlutionary currents of international radicalism was concerned. 
Taken together, these events fostered a consolidation of power by 
the eco~omically dominant class. 
Another social process that figured into the shaping of police 
actions might be called the IIdecomposition of power. II The IIdecom-
position ll seems appropriate because radical labor's power separated 
into its constituent parts after 1917. More to the point, the moves 
of third parties fueled the process through which the labor radicals 
lost power in Portland and Seattle. To be specific, the media, 
A.F.L. unions, and other community interests in Seattle and Portland 
shifted their positions vis a vis the employers and the labor 
radicals in response to many of the same events that served to 
consolidate power for the dominant economic interests. The war was 
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sufficiently powerful by itself to push the Seattle Star and the 
Portland News from one side of the class confrontation to the other. 
For the A.F.L. affiliates in Seattle, the collapse of the General 
Strike and the fear of reprisals in the strike's aftermath sufficed 
to drive a wedge between the labor radicals and them. The police, 
who were themselves somewhat divided over the issue of how to 
handle labor unrest in 1912-1913, were clearly on the side of the 
economically dominant class by 1920. Federal intervention into 
police affairs and postwar demobilization were two forces \'/hich served 
to insure that the allegiances of police .workers did not vacillate 
between the capitalist class and the working class. 
The intersection of the power consolidation and power decom-
position processes was marked by extreme police repression. The key 
point here is that the working class did affect police policy from 
1912-1920. The working class, acting through coalitions consisting 
of the A.F.L., the I.W.W., and other organizations, provided an 
impetus toward a police policy of toleration of labor radicals in 
1912-1913 and during the Seattle General Strike. Conversely, the 
working class affected police policy in a way that was detrimental 
to the Wobblies, Socialists, and Communists when the working class 
power coalitions decomposed, leaving the labor radicals isolated 
from the rest of the working class and thus subject to repression. 
The fact that heavy police repression tended to occur during the 
times when there was a decline in radical labor power supports the 
proposition that a sudden decrease in labor power leads to a policy 
of repression or a "Thermidorian reaction." 
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As for the repression itself, it was produced by social processes 
that operated in a zigzagging fashion rather than in a slow, evolu-
tionary manner. Police repression did not exist continuously 
through all stages of the conflict between the dominant political 
and economic interests and the labor radicals. Instead, the rhythms 
of repression were spasmodic, not running in any natural order of 
sequence. For example, after a steady period of repression in 
Seattle and Portland from 1917-1918, repression subsided during the 
Seattle General Strike. In fact, the proposition that toleration 
is likely to be adopted as a police policy in a revolutionary situation 
was borne out by the data on police actions during the General 
Strike. 
A related observation on the discontinuity of repression is 
that the authorities were compelled by the labor radicals to suspend 
repressive police acts during the General Strike. This fact seems 
to indicate that the power of the economically dominant class was 
not monolithic even after its' consolidation of political and economic 
resources. Stated in another way, militant workers were able to 
exert influence over police policy even though the employers and 
industrialists had achieved high levels of organization and power 
in 1919. 
Following the General Str'ike the level of repression zoomed 
up in both cities, reaching its zenith in 1919-1920. The high level 
of repression also was partly attributable to the leaders of police 
red squads who exploited the concerns of the employers about 
radicalism in order to promote their own organizational and 
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self-interests. Red squad leaders used repression as a political 
resource.* What happened was that the dramatic "revelations" pro-
duced by the raids and other more sordid adventures of the red 
squads activated employers into the role of benefactors who then 
provided direct assistance to red squad members in the form of 
monetary contributions. As a consequence, the repression seems to 
have literally fed on itself in a self-perpetuating fashion. 
The Structuring of Police Mobilization and Collective Action 
While an examination of the class base of repression points 
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out the general contours of the police response, it does not resolve 
the issues of why and how the police are mobilized to act collectively 
against the labor radicals. It is appropriate to address these 
issues at this point. When specifically considering the matters of 
police mobilization and collective action, the findings from the 
comparative study of Seattle and Portland are somewhat striking. 
They are striking because most of the propositions regarding the 
relationships between police actions and various social factors were 
supported by the data in Chapters IV-IX. 
The data on police mobilization indicate that high levels of 
labor unrest as measured by strike activity tended to be related to 
increases in the size of the Seattle and Portland police departments 
and to the modification of organizational arrangements in order to 
more effectively police labor wars and to suppress radicals. In terms 
*Michael Lipsky conceptualized some of the ways in which protest 
may be used as a resource in IIProtest as a Political Resource," 
American Political Science Review, 62 (December, 1968), pp. 1144-1158. 
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of the effect of labor unrest on size, it appears that most of the 
increases in police manpower that occurred because of strikes were 
due to the hiring of special police on a temporary basis. Hence, 
the effects of labor unrest on departmental size were short-term in 
nature. As for changes in organizational arrangements, it was almost 
customary for the Seattle and Portland police to alter deployment 
practices in precincts in accordance with the exigencies of labor 
unrest. Then, too, reserve forces, war emergency squads, and red 
squads were created for the purpose of dealing with the labor 
radicals. 
One proposition about police mobilization that was not supported 
was the proposition that a high level of labor power calls forth a 
greater emphasis on commitment mechanisms in police departments. 
While there were minor increments in police salaries from 1912 to 
1920, it does not appear that wage increases for the police were 
spurred on by the acquisition of power by the labor radicals. Other 
commitment mechanisms, however, were utilized as substitutes for 
financial incentives by the police. For instanCE, public recognition 
for patriotic service in the pages of the daily newspapers may have 
boosted the morale and loyalty of red squad members. Still, this 
public recognition was accorded to the "red hunters" at a time 
when the level of labor's power was low rather than high. 
Turning to the propositions on collective action, the data 
indicate that increases in the level of labor unrest were related 
to increases in the amount of emphasis placed on proactive police 
strategies. More specifically, police riots and attacks tended to 
decline in importance over the period of 1912-1920, while police 
raids became more frequent and prominent during this same period. 
While it must be acknowledged that police riots and attacks were 
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to some extent police-initiated events, these phenomena largely 
were precipitated by things such as a wagon passing by with a red 
flag attached to it and free speech fighters refusing to obey police 
orders. Conversely, the raids involved a more planned, deliberate 
type of police action than did the riots and attacks. 
The data are less clear with respect to preventive strategies. 
In fact, since the resources devoted to preventive activity were 
not compared over time, there is no way to evaluate the proposition 
that preventiv.~ strategies were stressed when there were low levels 
of unrest. However, one important finding emerged in regard to 
preventive strategies. It was discovered that there were no sharp 
divisions bet~~en proactive strategies which have been typically 
associated with repression and preventive strategies which have 
usually been thought to be associated only with reform and pacifism. 
Indeed, it appears that the utilization of both proactive and 
preventive strategies reaped repressive outcomes in the case of the 
Portland police. 
The significance of this finding resides more in the questions 
that it raises than in the answers it provides to the social 
scientist. If there was no fundamental difference between the out-
comes of these two strategies, what choice did the police have in 
terms of their response to the labor radicals? If there was no 
choice to be made with regard to strategic outcomes, then was the 
element of choice present with respect to the types of political 
251 
action possible for the police? Did the police have a choice between 
reactionary collective action and progressive collective action? 
The data in this study give the impression that the answer to all 
th ree of these ques ti ons is aqua 1 i fi ed "no. II 
The query about the political cast of police actions seems to 
be the pivotal question. During the entire period of 1912-1920 
the outstanding instance of progressive action on the part of the 
city police was the attempt of rank and file police in Portland 
to start a union in 1919. This ende;wor was promptly smashed by 
Hayor Baker and other city authorities. In a somewhat different 
manner, the sympathies of Guy Fuller and other street police for the 
plight of the striking fruit-sorters in Portland became submerged 
in the bureaucratic machinery of a reform administration. Moreover, 
is it difficult to imagine how the police could have behaved 
differently than they did in their encounters with the labor radicals, 
given their own position in the class structure. As the data on the 
years 1919-1920 seem to indicate, the police occupation was in a 
declining position relative to other occupations. This structural 
condition probably further propelled the police to participate in 
reactionary political action. 
Some other propositions that were supported by the findings 
were those on the scope, size, and intensity of police action. 
Specifically, the evidence showed that when the LW.W. broadened 
its scope of mobilization efforts by organizing the unemployed, 
the police also enlarged the scope of their actions by "vagging" 
unemployed persons. No data were collected on the relationship 
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between labor unrest and changes in police arrest practices pertaining 
to the regular labor force. However, it would be surprising if the 
proportion of laborers arrested did not increase during the Great 
Lumber Strike of 1917. 
As for the intensity of police action, one rather interesting 
observation can be gleaned from the data on the violence exhibited 
by the Seattle and Portland police. in 1919-1920. This observation 
is that the proposition about the relative levels of police violence 
under a condition of public hysteria versus a condition of high labor 
unrest may be inappropriate since police violence in 1919-1920 
apparently was neither begat by allred scare ll not caused by labor 
unrest. Instead, police actions vis a vis radicals in 1919-1920 
must be regarded as part of a broad red-hunting movement that was 
mainly sponsored by national political and economic interests. 
Another finding in regard to police violence is that the riotous 
behavior of the Portland police in handling the cannery strike in 
1913 did seem to radicalize some middle class persons who had 
previously been uncommitted to either side in the labor dispute. 
This finding is consistent with the proposition that the use of 
excessive force is likely to radicalize third parties to the class 
struggle.* 
Besides breaking down police response into the above-discussed 
parts, it is useful to take a holistic view of the police response 
to the labor radicals. When police response is considered as a 
*Due to data limitations, th~ other propositions about police 
violence were not explored in the dissertation. 
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single entity, one can not help but be struck by the impression that 
the police response to labor radicalism in 1919-1920 was characterized 
by an incredible amount of structuring. Even the people who controlled 
the police seemed to be controlled at times; even the reforming of 
the structure of municipal government failed to produce a more humane, 
tolerant police response; the only way out for the individual officer 
seemed to be permanent, e.g., quit the department and procure better 
work elsewhere. In sum, the individual police officer's freedom of 
choice in terms of the policy, strategy, and tactics for dealing 
with labor radicals was drastically constrained by structural forces. 
The Police Function Revisited 
This dissertation began with a statement on the importance of 
understanding the police function in terms of economic interests, 
power relations, and class conflict within particular communities. 
Then, too, it has been asserted that linkages between the economically 
dominant class, political leaders and law enforcement officers must 
be regarded as dynami c phenomena whi ch are in moti on, shi fting 
their course and altering the context in which the police policy is 
formulated and carried out by patrolmen and detectives. Above all, 
it has been argued that the interrelatedness of class, state, and 
police power is a central fact in police mobilization and 
collective action. 
The criminal law is one of the concrete points at which an 
analysis of the police must commence in order to fully capture the 
interlocking nature of economic and political phenomena in shaping 
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the police response. In the case of the Seattle and Portland police, 
data on the origins of the criminal syndicalism laws underscored the 
mutual and sometimes reciprocal relations between these social 
phenomena. It was shown that these laws in Oregon and Washington 
emerged in an environment that was large"ly formed by national economic 
and political interests and by international and national, and 
regional class conflict. The actual process of making it a crime 
to be a member of the I.W.W. was managed by state political leaders 
who appear to have been supported by public opinion. Both the state 
politicians and the Oregon and Washington publics, in turn, probably 
were influenced by the ebb and flow of the national red hunting 
movement. The result of these ties between international, national, 
and state level forces was legislation which rendered the hunting 
of Wobblies, Socialists, and Communists to be a legitimate police 
function. 
Another necessary point of concentration in the analysis of 
the police function is the application of criminal law. Here 
differences in power must be taken into account. Police actions in 
regard to the enforcement of criminal syndicalism and vagrancy laws 
in Poy·tland and Seattle amplified the theme that law enforcement 
policy and practices are to some extent influenced by the power of 
labor radicals in relation to the power of the economically driminant 
class, 
With respect to the application of the criminal syndicalism 
laws, the "spy for hire" scheme of Portland police exceeded the 
legal boundaries of the syndicalism statute. This excess was not 
due solely to the abuse of police discretion. Rather these extra 
curricular police activities were the result of the employers' 
direct influence over the police as well as the bureaucratic and 
financial interests of red squad members. At the same time, it 
must be recognized that the Wobblies and the other radi:cals lacked 
the power and status to be able to enter into a similar relation-
ship with the authorities. 
Similarly, the manner in which vagrancy laws were enforced 
protected the most powerful interests in the community. Since 
labor lacked any representation in Portland's commission form 
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of government, there was little chance of the lumber barons being 
"vagged" by the Portland police. This was true even though the 
behavior of many of the mill owners and logging company entrepreneurs 
may have been little different from the behavior of those who 
were arrested for vagrancy. Indeed, the lumberman and the typical 
unemployed protestor in 1913-1915 seem to have shared the status of 
being one who wandered about idly and performed little or no work! 
The important difference between the lumberman and the unemployed 
person, of course, was that the former possessed considerably more 
power than the latter. 
Power relations also affected the application of the law in 
the aftermath of the Seattle General Strike. The municipal author-
ities in Seattle displayed a great deal of selectivity in choosing 
the "whipping boys' for the strike. They sent a hail of repression 
down on the politically marginal and powerless ~/obblies instead of 
attacking the stronger forces that were responsible for the strike. 
As important as power differences were in determining the 
response of the Seattle and Portland police, they do not suffice 
alone as an explanation of police repression. It is important to 
see that the conflict between the capitalist and the working class 
provided the backdrop for the day-to-day maneuvers of the police. 
This conflict was not a static phenomenon;* instead it was a social 
formation, arising from processes which evolved over a period of 
time. 
The police function was enlarged or di~inished, strengthened 
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or weakened, and stressed or downp1ayed depending upon the relations 
between these classes (and to a lesser extent upon the actions of 
other classes and groups such as the middle class and the unemployed). 
In 1912-1913, for instance, the Seattle and Portland police on 
occasion filled the role of a neutral arbiter in skirmishes under 
the conditions of a division between the dominant power interests 
and relatively 10';1 levels of conflict and unrest. By contrast, the 
role of the Seattle and Portland police in 1917-1919 often was that 
of a military warrior, raiding and attacking all opposition to the 
established social order under a different set of social conditions 
than existed in 1912-1913. Gains in cohesion and consensus among 
the dominant political and economic interests, along with much 
higher levels of unrp.st, were reflected in the tendency of the police 
to retain a repressive policy toward labor radicals throughout most 
of this period. 
*Parts of this analysis derive from the thinking of E. P. 
Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1966). 
Care needs to be taken, however, not to pigeonhole police 
response as being totally repressive or tolerant or to stop history 
at a given point and assert that the police function was "thus and 
such" in a given year. It must be recognized that the police 
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function is not a thing. Instead it is a sociological phenomenon 
whose nature can be inferred by observing police actions in the 
context of specific class relations over a period of time. Taking 
this long view of police-radical encounters in Seattle and Portland 
from 1912-1920, it appears that the main continuity in these relations 
was that the police tended to invoke force and violence whenever 
class conflict became irreconcilable.* 
The anti-radical police violence in Portland in 1913 and the 
refusal of the Seattle police to protect the property of Socialists 
in the same year car: be viewed as expressions of the police functioning 
to perpetuate the class system in the specific situations where the 
cannery workers, the free speech fighters, and the Socialists 
refused to accept the pattern of social relations that made up 
their lives. During the period, 1917-1919, the contradictions and 
differences between the capitalist and working cla$~:: became even 
more apparent to both sides to the point where the relations between 
the two became highly conflict-laden. Again, the basic rationale 
of police work in Seattle and Portland under these sorts of conditions 
was the use or potential use of force. This observation is supported 
*Paul Takagi offered this observation in IILEAA's Research 
Solicitation: Police Use of Deadly Force," Crime and Social Justice 
(Spring-Summer, 1979), p. 55. 
by the existence of raids, dragnets, and gargantuan displays of 
police firepower that characterized this period. 
Back to Social Theory 
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As a concluding addendum to this discussion of the police 
function, it seems fitting to offer several observations on the 
apparent as well as the real weaknesses of the present study. First, 
a statement about the generalizeability of the findings is in order. 
An obvious criticism of this research is that police behavior in 
Seattle and Portland from 1912-1920 may not have been representative 
of police behavior in other cities and in other times. This is a 
valid point to make in regard to this study. A closely related, 
yet not entirely appropriate criticism is that this study lacks 
external validity because of the crises that occurred in the period 
that was under investigation. 
The latter criticism is s0mewhat inappropriate because wars 
and massive unemployment are integral parts of the capitalist system 
wTIich have recurred on a fairly regular basis throughout the twentieth 
century in the U.S- Crises in parts of the capitalist system are 
often produced by the system itself in 'order to restore equilibrium 
in other parts of the system. l Specifically, the unemployment 
crisis of 1913-1915 seems to have been precipitated by overproduction, 
while U.S. involvement in World War I was due, in part, to the 
perception that the survival of the capitalist system depended upon 
overseas economic expansion. 2 
Suffice it to note here that crises serve to galvanize class 
conflict in gener~l and to stimulate the police in particular to perform 
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the function of preserving the class system. To support this claim, 
it can be noted that the Portland police employed force against the 
IIHungry Hundred ll in an effort to blunt the thrust of the unemployed 
army's protest during the crisis of 1913-1915. Additionally, World 
War I served as a proximate force that led to a quasi-nationalization 
of the Seattle and Portland police in 1917-1918. The national 
influence that was exerted over the city police and the manifestations 
of this control benefitted the dominant political and economic 
interests in the U.S. While it is clear that the unemployment and 
war crises affected police response in important ways, it is still 
necessary to keep in mind that these crises and the outcomes wrought 
by them were part and parcel of larger conflicts and contradictions 
within the capitalist system in 1912-1920. 
Another possible criticism of this dissertation is that the 
analysis is somewhat mechanical and features an over-socialized 
conception of reality. This is a criticism that is to be expected 
given the limitations of the framework that has been constructed. 
Inasmuch as the mobilization perspective that has been integrated 
into the framework is a purposive model, it is not a surprise that the 
analysis in this dissertation depicts the Seattle and Portland police 
as acting with some sort of design in mind.* Neither is it a shock 
that police actions were seen as serving a specific function in a 
capitalist society in view of the emphasis on Marxian social theory. 
*Much of the commentary in this section is drawn from the 
observations made by Charles Tilly in From Mobilization to Revolution 
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 229-
231. 
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It is hoped that other studnets of police collective action 
will be able to IIbring human beir.gsll into their analysis.* It should 
be pointed out, however, that if accounting for individual differences 
and personality characteristics is a perplexing task in contemporary 
social scientific studies, it is even more difficult in historical 
research. Diaries, scrapbooks, and other similar documents are 
required in order to even begin to measure these types of factors 
in historical studies. There was a paucity of this type of data 
available for the investigation of police response in Seattle and 
Portl and. 
Another problem with the present study of the police response 
to labor radicalism is that there has been no clear delineation 
between the descriptive and causal explanations of police actions.** 
For the most part, the observations about the police response in 
Seattle and Portland were $orted into the categories of interests, 
organization, mobilization, repression, power, and collective action 
itself. This ordering of categories led to the view that the police 
attempted to achieve their interests with the resources available 
to them within the limits set by their class position, their function 
as part of the state apparatus, and so on. A causal explanation 
also implicitly figured into this analysis of police response. In 
*For an argument in favor of bringing human beings back into 
social research, see George C. Homans, IIBringing Men Back In,1I 
Americal Sociol0 ical Review,. 29 (December, 1964), pp. 809-818. 
Also see Dennis Wrong, liT e Oversocialized ·Conception of Man in 
Modern Sociology,1I .~merican Sociological Review, 26 (April, 1961), 
pp.183-l93. 
**This is a general problem of historical interpretation. 
adhering to Marxian social theory, it was stressed that large scale 
social changes affected the interests of organizations contending 
for power and, as a consequence, affected their mobilization and 
collective action. 
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Two points must be understood with respect to both types of 
explanation. First, the descriptive and causal types of explanation, 
as they were utilized in this study, involved two different levels 
of analysis. Whereas the descriptive form mainly operated at the 
organization level, the causal form operated at a social structural 
level. Second, the level of explanation achieved in this dissertation 
reflects a very primitive stage in the development of a theoretical 
perspective on police collective action. Again, however, this is 
a result that is to be expected given the exploratory nature of the 
study. Should students of police response choose to move beyond 
this primitive stage, the tasks of explicating the major dimensions 
of causation, identifying the role of other etiological processes 
such as the proletarianization of police labor, and then specifying 
the linkages bewteen the different levels of analysis remain to be 
accomplished. In addition, the problem of integrating descriptive 
and causal models must bE! resolved in order for knowledge to develop 
cumulatively in this area of police studies. 
With this great amount of unfinished business left for those 
interested in studying police collective action, what should be the 
overarching goal of future research in regard to this area of study? 
This question brings the dissertation around full circle from the 
heights of social structural forces down to the level of the individual 
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social scientist. The best reserach agenda for future police studies 
would seem to be one that includes problems that are relevant to 
the contemporary urban crises. IIRelevant" problems refer, in 
particular, to topics and episodes of police collective action that 
might shed light upon how individual human beings can effectively 
resist some of the large-scale structural transformations of the 
past and present which rob individuals of their power and hope. 
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APPENDIX A 
POLICE - IWW ENCOUNTERS SHEET 
Source: 
Type of Report: News article 
Other 
Editorial 
Page_ Col umn 
Advertisement Notice 
General Description (1-3 sentences describing encounter) 
Type of Event: 
Demonstrations 
Parades 
Assemblies, crowds, mobs=: 
Gatherings 
Rall i es 
Strikes 
Police Actions: 
Isolate and ignore 
Mass arrests (+10) 
General Strikes 
Meetings between police & IWW-
IWW meetings 
Special celebrations 
Police raids 
Other (speci fy) 
Deny workers access to an area 
Arrests 
Seizure of property 
Searches 
Order to disperse 
No. Police Shootings: 
Victim precipitated 
No. Police Killings: 
Yes No 
No. Police Assaults: 
Harrassment (verbal) 
Harrassment (physical) 
Number of Personal Injuries 
Property Damage 
Objective of Police Action: 
Police Strategy: 
Reactive (IWW initiated) 
Proactive (police/mayor or council-initiated) 
Preventive 
Numbers at Scene: 
City Pol ice 
Other Pol i ce 
IWW 
Names of Leaders: 
City Pol ice 
Geographical Location: 
Type of Building: 
Warehouse 
Auditorium 
Private Residence 
Municipal Bu11Jing 
Union Meeting Hall 
Police Headquarters 
Other (specify) 
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APPENDIX B 
POLICE INTERVIEW GUIDE 
1. How much contact did you have with the I.ILlL when you were 
a police officer? (If respondent answers "a lot," ask: 
What do you mean by "a lot"?) 
a) Do you recall any particular police cases involving the 
IJ~.~J. in which you were a participant? If so, please 
describe one or two of these cases. 
2. To what extent, if at all, did you feel that you had to pay 
attention to city politicians or busienssmen in your job? 
a) Did either city politicians or businessmen influence 
how you handled labor disputes involving the I.W.W.? 
b) As far as you know, were there any differences in what the 
Republican politicians wanted the police to do with the 
I.W.W. compared to what the Democrats wanted them to do? 
3. Would you say there was much corruption in the police depart-
ment when you were on the force? If so, what kinds of 
corrpution were there? 
a) Were there any efforts to get rid of some of the corruption 
when you were on the force? 
b) Did any of the reform activities have anything to do with 
the I.W.W.? 
4. Did you feel free to administer the law on the street in 
situations involving the I.W.W. as you saw fit? If not, why 
didn't you feel free to do things as you wanted to? 
5. Did you notice any changes in the police department that were 
made because of the I.W.W.? (Examples of changes: increases 
in size of force, increases in salary, more training, more 
specific plans for handling labor problems, etc.) 
6. What tactics did the police use to handle strikes, riots, street 
meetings, and other types of I.H.W. gatherings? 
a) Did the police use things such as "red" files or "plants" 
(i.e., undercover police officers)? 
7. What tactics, if any, did the police use to "prevent" I.W.W. 
organizing activities? 
a) Did the work that the police were doing with juveniles 
(e.g., supervising juvenile activities in skating rinks, 
shooting galleries, and the like) have anything to do with 
the loW. w. ? 
8. Were you ever involved in a police raid on an I.t~.W. hall? If 
so, 
a-) What happened? 
b) What was the purpose of the raid? 
9. Do you think most of the general public supported the way that 
the police handled the Wobbly situation? 
a) Were there certain groups in the city that were very 
supportive of the police? Were there any groups that were 
critical of the way that the police handled the labor 
disputes involving the I.W.W.? Did any of these groups 
have an important influence on police behavior? 
b) Did the newspapers have any influence on police response 
to the I.W.W. difficulties? 
10. Today, 'jn 1979, professionalism is a very popular idea. Was 
there much emphasis on "professionalizing" the police when you 
were on the force? 
a) What was done to professionalize the force? 
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b) Do you think that these changes (related to professionalism) 
made a difference in how the police responded to the I.W.W.? 
11. Many books have been written about the loW.W. What was the 
I.W.W. really like? What were the goals and objectives of the 
I .W.W.? 
a) Some people have argued that the loW.W. posed a challenge 
to the institution of private property and to the entire 
"free enterprise" system in the United States. How do you 
feel about this statement? Is this the way you felt when 
you were a police officer? 
12. As you know, there was quite a bit of violence in places like 
Everett and Centralia, Washington. Was there much police 
violence against the I.W.W. in (Seattle/Portland)? 
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a) Were there certain events, periods, or years in which you 
think that police violence against the I.W.W. was especially 
high? When? Why? 
b) Did you ever "rough up" or shoot a Wobbly? If so, why 
did you do it? 
